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Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1950-1961 Cover Image
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Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961.
Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1950-1961

Contributor(s): Slobodan Selinić (Editor), Radmila Radić (Editor), Dragan Bogetić (Editor), Dragomir Bondžić (Editor), Aleksandar Životić (Editor), Vladimir Lj. Cvetković (Editor)
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, History, Diplomatic history, Political history, Recent History (1900 till today), Special Historiographies:, International relations/trade, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
Published by: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije
Keywords: Balkan Pact; Yugoslavia; Josip Broz Tito; Khruschev; Belgrade Declaration; Cominform; Cold War; Non-Aligned Movement
Summary/Abstract: The collection of paper consists of 34 articles written by Serbian, Russian, Bulgarian, Israeli, Greek, Finish, Czech, Montenegrin, Croatian and Slovenian historians about different aspects of the foreign policy of the socialist Yugoslavia in the period between 1950 and 1961. In the focus of the researchers’ interests were the issues of the normalization of the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its allies after the confrontation which lasted from 1948 to 1953, the opening of Yugoslavia towards Western world, the way of the creation of the new concept of Yugoslav foreign policy based on the bloc non-alignment concept and the participation of Yugoslavia in the creation of the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey (1953-1954).

  • Print-ISBN-13: 978-86-7005-058-7
  • Page Count: 627
  • Publication Year: 2008
  • Language: English, Russian, Serbian
Predgovor

Predgovor
(Preface)

  • Author(s):Ljubodrag D. Dimić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Fascism, Nazism and WW II, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:25-46
  • No. of Pages:22
  • Summary/Abstract:U srpsku i jugoslovensku istoriografi ju zakoračuje nova generacija istoričara. Ubeđena je, kao i sve prethodne, da će dosegnuti one stručne visine sa ko jih se vidi „kako svetlost praskozorja pobeđuje tamu”. Zaželimo joj dobrodošlicu. Ukažimo joj poverenje. Podržimo njena interesovanja za nove teme, pitanja i probleme. Združimo njene stvaralačke energije sa onima koje sami ulažemo pokušavajući da saznamo prošlost. Pomozimo joj da što pre idejama svoga vremena i osobenim senzibilitetom obogati istoriografi ju, koja je plodotvorna jedino ukoliko predstavlja „vrenje svesti” više generacija istoričara koji stvaraju u jednoj kulturi.
  • Price: 5.00 €
Drugi jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob

Drugi jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob
(The Second Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict)

  • Author(s):Dragan Bogetić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:49-65
  • No. of Pages:17
  • Keywords:The Second Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict; Josip Broz; Khruschev; Peaceful Coexistence Policy
  • Summary/Abstract:After ten years, the same issues, typical of the sharp confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1948, characterized the second Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, as this sudden deterioration of relations between Belgrade and Moscow in 1958 was often termed in the West. However, this time the conflicts were less severe and less dangerous than the previous one, but their essence and issues were mainly the same. The cause for renewed discontinuation of cooperation between the states and parties of Yugoslavia and the USSR was Yugoslavia’s rejection to sign the Declarations of 12 communist parties at the conference in Moscow held in November 1957, and the adoption of the Program of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) at the Seventh Congress in Ljubljana in April 1958. However, the main reason of the confl ict between Khrushchev and Tito appeared due to the total failure of the Soviet action to get Yugoslavia back to the camp of socialist states and to persuade the Yugoslavs to renounce the politics of avoiding firm alliance with any of the two blocs. All the Khrushchev’s illusions of Yugoslavia’s return to the socialist circle definitely dispelled when the Yugoslav communists, instead of signing the Moscow declaration that had the character of the constitutive act of the new Cominform, adopted the Program of SKJ, i.e. a document of completely different content, with stress on communist parties’ independent choice of their path to socialism. In the scope of a fierce campaign against the Yugoslav „revisionist leadership” Moscow undertook a series of foreign-policy measures in an effort to hamper Yugoslavia’s international activities and consolidation of its internal order as much as possible. During 1958 and 1959 previously concluded spectacular credit arrangements have been cancelled, the scope of commodity trade has been reduced, the practice of exchange of top-level state visits has been discontinued and permanent political pressure has been exerted, very much like the one practiced in Stalin’s time. Such policy was fully adopted by other socialist countries, even those which have formerly followed some elements of the Yugoslav politics in certain segments of political system.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Нaчалний период нормализации советско югославских отношений (1953–1954 гг.)

Нaчалний период нормализации советско югославских отношений (1953–1954 гг.)
(The initial period of the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations (1953-1954))

  • Author(s):Anatoly Semenovich Anikeev
  • Language:Russian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:66-92
  • No. of Pages:27
  • Keywords:СССР; Югославия; Хрущев; Тито; нормализация советскоюго славских отношений
  • Summary/Abstract:Конфликт между СССР и Югославией 1948 г. обозначил очень важный момент в создании советского блока - одну из интегрируемых в него стран не удалось заставить отказаться, несмотря на мощное давление из Кремля, от части своих на ционально-государственных интересов ради общих интересов, возглавляемой Москвой коммунистической коалиции. Так возникла первая трещина в основании, строящейся на песке сталинской империи. Нормализация советско-югославских отношений стала естественным процессом между двумя странами, избравшими, так называемый, „социалистический путь развития”. В то же время, идущая из Москвы, и лично от Н. Хрущева инициатива вновь содержала прежние установки: Югославия должна вернуться в лоно „социалистического лагеря”, с его жесткой, централизованной дисциплиной и беспрекословным подчинением СССР и его гло- бальным целям. Первые оценки и анализ внутренней и внешней политики Юго- славии, сделанные в советском внешнеполитическом ведомстве в течение 1953- первой половине 1954 гг. практически не отличались от тех, которые были сделаны еще в 1948–1949 гг., в период начала конфликта. Это было особенностью работы дипломатического и партийного аппарата тех лет. Чиновники и функционеры го- товили материал, исходя из предположения, что его будут читать в основном теже лица (МИД в тот период возглавлял В. Молотов – А. А.), которые в свое время подписывали различные резолюции против югославской компартии. Этим же людям предстояло принимать и новые решения. Как мы видели, большую работу по информированию московских „товарищей” о своей позиции провела в эти годы югославская сторона. Белград дал недвусмысленно понять Москве, которая была серьезно обеспокоена постепенной интеграцией Югославии в политические и вое нные структуры Запада через Балканский пакт, что это всего лишь временная так тика, целью которой является решение проблемы Триеста. Перспектива восста- но вления экономического обмена между двумя странами, включавшая и поставки военной техники, отображалась в югославском сценарии нормализации, посыла емом Москве, как один из факторов, который будет способствовать прекращению военно-политического сотрудничества с Западом. С другой стороны, начальный этап нормализации дал дополнительный импульс к постепенной кристаллизации югославской политики неприсоединения. Югославии, выстраивая новые отноше- ния с Москвой, приходилось структурировать сложившиеся ранее связи с Западом, сохраняя все нужное и отсекая избыточное, привязывавшее ее к западным блокам. Белград стремился остаться на периферии двух сфер влияния и, лавируя между ними, каждый раз использовать свою позицию в собственных интересах, как по литических, так и экономических. Любопытно, что югославские дипломаты от кры то, и несколько наивно, говорили Москве о всех преимуществах такой вне- шне по литической линии. Первый период нормализации проходил на фоне скрытой борьбы внутри Кремля между защитниками прежней сталинской поли тики и сторонниками её частичного реформирования. Все это не могло не отразиться и на темпах восстановительного процесса и на его содержании. Итогом стала Белградская декларация 1955 года, которую можно рассматривать и как несомненный реванш Тито в его долгом противостоянии с Москвой, и как, с другой стороны, победу Хрущева над своими противниками. Не случайно Хрущев прислал Тито стенограммы заседаний июльского, 1955 года, пленума ЦК КПСС, на котором были осуждены позиции В. Молотова, Л. Кагановича и Г. Маленкова в отношении его «югославской» политики. Получается, что Тито в чем–то смог помочь Хрущеву. Вообще причины, по которым Югославия и Тито вызывали у Хрущева в те годы приступы „неконтролируемого” энтузиазма, еще предстоит исследовать. Можно только предположить, что в сознании Хрущева происходило формирование некой идеи, сутью которой могло быть следующее. СССР постепенно преодолевает международную изоляцию, устанавливает более-менее добрые отношения с США и Западом в целом, начинает с их помощью модернизацию своей экономики. Пример отношений Югославии с западными странами в этом случае мог казаться временами советскому лидеру идеальным. Поездка Хрущева и Булганина в Индию и Бирму в эти годы, почти параллельно визитам Тито, также ложится в данную гипотезу. Но идеализм Хрущева имел свои границы. Он не мог отрешиться от своих марксистских представлений, а также действовать вне жесткого контроля ЦК и сохранявшего свои позиции ортодоксального окружения. Ухудшение отношений с Югославией осенью 1956 года, в связи с венгерскими событиями, а затем весной 1958 года, убедительно это подтвердили.
  • Price: 6.00 €
The Yugoslav State Visit to the Soviet Union, June 1956

