Eksplanacija kao unifikacija i eksplanatorni pluralizam: redukcija, asimilacija ili dinamička sinteza?
EXPLANATION AS UNIFICATION AND EXPLANATORY PLURALISM: REDUCTION, ASSIMILATION OR DYNAMIC SYNTHESIS?

Summary/Abstract: In the first part of this paper I introduce the notion of a scientific phenomenon, defining it as any product of social dynamics that is perceived as an explanatory element in the knowledge production mechanism, and I briefly explain the thesis based on the introduction of the concept of dynamic synthesis versus the concepts of unification and transdisciplinary integration. In the second part I set up a framework for the defense of my proposal, where I deal with the topic of the unification of knowledge and more recent controversies related to it, especially considering what makes the growing unification of knowledge about nature a problematic concept. I compare, comment on and criticize the explanatory unification thesis and its claims that explanations contribute to our understanding of the world by embedding phenomena into general nomic patterns that we recognize in the world (Kitcher 1989; Schurz 1999; Bartelborth 2002), including observations made on it related to the asymmetric structure of explanations. I comment on the notions of the asymmetrical structure of explanations, and on Bayesian calculation of the epistemological "virtue" of unification (Myrvold 2004). I also tackle the interfield theory issue (Darden and Maull 1977) and compare exploratory relevance (Nathan 2017) and constitutive relevance (Kauffman 1971) commenting on Elsasser's proposal to overcome reduction by the formalization of complexity through the undifferentiated heterogeneity of logical classes (Elsasser 1981). In the third part I defend the "virtues" of modeling the dynamics of synthesizing knowledge across the boundaries of research fields and I advocate fuzzy logic in the dynamic modeling of scientific phenomena.

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