Kripke vs. Russell în problema referinţei
Kripke vs. Russell on Reference

Summary/Abstract: Our paper approaches B. Russell’s theory of descriptions (definite descriptions are not genuinely referring expressions, as are logically proper names, and sentences containing them are logically equivalent to complex general statements containing existential and universal quantifiers that do not refer directly to things in the world), along with both P. F. Strawsons’ criticism (with his main distinction between meaning and reference pinning down the source of Russell’s error, i.e., not words by themselves refer, but people using them in particular occasions) and S. Kripke’s criticism (unlike descriptions, proper names are rigid designators that refer directly to the same object in every possible world), and it attempts to argue that Russell’s theory may still be valid if we conceive it as an account of a second-order relation with objects.

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