Preparing for War in the 1930s The myth of the Independence War and Laidoner’s “active defence”
Preparing for War in the 1930s The myth of the Independence War and Laidoner’s “active defence”

Summary/Abstract: The ability to draw the right lessons from the First World War has been pinpointed as a key factor in the military effectiveness of armed forces in the inter-war period. Estonia can be seen as another case of a country leaning on the concepts and practices that had brought success in the previous war but rendered anachronistic by the rapid social and military developments preceding the Second World War. However, as the Estonian leadership chose not to fight in 1939-1940, estimates of the Estonian army’s fighting power rest on indirect evidence and will always remain speculative. The decision to capitulate before the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union can even be interpreted as a sign of prudence and recognition of the limitations of a small country. On the other hand, the trumping up of the myths and the spirit of the Independence War, questionable operational and tactical ideas displayed by the army commanders, and the unimaginative and overoptimistic scenarios at army manoeuvers that were noted by foreign military attachés, do call for a critical analysis of the Estonian imaginations and preparations for future war in the 1930s.

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