The Yugoslav State Visit to the Soviet Union, June 1956
(The Yugoslav State Visit to the Soviet Union, June 1956)

  • Author(s):Jan Pelikán
  • Language:English
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:93-117
  • No. of Pages:25
  • Keywords:Josip Broz; Khruschev; normalization; Eastern Bloc; Non-Aligned Movement
  • Summary/Abstract:The article analyses the circumstances and course of the visit of Josip Broz Tito to Soviet Union in the end of spring in 1956. His conversations in Moscow ended the process of normalization of mutual relations which was started soon after the death of Stalin. The conversations with Khrushchev showed on one hand the closeness of the points of view of the leaders of both totalitarian regimes and on the other hand they signalized differences in the points of view on the matter of the future form of mutual relations which were difficult to overcome.
  • Price: 6.00 €
България и съветско-югославското „сближаване” 1953–1958 г.

България и съветско-югославското „сближаване” 1953–1958 г.
(1953-1958 Bulgaria and the Soviet-Yugoslav 'convergence')

  • Author(s):Evgenia Kalinova
  • Language:Bulgarian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:118-138
  • No. of Pages:21
  • Keywords:България; Югославия; „сближаване”; Хрушчов; Тито
  • Summary/Abstract:След Втората световна война до края на 50-те години отношенията между България и Югославия се вписват в контекста на съветската външна политика. По внушение на Москва Българската комунистическа партия пренебрегва национал- ните интереси по „македонския въпрос”, а между 1948 и 1953 г. българо-югославските отношения са силно влошени от конфликта Тито-Сталин. След смъртта на Сталин СССР търси сближаване с Югославия. Промяната се налага от неблагоприятните за Кремъл тенденции на Балканите и в центъра на Европа. 1955 г. е повратна в съветско-югославските отношения. Създаването на За падноевропейския съюз с участието на ФРГ, която влиза и в НАТО, превръща спе челването на Югославия в приоритет за Кремъл. СССР. Москва нарежда на са те литите си незабавно подобряване на отношенията с Югославия по държавна линия. Българските управляващи без резерви изпълняват указанията, заобикаляйки „македонския въпрос”, защото повечето от тях са пряко свързани с налагането на погрешните схващания по него. Съветската интервенция в Унгария през 1956 г. поставя на изпитание „затоплянето” в съветско-югославските отношения. Върху тях рефлектират и вътре- шнопартийните борби в Кремъл. След известно подобряване, през 1958 г. в тях отново настъпва криза. В тези условия част от българските партийни лидери около Тодор Живков правят опит да формулират национално отговорна позиция по „македонския въпрос”. Белград и Скопие реагират остро, а Москва се стреми да пред- отврати разрастването на проблемите с Югославия. Поредният съветски натиск в края на 1958 г. кара БКП отново да направи компромис с националната кауза и да замълчи по „македонския въпрос”. Положителната промяна става възможна едва през 1963 г., когато се сменят и управляващите в България.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Советско-югославские отношения и внутренополитическая ситуaция в венгрии в условиях кризиса 1956 г.

Советско-югославские отношения и внутренополитическая ситуaция в венгрии в условиях кризиса 1956 г.
(Relations between Yugoslavia and USSR in Case of Internal Crisis in Hungary 1956)

  • Author(s):Aleksandr S. Stikalin
  • Language:Russian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:139-167
  • No. of Pages:29
  • Keywords:Imre Nagy; Kádár; Tito; Stalin; USSR; Yugoslavia; Hungary; Hungarian revolution
  • Summary/Abstract:The rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia after Stalin’s death influenced the relations between Belgrade and all the Soviet satellites. Hungary (as well as Bulgaria and especially Albania) was the case when the normalization of the relations with Yugoslavia went on with considerable difficulties. In a paper based on archival sources the author tries to reveal the reasons of troubles (the role of Rákosi regime in the anti-Yugoslav campaign after 1948 and the distrust of Belgrade to the Hungarian ruling communist elite, the situation with the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary, mutual financial claims and especially the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats in Hungary, their contacts with the inner-party reformist opposition, very active after the 20th Congress of the CPSU). It was Moscow which influenced both sides to meet one another – in spite of the fact that since mid-1956 the Soviet side expressed more anxiety about the attractiveness of the Yugoslav model for East-European communists as the alternative to the Soviet model. The author assesses the role of the Yugoslav model as an example for Hungarian communist reformers and reveals the complicated reaction of Tito and his team to the Hungarian revolution. The case of the prime minister Imre Nagy, who took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest on 4 November, the day of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, and the new complications in the Soviet-Yugoslav relations after the revolution, as well as the problem of the Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia since late 1956, provoked new difficulties in the Hungarian-Yugoslav inter-state relations. Most of the Hungarian communist elite (not only radical Stalinists, but the persons from Kádár’s team) looked at the Tito’s regime with mistrust. On the other side, the inconsistent policy of Tito’s regime towards the Hungarian revolution resulted to some extent in the discredit of the Yugoslav model in Hungary among the reformers. Nevertheless, both Belgrade and Budapest wanted to avoid the situation of 1948, tried to normalize the relations between two neighbouring countries equally interested in close economic ties and peace at the frontiers. The support of infl uential Tito and his team was especially important for Kádár in his desire to find a way from isolation. Even the death sentence for Imre Nagy in June 1958 did not affect the relations between Belgrade and Budapest in the long run.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Obnavljanje jugoslovensko-mađarskih odnosa 1953–1954. godine

Obnavljanje jugoslovensko-mađarskih odnosa 1953–1954. godine
(Yugoslav-Hungarian Reconciliation 1953–1954)

