NEDOUMICE О STALJINOVOJ POLITICI UOČI DRUGOG SVETSKOG RATA
STALIN’S AMBIGUOUS POLICY ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR TWO

Summary/Abstract: The author examines Russian historiography regarding the politics of major European countries before the Second World War, with particular attention to Stalin’s policy. The analysis starts with the Munich Agreement which, according to many historians, deepened Stalin’s distrust of England and France. Stalin’s policy is shown to have been directed towards achieving collective security in Europe, an idea which west-European powers rejected, deciding instead to drive Hitler to the east of Europe. Stalin did not think a great deal of the military power of either France or Great Britain but he feared a possible coalition of capitalist countries turning against the USSR. Driven by the knowledge that his country was vulnerable and unprepared for war, Stalin accepted the pact with Hitler in August 1939. However, this move was also prompted by his wish to gain time and get ready for the war, which according to some historians was obviously imminent. The idea of a preventive war against Germany was considered by Moscow but soon abandoned, as a result of the conviction that the West would not accept it. The pact with Hitler and the dividing of interest spheres in East Europe were defined in two secret protocols. In resorting to this solution, Stalin had adopted Hitler’s methods, renouncing Leninist principles of foreign policy, an action severely criticized by Soviet historians in the early nineties. According to the Polish historian, J. Zamoiski, Stalin’s plan was to postpone the war until 1942 but Hitler deceived him, grasping the initiative and directing events to suit his own designs. Supplements to this work are the Nonaggression Treaty signed between Germany and the USSR on 23 August, 1939 and the Amendment to this treaty the secret protocol signed on the same day.

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