DEMOCRAŢIA ÎN STARE DE URGENŢĂ ŞI COOPERAREA LOIALĂ ÎNTRE INSTITUŢIILE STATULUI
DEMOCRACY UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE LOYAL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AUTHORITIES

Summary/Abstract: Starting from the premise that democracy cannot be effective and sustainable unless the people trust state institutions, the present article aims to reemphasize the duty of constitutional loyalty, frequently evoked in the case law of the Constitutional Court of Romania. It presents the constitutional enshrinement of the democratic regime in Romania; it exposes a backsliding in the public authorities’ exercise of prerogatives established by the Constitution and it shows the solutions ruled by the constitutional litigation court when dealing with legal conflicts of a constitutional nature. In the current normative framework, while insisting on the fact that the exceptional measures should not be found outside of the extant constitutional and legal order, it presents and briefly analyses the presidential decrees by which the state of emergency was declared and sustained, and the parliamentary decisions which agree with the measure decreed by the President of Romania with regard to the state of emergency on the whole territory of Romania. Without detailing the complexity of the legal consequences that derive from states of emergency, one underlines that such situations are not and should not be an excuse neither for abandoning the rules of democracy, nor for the public authorities’ disregard for the duty of constitutional loyalty.

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