  • Author(s):Katarina Kovačević
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:168-187
  • No. of Pages:20
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Hungary; normalization of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations; Imre Nagy; Mátyás Rákosi
  • Summary/Abstract:During the late 1940s and early 1950s Hungary took the lead in fierce anti-Yugoslav propaganda by the Eastern Bloc. The Rajk’s trial marked the start of a ghastly series of death penalties, life sentences and long-term imprisonments in Hungary. Along with a strong media campaign, Yugoslavia continuously had the problem of frequent incidents along the border, which deteriorated the Yugoslav-Hungarian relations to the brink of armed conflict. Stalin’s death in March 1953 paved the way towards reconciliation between Yugo slavia and the Eastern Bloc. As in the previous era, Hungary was first, after the Soviet Union, to take the initiative for normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, which Belgrade used in order to dispense with the north border tension. Negotiations regarding this matter, as well as effort in forming a joint Yugoslav-Hungarian commission for investigating and identifying border incidents, began in the summer of 1953. However, Belgrade essentially acted with reserve, letting the other side take the initiative. After establishing diplomatic relations in August 1953, the border question was regulated and commercial trade contacts were restored during 1954. The Hungarian government even made steps towards the release of prisoners, Hungarian citizens and members of Yugoslav minority groups in Hungary. Nonetheless, the most important aspect for further development of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations was the suspension of the anti-Yugoslav campaign in the media in October 1954: the Yugoslav representative in Budapest, D. Soldatić, was informed of the Hungarian government’s decision to suspend the IB-emigration, to withdraw books and brochures of anti-Yugoslav character, and to ban the emigration newspapers. The existence of two different concepts regarding Hungarian internal development along with antagonism among their supporters, Imre Nagy and Mátyás Rákosi, di rectly infl uenced normalization of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. Stagnation in further normalization of state and party relations was evident already in the end of 1954. Mutual reserve and distrust between the Yugoslav and Hungarian leadership was enormous: the Yugoslav conclusion was that closer relations with Hungary were impossible as long as Mátyás Rákosi was at the top.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i odjek beogradske deklaracije u susednim „informbiroovskim” zemljama

Jugoslavija i odjek beogradske deklaracije u susednim „informbiroovskim” zemljama
(Yugoslavia and Reflection of the Belgrade Declaration in Neighbouring „Cominform” Countries)

  • Author(s):Vladimir Lj. Cvetković
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:188-206
  • No. of Pages:19
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; USSR; Belgrade Declaration; Cominform; Bulgaria; Hungary; Romania; Albania
  • Summary/Abstract:Signing of the Belgrade Declaration on 2 June 1955 represented an event which has undoubtedly greatly affected the relations among socialist countries of the time. It was a crown of reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as well as a result of a long process of approaching of two countries starting with Stalin’s death in 1953 and ending with Tito’s victory and the first known acknowledgement of the possibility that „different roads to socialism” may exist. The Belgrade Declaration was met with positive response in neighbouring „Cominform” countries and in all of them resulted in greater of lesser, faster or slower changes in relations with Yugoslavia. The general public of these countries understood this event as a victory of Yugoslav politics and its model of socialism over the rigid Soviet model. It also inspired hopes for a possibility that satellite countries might gain greater independence from the USSR. However, the reflection and impact of ideas contained in the declaration had its limits. Despite the changes of the overall attitude toward Yugoslavia and solution of a range of problems that were pending for a long time, changes that occurred after the Belgrade Declaration nevertheless remained li mited to a sphere of less important issues in mutual relations. The most important issues – the issue of financial claims in the case of Hungary, Serbian ethnic minority in the case of Romania, the „Macedonian issue” in the case of Bulgaria or, in the case of Albania, the issue of responsibility for the break-up of relations in 1948 and the Koçi Xoxe trial – remained unsolved. Addressing and solving them required a stronger incentive than the one which occurred by the signing of the Belgrade Declaration. For most of these countries it came next year, in 1956, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU.
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Informbiroovska emigracija u jugoslovensko- čehoslovačkim odnosima

Informbiroovska emigracija u jugoslovensko- čehoslovačkim odnosima
(The Cominformist Emigration in Yugoslav-Czechoslovak Relations)

  • Author(s):Ondřej Vojtěchovský
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:207-230
  • No. of Pages:24
  • Keywords:Czechoslovakia; Yugoslavia; Yugoslav Cominformists in Czechoslovakia; Prague; Nova borba
  • Summary/Abstract:The group of Yugoslav political emigration in Czechoslovakia, which was established in 1948 after the split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and other „people’s democracies”, numbered around 180 persons. Prague archives contain abundance of materials originating from émigrés’ organisation, as well as from the Czechoslovak political and security authorities, all of which to some extent and in a specific way document the activity and life of this emigration. Among other things, these archive funds contain personal materials of most of the people who claimed to be anti-Titoist emigrants in Czechoslovakia. The personal cards and personnel questionnaires, autobiographies, Czechoslovak police records on private talks, correspondence etc. are sources which offer the opportunity to map national, social, vocational and age structure of the emigration and show how these categories were projected on political opinions of an individual and the whole collective. Our task is to cover the different levels of the identity of this group. Judging from the presently known facts about the circumstances of the formation of the cominformist emigration in Czechoslovakia, the Prague group can be viewed as a certain representative sample of the post-war Communist party of Yugoslavia. The political culture, behaviour patterns and the approach to ideology and political practice in this part of the pro-soviet emigration were at the time of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture basically the same as of the membership of Yugoslav party which stayed loyal to Tito’s leadership. Nevertheless, the specifi cs resulting from the tradition of the radical leftist movement in Yugoslavia were different from the conditions in Czechoslovakia and its communist party, which produced misunderstanding and clashes in relations between the emigrants and their Czech hosts.
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Jedan ibeovski diplomata u Beogradu

Jedan ibeovski diplomata u Beogradu
(A Cominform Diplomat in Belgrade:)

  • Author(s):Slobodan Selinić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:231-251
  • No. of Pages:21
  • Keywords:Czechoslovakia; Yugoslavia; Belgrade; Vilem Pithart; Normalization of Relations between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
  • Summary/Abstract:After several years of hostility from the end of 1949 until mid-1953, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia started to normalize their relations in August 1954 by signing a trade agreement. Raising of diplomatic relations to ambassador level followed and Czechoslovakian Ambassador Pithart arrived to Belgrade on 21 September 1954. Normalization of economic relations gained in importance after the establishment of economic exchange at the level of regular annual contracts on the basis of an Agreement of 19 February 1955. Ambassador Pithart has invested most of his efforts in solving the issue of mutual claims which was resolved by an agreement of 11 February 1956. In the first stage of dealing with this issue, he was the main Czechoslovakian negotiator, following the instructions he got from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and his government. In addition, in 1955 Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia exchanged prisoners of respective countries. Pithart arrived to Belgrade without diplomatic experience, but had experience in economic affairs, which was certainly important at a time when solving of economic and financial issues was among the most important for the process of normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. He also came as a loyal party worker, convinced in the correctness of not only Czechoslovakian road to socialism but also of Stalin’s work, although he served in Belgrade after Stalin’s death.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i NATO 1951–1958.

