Should we avoid the terms ‘justice’ and ‘harm’ when promoting restorative justice to jurists of the Romano-Germanic legal tradition?
Should we avoid the terms ‘justice’ and ‘harm’ when promoting restorative justice to jurists of the Romano-Germanic legal tradition?

Summary/Abstract: Many jurists, especially those coming from the Romano-Germanic (or civil law) legal tradition, are sceptical of restorative justice or simply do not fully understand it, especially in criminal matters, even though it is part of supranational normative documents and laws in many countries. Does the language we use play a role in jurists’ reluctance to embrace restorative justice? What do legal professionals and scholars understand behind the vocabulary we usually use in the restorative justice literature? We will argue that both the terms ‘justice’ and ‘harm’ can be problematic from a legal perspective because they can lead to concepts that may cause confusion or misunderstanding about restorative justice and should therefore be reconsidered. On the one hand, the ‘justice’ part of the term restorative justice – which has already been criticised by restorative justice scholars – presents some questionable ontological assumptions from a legal perspective. On the other hand, jurists tend to understand the term ‘harm’ as referring to private relationships and thus to negotiated transactions and monetary compensation of a civil nature, rather than to criminal activity. So how can we better communicate to jurists the essence of restorative justice in criminal matters in a way that respects their mindset and language?

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