System kar pieniężnych w polskiej ustawie o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów – potrzeba i kierunek dalszych zmian
System of pecuniary sanctions in Polish competition law – the need and direction for further changes

Summary/Abstract: In its initial part, the article discusses the drawbacks and inconsistencies in the sanctioning system provided by the current Act on Competition and Consumers Protection (the “Act”). In the Act, pecuniary fines are expressed as a % of the turnover, as a lump-sum, or a multiplication of the average income; some are set out in PLN, others in EUR. Such an inconsistent approach may thus lead to unfair differences in the fines imposed by the UOKiK President (President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection). The paper explains also that pecuniary sanctions and their execution should be carefully balanced with other types of sanctions envisaged for antitrust violations in a given jurisdiction. In the following part of the paper, the Author anticipates possible (and required) changes in the actual execution of fines, in particular those that are promoted by the amended Act. One of the crucial issues here is the establishment of the base amount for the fine calculation. It is claimed that proportionality and fairness should make the sanctioning authority look at the income reached from the sales of the goods/services subject of the violation. The paper strives also to identify major problems surrounding sanctioning policy in antitrust enforcement in the EU and the US. Many competition authorities and legislator continue to work on designing the most effective measures possible to discourage antitrust violations, which are often repeatedly committed by the same companies. Indeed, apart from effectiveness, the fine should be fair and proportional, a consideration to which the rest of the paper is devoted. Hence, several questions arise in light of Polish jurisprudence in this area: should the fine for the same type of violation have the same reference base; should the first violation of a given type be sanctioned more leniently, or should fines for procedural actions be kept in proportion to fines for substantive violation. The paper’s purpose is not to answer these questions in an exhaustive manner but to make legislators aware of a broader context and interdependencies of their sanctioning policy in order to create effective, but also fair and proportional, enforcement of competition rules in Poland

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