Jugoslavija i NATO 1951–1958.
(Relations between Yugoslavia and NATO 1951–1958)

  • Author(s):Bojan B. Dimitrijević
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:255-274
  • No. of Pages:20
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; NATO; Military Assistance Pact (MAP); Mutual Defence Aid Programme (MDAP)
  • Summary/Abstract:The Tito-Stalin controversy came into the open with the expulsion of the Co mmunist Party of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in June 1948. After the first suspicions in the background of the 1948 confl ict, the West started to realise that it should be useful to support the Yugoslavs, fi rst of all, in the military potentials. The Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State had been swift to explore the opportunities now opening up to sow maximum discord in this part of the Communist world. It has been remarked by the US offi cials that Yugoslavia is of the direct importance to the security of the United States. As a result of this remark, it was decided that military and economic aid should be extended to Yugoslavia to increase its potentials to defend against Soviet threat. The Military Assistance Pact (MAP) was fi nally signed between the officials of the Yugoslav and the US governments in Belgrade on 14 November 1951. According to this Pact, Yugoslavia was introduced in the framework of the Mutual Defence Aid Programme (MDAP). Yugoslav orders for equipment should have been fulfi lled from the United States, Great Britain and France. The Presidium of the Yugoslav Parliament ratified MAP on 9 January 1952. Those first programmes were intended to fill the gaps in the Yugoslav military potentials, while the later ones were intended to complete and rearm Yugoslav units. Yugoslavs found out later that the total sum of planned military aid was 746.5 million dollars. By signing the MAP, the Yugoslav Government permitted that a certain number of the US military and civil personnel be accepted and allowed to monitor the process of MDAP deliveries. Equipment deliveries in the framework of the MDAP enabled the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA (The Yugoslav People’s Army, the term People’s was introduced on 22 December 1951) a qualitative and quantitative growth. Contrary to this, the previous period of the Soviet blockade could be characterised at least as stagnant. Incorporation into the MDAP enabled parts of the JNA offi cers’ corps to attend special conversion and training programs. Following normalisation of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1955, their political, economic and even military contacts started to be restored. On the other hand, this led to much colder relations with the Western side. This process had a reflection on the process of MDAP deliveries which became much slower and with more delays. Suddenly, in view of their own new policy relations, the Yugoslavs decided to cancel further weapon aid deliveries. This was decided and published in a communiqué of the Yugoslav Government on 15 July 1957. Equipment from the MDAP defi nitely ceased arriving to Yugoslavia in February 1958. A total of 92.7% of estimated sum was delivered in a previous period. The most intensive development of Yugoslavia’s armed forces during its post-war existence occurred at the time when it was incorporated in MDAP system. In this period, thanks to the mentioned deliveries, the JNA grew into a several times stronger and much more modern structure than in the period of isolation from the East. The MDAP-supplied equipment raised a level of the technical culture and, not to be forgotten, influenced some of the later Yugoslav weapon developments. A much modern look of JNA was also of signifi cance, because it came out of this period equipped much alike any of the Western armies. It was American military equipment, coupled with development of domestic industry in the interior of the country that enabled Yugoslavia to adjust to the termination of Soviet military supplies and maintain its new defence posture. In the following period stagnation was dominant as well as the lack of the modernisation trends. It lasted until 1962, when Yugoslavia started an intensive military co-operation with the USSR.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i projekti kolektivne bezbjednosti 1950–1960.

Jugoslavija i projekti kolektivne bezbjednosti 1950–1960.
(Yugoslavia and Collective Security Projects 1950–1960)

  • Author(s):Ivan Laković
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Military history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:275-291
  • No. of Pages:17
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Collective Security Projects; NATO; USSR; USA
  • Summary/Abstract:During the early post-war years, Yugoslavia has been considered as one of the most faithful and ideologically righteous Soviet allies, the one of the opinion that USSR had played the most important war role, and that it had proved to be the natural and unquestionable leader of the forthcoming world revolution. Although the eastern bloc, which existed on the basis of ideological uniformity and, more importantly, clear supremacy of the Red Army, hasn’t been organized as a formal alliance until 1955, it had all the attributes of a functional military-ideological organization with strong subordination and hierarchy. Yugoslav projections of the future bonds of security and military cooperation have always included a membership in the eastern family and, until infamous 1948 Information Bureau Resolution; nothing seemed to be able to change them. After the break with the East, Yugoslavia tried to preserve its internal system while gaining support from the West, particularly the USA. Its position of ideological closeness to the East had been considered a desirable model for the rest of the bloc, therefore western countries have backed it up with economic, financial and military aid program. But, although fully dependant on this aid, Yugoslavia showed a high level of resistibility to all the western efforts to formally bond it with NATO institutions, do sing the measure of its opening to the extent that would provide western protection without transferring any part of national sovereignty to the alliance. Although there were moments when it seemed that a sense of threat on the eastern borders could lead to closer mutual relations, when it came to realization both sides refrained from making any resolute steps towards it, and opportunities remained unused. Yugoslavia succeeded in its intention to stay formally neutral, while the West was willing to allow it. Staying away from two major collective security systems did not mean that Yugoslavia a priori rejected all the systems of that kind. While rhetorically not rejecting the possibility of being part of than actual project of EDC, it also showed its real integrative capacity in the process of forming the Balkan Pact with Turkey and Greece. The mentioned projects, on the other hand, had not presented a threat for its foreign- and military-policy autonomy since the former have not even passed the ratification in the NATO countries, while the latter, important for the effect of its conclusion on the USSR, remained without any real operatively-functional role.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i SAD u svetlu hladnoratovskih kriza 1956. godine

Jugoslavija i SAD u svetlu hladnoratovskih kriza 1956. godine
(Yugoslavia and the USA in the Light of Cold War Crises in 1956.)

  • Author(s):Tatjana Lečić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:292-306
  • No. of Pages:15
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; USA; Cold War; Tito; Khruschev
  • Summary/Abstract:During 1956 Yugoslavia continued to vacillate in its relations toward two powers that ruled the bipolar world. Implementing the new concept of foreign policy strategy and abiding by equidistance and peaceful coexistence policies, Yugoslavia has managed to preserve its independence and socio-political system. Yugoslav anti-bloc policy has enabled it to take critical attitude toward both parties in almost all international conflicts. However, the bloc logic did not allow affirmative treatment of non-aligned policy, particularly its clear guidelines aimed against colonial division of the world and nuclear armament. Western countries remained the major economic partner of Yugoslavia and its overall economic prosperity depended on cooperation with them. Any indication of the Yugoslav-Soviet convergence raised doubts in the West about Yugoslavia’s return to the socialist bloc. In this context, ideological closeness during Tito-Khrushchev meeting in Moscow in June 1956, as well as secret Yugoslav-Soviet consultations and Yugoslavia’s reaction to revolutionary events in Hungary in Autumn 1956 caused great suspicion on the West. The same refers to relatively unanimous position of the Yugoslav and Soviet leadership concerning the Suez crisis, colonial issue and national liberation movements in Asia and Africa. The U. S. has negatively reacted to then course of the Yugoslav foreign policy. Although it maintained economic cooperation with Yugoslavia, it nevertheless often reexamined the possibility for the continuation of the programme of material assistance to Yugoslav leadership. Periodic accusations between Yugoslavia and the U. S. Represented a usual occurrence which has for many years accompanied the cooperation of two countries so different in terms of their ideological and political aspirations. Despite huge differences, the two sides have nevertheless managed to alleviate mutual political animosities to the mutually acceptable degree and thus created prerequisites for future cooperation.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija u američkoj vojnopolitičkoj strategiji odbrane zapada od SSSR-a 1950–1954.

Jugoslavija u američkoj vojnopolitičkoj strategiji odbrane zapada od SSSR-a 1950–1954.
(Yugoslavia in the US Military-Political Strategy of Defence of the West from the USSR 1950–1954)

  • Author(s):Nemanja Milošević
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Military history, Political history, Security and defense, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:307-321
  • No. of Pages:15
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; USA; USSR; Greece; Turkey; Trieste Crisis
  • Summary/Abstract:Military-political relations between Yugoslavia and the USA (1950–1954) were very important part in geopolitical and strategic planning of the American foreign policy. After Tito-Stalin conflict in 1948 Yugoslavia was confronted with possible antagonism from the countries under the „Soviet umbrella”. This situation, precarious for Tito’s regime and survival of Yugoslavia, both in economic and political sense, dictated a slew toward the USA and Western countries. Soviet military threat was very realistic for Western analysts. As response to the Soviet threat, Western allies created a military alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This organization was very important for the future relations between Yugoslavia and the U. S. The first serious dialogues and contacts were initiated in 1950. Yugoslav authorities were afraid of the possible Soviet aggression. U. S. policy-planners, analysts and members of administration shared the same opinions and estimates. The war in Korea did not broadcast fears and pessimistic expectations on both sides. The result was Military Aid Agreement between Yugoslavia and USA, signed in November 1951 in Belgrade. Greece and Turkey joined NATO the same year. Those two countries had important role in Western strategic planning of defence against Eastern threats. Their position had directly closed Soviet output in the Mediterranean. Yugoslavia became more important not just as an example of „axle-pin strategy” but also as a strategic part of „defence-wall” against the Soviets. American policy-planners saw West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey as „corner-stones” of that defence wall. Contacts between three Balkan countries started in 1952. The result was the Balkan Pact in 1953 and the Balkan Alliance in 1954. On the one side, American administration supported this Alliance because in that way Yugoslavia was much closer to the NATO, but, on the other, it slowed down negotiations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey because it wanted to have Italy in the Alliance as well. It would help the solution of the Trieste Crisis. The Trieste Crisis and the „Djilas Case” were problems which burdened relations between Yugoslavia and the USA. The agreement in 1954 between the USA, Great Britain and Yugoslavia about Trieste was a significant relief for both sides and helped further improvement in their relations.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i Vatikan

Jugoslavija i Vatikan
(Yugoslavia and Vatican)

  • Author(s):Radmila Radić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism
  • Page Range:323-349
  • No. of Pages:28
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Catholic Church; Vatican; Alojzije Stepinac; Holy See
  • Summary/Abstract:Severance of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Vatican has directly influenced the tightening of relations in the country between government agencies and the Catholic Church. Government agencies attempted to apply the tactic of pressure, on the one side and, on the other, to win over moderate bishops in order to show that the agreement with the Catholic Church is still possible in the situation when the re presentatives of Vatican are no longer present in the country. The Episcopate of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia was divided between the extreme individuals who declined any compromise with the government agencies and the more moderate ones who proceeded from the position that changes in the country could not be expected in a short time and that it was better for the church to find ways for coexistence. However, they could not undertake anything without the consent of Vatican which was not willing to give such approval. At the same time, Vatican has pursued intense anti-Yugoslav campaign, which as a rule intensifi ed and was recalled the freedom of religion and church in the FPRY whenever Yugoslav representatives attempted to achieve something at the international level. Activities of Catholic clerical emigration with hostile attitude to the Yugoslav state have also been supported. The attitude of the Holy See toward Yugoslavia has largely depended on the general direction of Vatican policy toward socialist bloc states. Already at the beginning of 1955 there were various indications that Vatican was interested in renewing relations with Yugoslavia, but Yugoslav government bodies have rejected such attempt, hoping that they would be able to coax bishops in the country to negotiations that would bypass the Holy See. The turning point came in the late 1950s and early 1960, with the election of Pope John XXIII and death of Alojzije Stepinac. By that time rigidity in Yugoslavia has generally been eased and circumstances liberalized, including relations between the state and the church. The number of public attacks on bishops and clergy has declined. Mutual testing of ground lasted almost two years and led to the beginning of negotiations that resulted in the signing of the Protocol in 1966.
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Velika Britanija i „Slučaj Đilas” 1954.

Velika Britanija i „Slučaj Đilas” 1954.
(Great Britain and the „Djilas Case” 1954)

  • Author(s):Katarina Spehnjak
  • Language:Croatian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism
  • Page Range:350-362
  • No. of Pages:13
  • Keywords:Great Britain; Yugoslavia; Milovan Djilas
  • Summary/Abstract:The paper presents offi cial British positions on the „Djilas case” in 1954. From the review of reports of the Embassy in Belgrade and Foreign Office’s deliberations of the development of events concerning Djilas, it is obvious that offi cial Britain, although interested in his ideas, did not consider them desirable. This referred both to mutual relations between the two countries, with Yugoslavia treating this case as a strictly internal matter, and to general stability of Yugoslavia. According to British offi cial positions, Djilas’s views and particularly the possibility of expanding and accelerating events in this context, threatened to complicate the situation in Yugoslavia. Internal liberalization of the regime, although only partial according to a range of FO’s analyses, recognized in a series of measures, and particularly openness of Yugoslavia for a number of new strategic foreign-policy initiatives, were considered promising policy shifts which could be threatened by „premature” or „too fast” liberalization – as it was perceived on the basis of Djilas’s ideas. Therefore, the Yugoslav authorities were supported in formal and in less formal forms of communication, in their approach to this issue in 1954.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Britansko-jugoslavenski odnosi od Bagdadskog pakta do sueske krize

Britansko-jugoslavenski odnosi od Bagdadskog pakta do sueske krize
(British-Yugoslav Relations from the Baghdad Pact to the Suez Crisis)

  • Author(s):Ante Batović
  • Language:Croatian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:364-380
  • No. of Pages:18
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; British-Yugoslav Relations; 1955/56; Baghdad Pact; Suez Crisis; Josip Broz Tito
  • Summary/Abstract:Despite occasional disagreements, relations between Yugoslavia and Great Britain since the end of the Second World War remained relatively good. In the post-war period, Great Britain was rapidly losing its global influence, with the Suez Crisis representing the final blow. Yugoslav criticisms of British moves in connection with the Baghdad Pact and, somewhat later, of the Israeli-Anglo-French intervention in Egypt have been seriously accepted in Foreign Office, although the risk that these frictions could turn into a major crisis in relations between the two countries actually never existed. Yugoslavia did not have direct interest in these events and criticism served Yugoslav politics to show the consistency of its non-aligned policy. Namely, since the early 1950s, Yugoslavia has acquired a special status in strategic deliberations of Western diplomats due to opposition attitude that it took toward the Soviet Union and anti-Soviet influence it exerted on Eastern bloc countries. Strong and independent Yugoslavia remained a priority for the West even after Stalin’s death in 1953, and after normalization of Soviet- Yugoslav relations in 1955. From the military point of view, Yugoslavia was a buffer which protected Italy and partly Austria on the North and Greece on the South from direct Soviet threat and, although outside military blocs, it could expect NATO support in case of a Soviet attack. From the political point of view, Yugoslavia with its specific road to socialism, served excellently to the West in Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia’s influence on Eastern bloc satellite states was not as big as Tito used to stress. However, the fact that the West supported the maintenance of an independent communist Yugoslavia speaks in favour of the fact that Yugoslavia’s influence on events in Poland, Hungary and later in Czechoslovakia nevertheless existed. With its policy that could be described as balancing on the edge, Yugoslavia developed strong international activity during the 1950s. However, it was caused more by Tito’s attempt to protect his independence in relation to the Soviets and also to justify cooperation with the West, then by declared consistency in avoiding alignment in Cold-War blocs. Non-alignment was a good way to reconcile these two contradictions, and although Tito was certainly aware of its shortcomings and relatively small influence on global political events, there remains the fact that he has excellently used the opportunity presented by the situation he faced in 1948 and given Yugoslavia’s modest geopolitical possibilities turned it into a significant international factor, particularly among Third World countries, which it remained until its break-up in the early 1990s.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Finnish-Yugoslav relations 1948–1961

