АГЕНЦИЈСКИ ПРОБЛЕМ У УГОВОРНОМ ОДНОСУ АДВОКАТА И КЛИЈЕНТА
The Agency Problem in Lawer-Client Contractual Relation

Summary/Abstract: In this article, the authors analyze different methods of paying lawyer fees for legal services in the US law and Serbian law by observing the issue from the aspect of the Economic Analysis of Law (EAL) theory. The primary objective is to determine the economic implications underlying different methods of payment for lawyer services in terms of frequency of legal representation in court proceedings and settlement proceedings, economic incentives for client representation and lawyers’ performance in client representation. The focal point of this analysis is the principal-agent problem in the lawyer-client contractual relationship, which eventually raises the question concerning the roots of this problem. Drawing upon the relevant literature and empirical research on this matter, the authors discuss the economic implications of different methods of payment for lawyers’ professional services which are envisaged in the Serbian Advocacy Act (2011) and the Code of Lawyer’ Professional Ethics. The authors explore whether the current legal solutions aimed at minimizing the agency problem are based on the underlying logic of the economic analysis of law.

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