Incentivizing Publication Activity and the Inevitable Problems
Incentivizing Publication Activity and the Inevitable Problems

Summary/Abstract: This paper examines in a mathematically simplified form the incentive system of publication activity adopted by Bulgarian universities. The methodology of the study is a mathematical analysis of a competitive game between multiple players. All proofs are made in the generalised case. It is shown that in this (and similar) mathematical form of the basic formula for calculating players’ rewards, there exists an optimal number of publications at which each player reaches his maximum profit. It is shown that if individual players do not cooperate but follow competitive behavior, they will realise their maximum profits in a Nash equilibrium. It is shown that in this equilibrium some players will prefer to have zero publication activity, which depends on the costs they incur for their publications. Easy done and cheap publications will be more competitive and more numerous. It has been shown that it is more profitable for players to cooperate and minimise the amount of publications rather than compete. Potential problems and distortions in the implementation of incentives are commented.

• Details
• Contents