Finnish-Yugoslav relations 1948–1961
(Finnish-Yugoslav relations 1948–1961)

  • Author(s):Rinna Elina Kullaa
  • Language:English
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:381-396
  • No. of Pages:16
  • Keywords:Finland; Yugoslavia; Soviet Border; Tito-Stalin split; Nordic Union; Balkan Pact
  • Summary/Abstract:This paper examines the content of the Finnish-Yugoslav ties formed in the 1950s. These two states were signifi cantly affected by the extension of the Soviet border into Europe after the Second World War. I argue that Soviet influence over the states of the Warsaw Pact represents a de facto extension of the Soviet border into Eastern Europe after WWII. Recent Russian historiography posits a turn toward geo-political pragmatism and away from ideological primacy during the war; some describe Stalin as adhering to Tsarist foreign policy priorities over considerations of world Communism. An examination of Finnish-Yugoslav relations reveals that a similar focus on pragmatism and border security was continued by Stalin in the post-WWII period. I argue that Finnish-Yugoslav ties in the 1950s serve as evidence of the regional nature of the Soviet foreign policy focused on the Soviet-European border. This extension triggered, in part, the drafting of separate but similar neutralism policies in Yugoslavia and in Finland in the 1950s. The paper seeks to define interactions between the Soviet, Finnish and Yugoslav leaderships with regard to neutrality and security along the Eastern European border. The paper investigates the Yugoslav and Finnish leaderships’ judgments of each other in the aftermath of 1948 and follows the comparative analysis of corresponding reactions to the death of Stalin in Helsinki and in Belgrade in 1953. The Nordic Union and the Balkan Pact re-signed in 1952 are discussed as regional responses to the extension of the Soviet border. The study compares the differences in policy reactions in Finland and in Belgrade to the political pressure exerted by Moscow in the aftermath of the Hungarian revolution and seeks to explain why at the conclusion of the 1950s – decade contemplative of common roads to neutralism – the Finnish membership in European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Yugoslav Non-Alignment Movement produced separate foreign policy futures.
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Jugoslovansko-italijanska meja in vprašanje slovenskega izhoda na morje

Jugoslovansko-italijanska meja in vprašanje slovenskega izhoda na morje
(Yugoslav-Italian border and the issue of Slovenian landlocked)

  • Author(s):Nevenka Troha
  • Language:Slovenian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism
  • Page Range:397-407
  • No. of Pages:11
  • Keywords:Italija; Jugoslavija; Slovenija; Istra; Trst; meja; STO
  • Summary/Abstract:Pas slovenske poselitve ob morju sega strnjeno od Devina do Savudrijskega po lotoka. Po letu 1918 je bila jugoslovanska Slovenija od morja ločena s širokim pasom ozemlja Kraljevine Italije. Z mirovno pogodbo z Italijo, podpisano februarja 1947, je velik del tega območja Slovenija sicer priključila, ni pa segla do morja. Pas slovenske obmorske poselitve je bil vključen v Svobodno tržaško ozemlje (STO), ki je vse do Spomenice o soglasju oktobra 1954 ostajalo razdeljeno na dve coni pod anglo-ameriško in jugoslovansko vojno upravo. Z državno-pravnega stališča je bila tako vse do leta 1954 Slovenija odrezana od morja. Dejanski položaj pa je bil drugačen. V Slovenskem primorju so ob osvoboditvi maja 1945 slovenske civilne oblasti prevzele upravo, tudi v coni B Slovenskega primorja, vzpostavljeni junija 1945, in nato v koprskem okraju cone B STO. Slovenija je tako dejansko, ne pa tudi pravno-formalno vse od maja 1945 imela izhod na morje. Potem ko je resolucija Informbiroja iz junija 1948 spremenila razmerja sil, sta ZDA in VB pričeli pritiskati na Italijo in Jugoslavijo, naj sprejmeta dogovor, da bi ob določenih popravkih meje cona A pripadla Italiji, cona B pa Jugoslaviji. Tudi za Jugo slavijo je postalo STO nesprejemljivo. Do sklenitve Spomenice o soglasju so tekla pogajanja, na katerih so jugoslovanski pogajalci podali različne predloge razmejitve, ki pa so vedno upoštevali tudi izhod Slovenije na morje. Dosegli so razdelitev na osnovi demarkacijske črte z manjšim popravkom, zato da bi Koper, ki naj bi postal središče Slovenskega primorja, dobil širše zaledje. Slovenska zahteva po izhodu na morje je bila tako izpolnjena.
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Nemačka odšteta žrtvama pseudomedicinskih eksperimenata u Jugoslaviji

Nemačka odšteta žrtvama pseudomedicinskih eksperimenata u Jugoslaviji
(German Indemnification for the Victims of Pseudo-Medical Experiments in Yugoslavia)

  • Author(s):Zoran Janjetović
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Economic history, Political history, Health and medicine and law, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:408-415
  • No. of Pages:8
  • Keywords:Pseudo-medical experiments; Indemnification; Yugoslavia; Germany
  • Summary/Abstract:In 1951 Germany expressed its willingness to indemnify the victims of Nazi pseudo-medical experiments. The Yugoslav diplomacy availed itself of this opportunity, collecting some 1500 applications by 1956. However, the solution of the problem was delayed by the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in October 1957. Eventually German bureaucracy sifted the applications early in 1959, and in May 112 victims were subjected to medical examination. The year 1960 passed in futile negotiations. Later that year, the Yugoslav diplomacy suggested lump payment, but used the opportunity to announce their demand for a (much larger) payment of indemnification for „victims of Nazi persecutions”. The agreement on indemnification for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments was reached on 25 April 1961. Under the treaty, Yugoslavia received DM 1.75 million. Since late 1961 the Yugoslav officials strove to revise the settlement and to increase the sum. This was eventually achieved on 7 September 1963. Germany conceded to grant DM 7,950,000 for the victims of pseudomedical experiments – not least in order to avoid paying a much higher sum for other Nazi victims. The Yugoslav side used both matters to pressurize Germany – the victims being only an excuse to get some money for the socialist economy.
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U senci gvozdene zavese.

U senci gvozdene zavese.
(In the Iron Curtain Shadow.)

  • Author(s):Sanja Petrović Todosijević
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:416-436
  • No. of Pages:21
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; UNICEF; USA
  • Summary/Abstract:The policy of the Yugoslav state toward the International Children’s Fund in the period following the end of World War II reflects the international position of the socialist Yugoslavia which was considered, until the summer of 1948, a territory under pronounced Soviet sphere of influence. In keeping with the policy of Western powers and the United States, after the conflict with the „big” Soviet leader it acquired a status of a country which should at least be „kept afloat”. By the summer of 1950 Yugoslavia became a privileged benefi ciary of UNICEF programmes. As the only Eastern bloc country which managed to oppose Soviet infl uence and tried to build what was often referred to as „its own road to socialism”, Yugoslavia became strategically an extremely important partner to Western democracies. The work of the UNICEF Mission’s Office in Belgrade, particularly the activities of its foreign members, were under close scrutiny of the community traditionally sceptical of anything and anyone coming from abroad or more precisely from the West. They were also closely watched by police bodies of the new Yugoslav authorities which did not want to take any chances. The need to protect and defend the established order, particularly after the split with the USSR in the summer of 1948, often turned into paranoia. Field work was an additional challenge for the Yugoslav police. Restricted in movement, access to information and institutions through which UNICEF programmes have been carried out, the officials of the Fund Mission temporarily on assignment in Yugoslavia have been facing challenges of development of the new state and order in socialism. Promotion of UNICEF activities in FPRY was in direct correlation with Yugoslavia’s foreign-policy orientation between 1947 and 1954.
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Uloga muzičkog folklora u spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Jugoslavije 1950–1952.

