Веза између независности Народне банке Србије и кретања инфлације
Relationship Between The Independence Of The National Bank Of Serbia And Inflation
Author(s): Maja Drobnjaković, Branislav VeselinovićSubject(s): Economy
Published by: Универзитет у Нишу
Keywords: monetary policy; independence of central banks; political cycles; monetary aggregates, behaviour of inflation
Summary/Abstract: Economic theory initially supported the hypothesis of a negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation, but later had ―second thoughts‖, due to the rising complexity of the present economic systems. Lately, the new ―political macroeconomics‖ has focused more on the effects of political influence on the monetary aggregates and the amount of inflation, than on the codes of good economic practice. For this reason, the paper presents a comparison of ―quantified‖ independences of central banks in the countries of Southeast Europe, as well as central banks in the most powerful countries in the world (according to a specified methodology), and places emphasis on examining the interdependence of the degree of independence of the National Bank of Serbia and inflation, including the possibilities of inflation targeting. This topic includes the analysis of inflation-stabilization trade-off, central banks independence, and inflation targeting.
Journal: Teme - Časopis za Društvene Nauke
- Issue Year: 2014
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 1523-1539
- Page Count: 17
- Language: Serbian