Brytyjsko-niemiecki układ morski z 18 czerwca 1935 roku
Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935
Author(s): Krystian Maciej SzudarekSubject(s): History
Published by: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Keywords: Great Britain; Germany; Anglo-German relations; disarmament; rearmament; appeasement
Summary/Abstract: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed on 18 June 1935 in London through the exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare and the representative of the Third Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop. In this agreement the British government accepted Germany’s right to grow their Navy up to the level equalling 35% of the aggregate naval strength of the members the British Commonwealth of Nations. From a military perspective it meant that Germany could increase their Kriegsmarine’s global tonnage fourfold (from 108,000 tonnes limit set in the Treaty of Versailles to 420,500 tonnes). From an official and legal point of view it meant a revision of the Treaty of Versailles and legalisation of Adolf Hitler’s renunciation of the Part V of the Treaty of Versailles in March 1935 by Great Britain. The political dimension highlighted a trend in British policy to seek an agreement with Berlin through a revision of the Versailles order within the so-called policy of Appeasement. It also meant a break in the joint British, French and Italian front towards Germany and a move away from a policy of agreement between western powers on revising military caveats of the Treaty of Versailles in exchange for some concessions by Adolf Hitler (Germany’s return to the League of Nations and to the Disarmament Conference and Germany’s accession to the regional security pacts: the Air Pact, the Eastern Pact and the Danubian Pact. This article presents the background to this agreement from the British point of view and the analysis of the logic that made British government accept Hitler’s demands and conclude the agreement on German terms. British government signed the agreement taking into consideration political, strategic, military and economic factors. Great Britain was not keen to react to the remilitarisation of Germany with sanctions. London believed that concluding the agreement on German terms is the only alternative to the unlimited growth of the Germany Navy. British ministers considered the rejection of the German “offer” off the table due to the view of their public opinion in the run-up to the General Election. Signing the agreement on German terms was accepted by the British Admiralty where the deal was analysed in a broader perspective through the lenses of the Japanese threat to the Far East. Foreign Office, on the other hand, assumed that a bilateral agreement with Berlin would be a good opening towards a general settlement with Germany that would embrace other elements including the Air Pact so significant for the security of Britain.
Journal: Studia Maritima
- Issue Year: 30/2017
- Issue No: 1
- Page Range: 151-189
- Page Count: 39
- Language: Polish