Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
Neuroscientist who does not feel pain: Subjective ontology and the perspective anamorphosis of consciousness
Author(s): Andrija JurićSubject(s): Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Neuropsychology, Ontology
Published by: Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci
Keywords: subjective ontology; first-person perspective; phenomenal quality; mental states; neuroscience;
Summary/Abstract: Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective.
Journal: Sineza
- Issue Year: 5/2024
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 7-29
- Page Count: 23
- Language: English