Substance vs. Manifestation: Some Pages of “Person’s” History
Substance vs. Manifestation: Some Pages of “Person’s” History
Author(s): Kateryna RassudinaSubject(s): Anthropology, Philosophy, Social Sciences, Psychology, History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Epistemology, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Cultural Anthropology / Ethnology, Psychology of Self, Phenomenology
Published by: Национално издателство за образование и наука „Аз-буки“
Keywords: consciousness; manifestation; person; substance
Summary/Abstract: There are two ways in which a concept of “person” can be considered: substantial and demonstrative-relative ones. The former is based on the apprehension of the person as a being, on the search for the ultimate reasons of its existence. The latter refuses to consider these issues, thus describes the person as a phenomenon, a process of changing the states of consciousness. The danger of demonstrative-relative approach is that, examining only person’s manifestations, we risk not seeing the essence under poorly visible phenomena. Contemporary philosophers therefore should use substantial conception, despite the fact that it may seem ancient and old-fashioned.
Journal: Философия
- Issue Year: 29/2020
- Issue No: 3
- Page Range: 240-248
- Page Count: 9
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF