Can Expected Utility Maximization be Used as a Criterion of Rationality? Cover Image

POATE FI UTILIZATĂ MAXIMIZAREA UTILITĂŢII AŞTEPTATE CA UN CRITERIU AL RAŢIONALITĂŢII?
Can Expected Utility Maximization be Used as a Criterion of Rationality?

Author(s): Dragoş Bîgu
Subject(s): Social Philosophy
Published by: Editura Academiei Române
Keywords: expected utility theory; rationality; Allais paradox; dynamic inconsistency; prospect theory;

Summary/Abstract: In this article, I analyze whether expected utility theory can be used as a criterion of rational choice. More precisely, I examine whether the conclusion that a certain behavior is irrational can be drawn based on the fact that it conflicts with expected utility maximization rule. My answer is negative. First, many actions that seem incompatible with expected utility theory can be accommodated in this framework. Secondly, agents that do not follow, in their choices, the utility maximization rule are not necessarily irrational.

  • Issue Year: LXIII/2016
  • Issue No: 3
  • Page Range: 269-280
  • Page Count: 12
  • Language: Romanian, Moldavian
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