Uloga muzičkog folklora u spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Jugoslavije 1950–1952.
(The Role of Musical Folklore in Socialist Yugoslavia’s Foreign Policy 1950–1952)

  • Author(s):Ivan S. Hofman
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Cultural history, Customs / Folklore, Music, Diplomatic history, Political history, Sociology of Culture, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism
  • Page Range:437-456
  • No. of Pages:20
  • Keywords:Musical Folklore; Folklore Groups; International Congress of Ethnomusicologists in Opatija; Foreign Policy; Yugoslavia
  • Summary/Abstract:The conflict with Cominform in 1948 was a turning point in the history of socialist Yugoslavia. In complete isolation and difficult economic crisis, after initial vacillation and desire to prove its Stalinist orthodoxy Yugoslavia has started to seek new ways in the development of socialism, on the basis of its own revolutionary experience. On the foreign policy plan, its diplomatic activity was aimed toward restoration of previously severed ties with the West, in an effort to get necessary aid from this side and thus free itself from the heavy pressure of the USSR and its satellites. Musical folklore got its place in the new foreign-policy orientation of Yugoslavia. In the 1950–1952 period the Government of the FPRY sent leading professional and certain amateur folklore groups to competitions and tours in the West lasting several weeks, and in September 1951 organized an international congress of ethnomusicologists in Opatija. The government of the FPRY regarded tours of folklore ensembles and the international congress as one of the means to overcome isolation of the country, as well as a way to present Yugoslavia as a new leader of international labour movement, after the Soviet communists, as it was believed, betrayed fundamental principles of Marxism and international proletarian solidarity.
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„Pošteni posrednik”. Jugoslavija između starih i novih spoljnopolitičkih partnerstava sredinom pedesetih godina

„Pošteni posrednik”. Jugoslavija između starih i novih spoljnopolitičkih partnerstava sredinom pedesetih godina
(„The Honest Broker”. Yugoslavia between Old and New Commitments in the mid-1950s)

  • Author(s):Vladimir P. Petrović
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:459-472
  • No. of Pages:14
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Josip Broz Tito; Middle East crisis 1955–56; doctrine of active peaceful coexistence
  • Summary/Abstract:The contribution is dealing with the specificities of an important stage in the transformation of Yugoslav foreign policy in the 1950s, characterized by the Yugoslav attempt to conceptualize a flexible diplomacy by performing the role of a broker in international affairs. Mediation in resolving crises was a pragmatic manifestation of the Yugoslav doctrine of active peaceful coexistence, as well as an attempt to harmonize various commitments acquired during intensive cooperation with the West, the East and the noncommited countries. The role of Josip Broz Tito in the development of the Middle East crisis 1955–56 is particularly scrutinized. Through his contacts with state offi cials of all sides, he attempted to alleviate the crisis, legitimizing at the same time an awkward Yugoslav position and presenting the country as a useful impartial channel of global communication. This strive towards the role in international relations which Yugoslavia could hardly sustain brought mixed results. The unpredictability of the international brokering was underlining the tension between the goals of such policies and the scarce resources Yugoslavia had, and was largely abandoned in favour of more institutionalized approach to international relations.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Israel and Yugoslavia between East and West

Israel and Yugoslavia between East and West
(Israel and Yugoslavia between East and West)

  • Author(s):Shaul Shay
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:473-482
  • No. of Pages:10
  • Keywords:Israel; Yugoslavia; East; West; Tito; Cold War
  • Summary/Abstract:The years between 1947 and 1953 were a critical period for both Israel and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was formed from the ruins of the Second World War, as a new socialist state under the leadership of Tito, searching for a new identity in the bipolar world. Israel was founded as a new independent state and had to fight in order to protect itself against hostile Arab neighbors. Israel like Yugoslavia had to choose its orientation between East and West. On these backgrounds Israel and Yugoslavia had some common interests that led to cooperation between the two states. This article will discuss some examples of the bilateral relations between the two states on the backdrop of the „Cold War” era: The Israeli Yugoslav cooperation during the Israeli independence war 1947–1949. The Israeli Yugoslav relations between 1950 and 1953. In the first years after WWII Yugoslavia had taken an adherent position towards the Israeli side in the conflict and allowed the transfer of arms, and by doing so contributed to the victory of Israel in the 1948 war. Later, Yugoslavia had a pro-Arab policy, which lasted for the most of the „Cold War” era.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i Bliski istok (1945–1956)

Jugoslavija i Bliski istok (1945–1956)
(Yugoslavia and the Middle East (1945–1956))

  • Author(s):Aleksandar Životić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:483-496
  • No. of Pages:14
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Middle East; Egypt; Israel; Suez crisis
  • Summary/Abstract:In the years following the Second World War the Middle East had an important place in Yugoslav foreign policy. The evolution of Yugoslav policy in that region had three phases. During the first phase which lasted from the end of the Second World War to 1948, a relatively reserved attitude regarding this region can be observed. In this period the interest in this region existed only in the sense of the solution of the problem in the United Nations bodies, while economic cooperation was rather small and dependent on traditions of the pre-war period. The second period which started with the creation of the Jewish state in 1948 is characterized by the development of very close political, economic and military relations with Israel and closer approach to Egypt after the progressive solution of the problem in mutual relations caused by Yugoslav contacts with persecuted Egyptian communists. Egyptian military revolution in 1952 and the beginnings of shift of the Yugoslav foreign policy toward the creation of a wider movement of countries which were not engaged in any blocs and which were non-aligned caused the Yugoslav orientation for the development of closer relations with Arab countries. In this period, political, economic and military relations with Arab countries began to develop faster. The improvement of relations with Arab countries led to aggravation of contacts with Israel. Nevertheless, the two countries have not completely alienated during that period. The Suez crisis and Yugoslav full support to Egypt during this crisis profi led the Yugoslav policy in this region and connected Yugoslavia with Arab countries and, on the other hand, distanced Yugoslavia from Israel. This marked the beginning of Yugoslavia’s Middle-Easterm policy, which henceforth represented one of the determining characteristics of its foreign policy.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i zemlje Magreba 1956–1958.

Jugoslavija i zemlje Magreba 1956–1958.
(Yugoslavia and the Maghreb Countries 1956–1958)

  • Author(s):Srđan Miletić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:497-512
  • No. of Pages:16
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Tunisia; Morocco; Algeria; Maghreb; Non-Aligned Movement
  • Summary/Abstract:After the end of its conflict with the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav leadership attempted to take a new course in world politics. That course implied the establishment of contacts with newly-liberated countries of Asia and Africa, followed by their integration into the Non-Aligned Movement. Certain FPRY bodies maintained contacts with representatives of Tunisia and Morocco even before the proclamation of their inde pendence, but they were not of particular signifi cance and were restricted either to relations with communist parties of these countries or to cautious assistance to the movement for independence of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Since Yugoslavia ran the risk of running afoul of France for supporting the Maghreb countries in their intentions, its contacts with Tunisia and Morocco until 1956 had to be more careful and limited. However, once they gained independence, there were no obstacles for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations and for the development of cooperation with the FPRY. The 1956–1958 period covered by this paper is not long, but in such a short time a fair level of cooperation with the Maghreb countries has been achieved, particularly with Tunisia, not only because it was geographically closest to Yugoslavia, but also due to its aspirations for a leading position in the Maghreb region. Algeria was in civil war at the time and in relation to this country Yugoslavia pursued special policy which was not substantially different from the policy toward Tunisia and Morocco until 1956. Talks conducted by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris, Aleš Bebler, as Minister Plenipotentiary, with the most important political fi gures of Tunisia and Morocco, during 1957, represented a valuable source of information and were a prelude to opening of Yugoslav diplomatic missions in these countries. The next step was expansion of bilateral cooperation at all levels, but that was the process which was carried out on a step-by-step basis and required more time.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Otkrivanje Afrike

