DVA REZULTATA NEMOGUĆNOSTI U TEORIJI DRUŠTVENOG ODLUČIVANJA
TWO IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

Summary/Abstract: In this paper we deal with some problems of public choice theory. We start with exposition of Arrow's impossibility result which was the starting point in constitution of a whole problematic: the impossibility of existence of a social welfare function. We will mention one solution to the paradox, proposed by Duncan Black, namely, the existence of single-peaked structure of preferences. Then we will pass to another impossibility result-that of impossibility of aggregation of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions. We will introduce the idea that this problem represents a larger frame in which the problem of aggregating preferences can be embedded. We will expose one solution to that paradox as well – the existence of unidimensional alignment in the structure of individuals. The main question then is by what means do we achieve this kind of a structure? We will propose a skecth for a future study in which a belief revision theory play important role in finding a solution to these problems.

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