O onome što bi bilo pre svega u filozofiji matematike
On What Should Be Before All In The Philosophy Of Mathematics

Summary/Abstract: In the philosophy of mathematics, as in its a meta-domain, we find that the words as: consequentialism, implicativity, operationalism, creativism, fertility, … grasp at most of mathematical essence and that the questions of truthfulness, of common sense, or of possible models for (otherwise abstract) mathematical creations, i.e. of ontological status of mathematical entities etc. – are of a second order. Truthfulness of (necessary) succession of consequences from causes in the science of nature is violated yet with Hume, so that some traditional footings of logico-mathematical conclusions should equally be falled under suspicion in the last century. We have in mind, say, strict-material implication which led the emergence of relevance logics, or the law of excluded middle that denied intuitionists i.e. paraconsistent logical systems where the contradiction is allowed, as well as the quantum logic which doesn't know, say, the definition of implication etc. Kant's beliefs miscarried hereafter that number (arithmetic) and form (geometry) would bring a (finite) truth on space and time, when they revealed relative and curvated, just as it is contradictory essentially understanding of basic phenomena in the nature: of light as an unity of wave – particle, or that both „exist“ and „don't exist“ numbers as powers of sets between א0 and c (the independence of continuum hypothesis) etc. Mathematical truths are „truths of possible worlds“, in which we have only to believe that they will meet once recognizable models in reality. At last, we argue in favour of thesis that a possible representing „in relief“ of mathematical entities and relations in the „noetic matter“ (Aristotle) would be of a striking heuristic character for this science.

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