THE SOVIET FACTOR IN THE 12 MARCH 1934 COUP D’ÉTAT IN ESTONIA Cover Image

NÕUKOGUDE FAKTORIST EESTI 12. MÄRTSI 1934. AASTA RIIGIPÖÖRDES
THE SOVIET FACTOR IN THE 12 MARCH 1934 COUP D’ÉTAT IN ESTONIA

Author(s): Magnus Ilmjärv
Subject(s): History
Published by: Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus
Keywords: Estonia; Estonian History; SOVIET FACTOR ; 12 MARCH 1934 COUP D’ÉTAT IN ESTONIA

Summary/Abstract: The article examines the role played by the Soviet Union in the coup d’état that took place in Estonia on 12 March 1934. The following questions are dealt with: What was the Soviet Union’s attitude toward the Estonian political parties in 1933 and at the beginning of 1934? What were the foreign policy views of the veterans of the War of Independence (vabadussõjalased)? How did the Soviet Union try to help Konstantin Päts to remain in power? Did the planners of the coup d’état attempt to discover what the Soviet Union’s response to the coup would be? Did Moscow’s orders for Estonian goods play any role in the execution of the coup? Was Moscow cognizant of the coup? And, finally: What did the legations of Germany, Poland and England know about the possibility of a coup d’état? The years 1933–1934 were tense and complex in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas in Estonia. In domestic policy this was evidenced by the constitutional crisis, the discontent of the populace because of the economic crisis and, certainly, in the battle of the various political groupings over power. But it was certainly also evidenced by the assiduous attempts of the Soviet Union, Germany and Poland to exert influence on the domestic policies of the Baltic States. One object of study is the claim of historiographers that from Moscow’s viewpoint it made no difference who became the president of Estonia, that is the domestic policy fight in Estonia was of no vital importance to the Soviet Union. The assertion of historiographers that, from Moscow’s point of view, it was desirable that Päts should become president but that there was no great difference between him and the other candidates proves to be untrue. Similarly, the assertion that for the Soviet Union the internal political battles in Estonia were not of great importance is not acceptable. It is true on a global scale but on the Baltic or East European scale these were indeed considered to be very important. The 1933 reports of the Soviet legation in Tallinn as well as the instructions from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the legation continuously emphasized that while the coming to power of the right wingers could not be avoided, this development would be most undesirable for relations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States. For an explanation as to why the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs found it necessary to support Päts in the Estonian presidential elections one must point first of all to his former ties to the Soviet legation and trade delegation. No other Estonian leading political figures or higher government officials of the time had, during the 1924–1934 period, such special relations with the Soviet legation in Tallinn.

  • Issue Year: 2010
  • Issue No: 15
  • Page Range: 073-104
  • Page Count: 32
  • Language: Estonian