THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NEGLIGENCE RULES Cover Image

ЕКОНОМСКИ ЕФЕКТИ РАЗЛИЧИТИХ ПРАВИЛА О ОДГОВОРНОСТИ ЗА НЕПАЖЊУ
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NEGLIGENCE RULES

Author(s): Ljubica Nikolić, Aleksandar Mojašević
Subject(s): Economy, Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Law on Economics
Published by: Правни факултет Универзитета у Нишу
Keywords: precaution; harm; liability; efficiency; incentives; costs

Summary/Abstract: This study comparatively analyzes economic effects of different negligence rules, contained in American law on the one hand, and Serbian law on the other. It is important to establish economic implications of the different negligence rules, based on the incentives for tortfeasor’s and victim’s precaution under the different negligence rules. Study of the efficiency of several different forms of negligence rules: simple negligence, negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, comparative negligence and strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, is based on the economic models, which have been developed by Law and Economics scholars. The expected social costs of accidents represent the basic criterion for evaluation of the efficiency of negligence rules. The first part of the study deals with the economic implications of different negligence rules in respect to the preventive effects and the allocation of the tort liability. In the second part, the economic implications of the simple negligence, the negligence with a defense of contributory negligence and the comparative negligence are presented. The third part encompasses the economic implications of the strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. The analysis of the negligence rules is followed by the examination of the American case law. Finally, the author states the general conclusion regarding the role of courts in the prevention of expected harm.

  • Issue Year: LXIII/2012
  • Issue No: 63
  • Page Range: 63-81
  • Page Count: 19
  • Language: Serbian
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