DINCOLO DE IDENTITATE: DE LA REVELAREA FIINȚEI LA SINGULARITATEA PERSOANEI
BEYOND IDENTITY: FROM THE DISCLOSURE OF BEING TO THE SINGULARITY OF A PERSON

Summary/Abstract: The article compares two different critiques of the concept of identity: the Heideggerian phenomenological destruction of metaphysical and logical identity and the Lacanian critique of an identity based on particularity, as opposed to the non-identitarian singularity of a person. The first endeavor of the article will be to take the poem of Parmenides as a primary example, where tautological identity can be brought to its most radical conclusions and thus shattered within a linguistic framework that takes speech into account. This will be articulated in the Heideggerian logic of the disclosure of being. The second and parallel endeavor is to show the similarity between Heidegger’s position and Lacan’s analysis of another tautology: not that of being, but that of the naming of a person. This is done with reference to God’s refusal to pronounce his name in front of Moses in Exodus, saying only "I am what I am", ’ehye ’ăšer ’ehye, and through Lacan’s close reading of the tragedy of Antigone, where the naming of her brother brings us close to the same impossibilities that can be found in the naming of being.

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