Gyvūniškoji negalia: gyvūno klausimas Jacques’o Derrida filosofijoje
Animal impotentiality: The question of the animal in Jacques Derrida’s philosophy

Summary/Abstract: The essay discusses the question of the animal in Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. On the one hand, Derrida makes an explicit critique of what he calls “animal genocide” – the industrial production and massive annihilation of animals. On the other hand, Derrida refuses to discuss this killing of animals in terms of animal rights, arguing that the very notion of rights should be reconsidered. Every discussion of rights already presupposes the dispositif of power, whereas the animal is defined in terms of incapacity or inability. Referring to Jeremy Bentham, Derrida argues that the main question related to animals is whether animals can suffer. Suffering is not a power; it is passivity, a suspension or an impossibility of power. In this sense the question of the animal should be discussed not in terms of power but in terms of the suspension of power or impotentiality. Reading Heidegger’s theses on animality, Derrida points out that a certain impotentiality as an experience of finitude and mortality is common both to man and animal. By contrast, Agamben, in discussing the notion of impotentiality, defines it as a specific feature that divides man from animal: according to Agamben, human beings are the animals who are capable of their own impotentiality. The essay opposes Agamben’s insights and argues that it is impotentiality or incapacity which creates the common ground for humans and animals and implies the impossibility of establishing hierarchies and separations.

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