Zakres i cel działania komisji nadzoru finansowego w wypełnianiu funkcji nadzoru korporacyjnego w otwartych funduszach emerytalnych
The role of the financial supervision authority in pension fund governance. Example of open pension funds
Author(s): Adam SamborskiSubject(s): Financial Markets
Published by: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe
Keywords: agency theory; agency problem; conflict of interest; open pension fund; general pen¬sion society; financial supervision authority
Summary/Abstract: The relationships in which the open pension fund (OFE) and the general pension society (PTE) enter are very complex and take the form of an inter-organizational agency relationship. OFE has legal personality. It is equipped with only one body. PTE is the body of OFE. PTE is organized in the form of a joint-stock company. PTE creates, manages and represents OFE to third parties. The legislator did not provide the OFE with an body that would represent the interests of fund members. Therefore, on the basis of laws, significant supervisory powers over the activities of open pension funds assigned to the Financial Supervision Authority (KNF). The scope of KNF’s tasks was defined very broadly and divided into typically supervisory, analytical, educational, cooperative and informational tasks. The deliberations at work were embedded in the positive theory of the agency, focusing on the mechanisms limiting the agency’s conflict. Governance mechanisms were defined as legal institutions whose purpose is to protect the interests of OFE members. It was assumed that in the OFE – PTE relationship, a member of an open pension fund is a principal and a general pension society is an agent. The aim of the study is to determine the place and role of the Financial Supervision Authority in the governance of open pension funds.
Journal: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
- Issue Year: 2018
- Issue No: 108
- Page Range: 299-318
- Page Count: 20
- Language: Polish