EPISTEMOLOGIA SOCIALĂ ORIENTATĂ DE INTERES
Interest-Oriented Social Epistemology

Summary/Abstract: Interest-oriented social epistemology was initiated by naturalistic philosophers of science and sociologists of scientific knowledge, such as David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Steve Shapin, and David Edge of the Strong Program (SP), who hold that scientific methods are means for achieving social goals. In this perspective, social factors such as interests and aims, things that are specific to a society, play a primary causal role in the explanation of scientific belief. SP plays the role of a descriptive naturalistic metascience (that is, a science of science), a successor to traditional philosophy of science. For SP seen as a representative main branch of the sociology of scientific knowledge, scientific rationality is found in the social context of scientists. The main opponent of the SP is rationalist philosophy of science, represented by Larry Laudan and Ernan McMullin. They hold that rational explanation explains the success of science, and that social explanation explains the failure of science. This chapter examines whether the SP lives up to its own standards and then whether it avoids the charge of a self-refuting relativism. In addition, I explicate Fuller’s solution to the problem of relativism, a problem that Fuller must address. („Interest-Oriented Social Epistemology”, chapter 2 of the book: Francis Remedios, Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology, Lexington Books, 2003, p. 29–46. Translation into Romanian by Henrieta Anișoara Șerban).

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