Więcej władzy niż własności – Skarb Państwa jako szczególny inwestor na GPW w Warszawie
More control than ownership: State as a specific investor on Warsaw Stock Exchange

Summary/Abstract: The empirical research presented in this paper covers six biggest and most important public companies (listed at Warsaw Stock Exchange) in which the state is a minority but dominant shareholder. We analyse these companies’ charters to identify provisions which give the state shareholder different privileges. The study also covers the analysis of voting records of the last few General Shareholders Meetings concerning the elections of company bodies. It is found that the scope of the state control in the analyzed companies is significantly larger than its share in ownership. It means that the dominant shareholder – the state – uses a control leverage in these companies. We conclude that the state “captures” the basic supervisory authority – the supervisory board – with negative effect on firms’ functioning and performance on the stock exchange.

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