Are groups smarter or just adept faster? Cover Image

Okosabbak-e a csoportok, vagy csak gyorsabban alkalmazkodnak?
Are groups smarter or just adept faster?

Author(s): Csanád Dénes Gálffy, Edmond Nagy Beczkai, Imre Péntek
Subject(s): Education, Methodology and research technology, Management and complex organizations, Human Ecology, Identity of Collectives
Published by: Medea Egyesület
Keywords: behavioral game theory; equilibrium strategy; strategic adaptation; group decision

Summary/Abstract: People systematically violate two important presumptions of game theory namely that players care only for there own payoffs and players are rational and the rationality of players is common knowledge. As a consequence people deviate from equilibrium strategies in different games during strategic interactions. We will argue that competing groups as well as individuals deviate from equilibrium strategies in the same way, but groups can learn and adapt much faster then individual players in repeated games. Intra-group communication facilitates reflective metacognitive thinking of group members, when strategic decisions have to be made consensually. Thus groups tend to reach equilibrium strategy in significantly fewer iterations then individual players.

  • Issue Year: IV/2009
  • Issue No: 4
  • Page Range: 17-26
  • Page Count: 10
  • Language: Hungarian