Рефлексивността - епистемична добродетел или конститутивна кръговост на описания и реалност?
Reflexiveness - Epistemic Virtue, or a Constitutive Circularity of Descriptions and Reality?

Summary/Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the notion of reflexivity as used by Bourdieu to great extent remains within the boundaries of its classical interpretation as academic virtue, clearing the way to an epistemically priviled point of view. The reason is that it is operating within one specific sort of social ontology. I argue that this notion could become an entrance to a much more versatile social realm. First, I introduce the general outlines of two different conceptions of reflexivity, arising from different ontological projects. Then I summarize the main points and initial assumptions on which Bourdieu (stubbornly) insists. Finally, I attempt to present roughly some assumptions and main intuitions of an ontology, which is more adequate ground for a notion of reflexivity, more relevant to the complexity of the social.

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