KVAJNOVA NATURALISTIČKA EPISTEMOLOGIJA I SKEPTICIZAM
QUINE’S NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND SKEPTICISM

Summary/Abstract: When it comes to Quine’s position on the naturalization of epistemological research, it is generally considered that as the first and most important step, that position implies the abandonment of Cartesianism and the skepticism it implies. However, here we will argue that such a diagnosis is inappropriate, and that, in principle at least, Quine’s attitude towards skepticism, even of the Cartesian type, is much more flexible than is usually thought, and perhaps even than Quine himself thought. In this regard, we will try to show how Quine was actually the one who accepted what Barry Stroud called the ‘conditional correctness of skepticism (Cartesianism)’ and not the logical positivists, and that the main reason for this is that he recognized the autonomy of the discourse (epistemology’s meta-context) established by Descartes.

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