Otkrivanje Afrike
(Discovering Africa)

  • Author(s):Dmitar Tasić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:513-525
  • No. of Pages:13
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Africa; Ethiopia; Haile Selassie; Josip Broz
  • Summary/Abstract:Easing of Cold War tensions in Europe, Yugoslavia’s increasingly frequent and closer contacts with Western countries, acceptance of Western military aid, founding of the Balkan Pact and indications of successful solution to the Trieste issue ushered Yugoslavia out of diplomatic isolation that lasted since the conflict with the USSR in 1948. Parallel with this, through participation in the UN activities, Yugoslavia came into contact with several countries that shared similar views on international politics. One of the countries with which Yugoslavia has developed intense economic and political relations was the Empire of Ethiopia, an ancient and the only independent (in the proper sense of the word) African state. Diplomatic relations have been established through exchange of goodwill missions and visits of military and economic delegations. That was an introduction to two meetings of a president and an emperor who led two countries from different continents, with different histories and government orders. Ha ile Selassie’s visit to Yugoslavia in July 1954 and Josip Broz Tito’s to Ethiopia in December 1955 reinforced already stable relations between these two states. Over time, the two leaders developed a cordial and friendly relationship. Yugoslavia acquired in Addis Ababa a strong foothold for further political and economic action in Africa.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslavija i Azija (1947–1953)

Jugoslavija i Azija (1947–1953)
(Yugoslavia and Asia (1947–1953))

  • Author(s):Jovan Čavoški
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, WW II and following years (1940 - 1949), Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:526-543
  • No. of Pages:18
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Asia; China; India; Burma
  • Summary/Abstract:The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of early relations between Yugoslavia and the major states in East, South and Southeast Asia, implying primarily China, India and Burma, using archive materials from the main domestic archives and, for the first time, recently declassifi ed sources of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PR of China. The timeframe of the paper encompasses the period between 1947 and establishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, which can be considered the first serious contact of Yugoslav diplomacy with the main Asian states, and 1954, which was crowned by extremely successful visit of Josip Broz Tito to India and Burma, as well as establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the PR of China in January 1955. Monitoring the activity of Yugoslav diplomacy through three main stages (revolutionary, observational and active), this paper provides a detailed analysis of bilateral relations of the socialist Yugoslavia with the mentioned three Asian states. In fact, analyzing all the details of ideological and political relations that were developing with Asian partners in all fields, or were limited by certain external factors (adverse influence of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict on Chinese-Yugoslav relations), we can clearly review all the details which contributed that Yugoslavia and its leadership choose the mentioned countries as the main partners in their strategic choice of the course toward the non-engagement and peaceful coexistence policy.
  • Price: 6.00 €
The Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia 1953–1958 as Published in the Greek Daily Press.

The Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia 1953–1958 as Published in the Greek Daily Press.
(The Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia 1953–1958 as Published in the Greek Daily Press.)

  • Author(s):George Skaltsogiannis
  • Language:English
  • Subject(s):Media studies, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:544-557
  • No. of Pages:14
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Balkan; Tito; Stalin; Khrushchev
  • Summary/Abstract:The period 1953–1958 is characterized by a declaratory tendency of the Balkans for special treatment. Generalities do not cover the researching of the period, therefore we should focus our research within the premise of moving away from the two-front facade of the decade and attempt to promote the special conditions that prevailed in the Balkans for each state separately. The text emerged from 774 articles of the Greek Eleftheria, Tachydromos and Estia newspapers of the year 1958 in an effort to elevate from obscurity the role of the Yugoslav foreign policy with respect to local conditions.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Stipendisti iz Indije i Burme u Jugoslaviji 1951–1955.

Stipendisti iz Indije i Burme u Jugoslaviji 1951–1955.
(Scholars from India and Burma in Yugoslavia 1951–1955)

  • Author(s):Dragomir Bondžić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Higher Education , History of Education, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:558-570
  • No. of Pages:13
  • Keywords:Scholars; India; Burma; Yugoslavia
  • Summary/Abstract:Within the policy of diplomatic convergence and cooperation with India and Burma in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia tended, through the Science and Culture Council and the Commission for Cultural Relations with Other Countries, to establish and reinforce cultural and educational ties with these countries. Special attention has been de voted to providing scholarships for education, advanced training and professional practice at Yugoslav universities, scientifi c and economic establishments, to Indian and Burmese students and graduated professionals. That is why the number of scholarships awarded to India and Burma was from the beginning by far the highest compared with other countries. A the time of establishment of close diplomatic contacts 1954/55 it was carried out on the basis of exchange and amounted to nearly one third of the total number of scholarships granted to foreign students. Despite many difficulties with accommodation, work at the faculties, relations with local students and language barrier, some students have achieved good results and have successfully benefi ted of their stay in Yugoslavia, while exchange of scholarships has played an important role in the development of amity, better understanding and encouragement of cooperation and linking between remote and different countries, peoples and cultures. In the second half of the 1950s, after reinforcement of political ties, the volume and significance of scholarships provided to students from India and Burma declined and was suppressed by high increase in the number of scholars from other Afro-Asian countries.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Tito i Balkanski pakt

Tito i Balkanski pakt
(Tito and the Balkan Pact)

  • Author(s):Milan Terzić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:573-586
  • No. of Pages:14
  • Summary/Abstract:The Balkan Pact helped Tito bridge his relations with the West at the local level. It enabled him to soften and cushion Western requests for integrating into NATO defence structures at the global level. Thus, he has shown the West that after the conflict with Stalin he was moving in their direction, but on the internal plan he did not give up communism and retained it in a „softer” form, pursuing policy at two levels. With the Balkan Pact Tito also became and remained acceptable to the West, while managing to resist the requests to join another pact (NATO). Entering one pact (the Balkan Pact) did not imply joining another one (NATO). This was made possible by the Soviet initiative for normalization of relations initiated at this time. It is at this time that he laid groundwork for his foreign-policy position and focused on non-alignment, leaning neither to one nor to the other side.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact (1953–1954)

Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact (1953–1954)
(Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact (1953–1954))

  • Author(s):Jordan Baev
  • Language:English
  • Subject(s):Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
  • Page Range:587-601
  • No. of Pages:15
  • Keywords:Balkan Pact; Bulgaria; Yugoslavia; Greece; Turkey
  • Summary/Abstract:The tripartite Balkan pact between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, established with the treaties of Ankara of 28 February 1953, and of Bled of 9 August 1954, was discussed quite scanty in the contemporary historiography. It was described as a rather curious example of an „unthinkable treaty” between states with opposite political systems or a „virtually moribund” alliance since the beginning. The paper aims to reveal the Bulgarian official reaction and comments on the establishment of the Balkan Pact and the consequent joint military and political activities of the three Balkan states. The research is based mainly on a large number of newly available Bulgarian political, diplomatic, security, and military records; in particular, the reports and cipher correspondence from Bulgarian diplomatic missions in Ankara, Belgrade, and Athens.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Jugoslovensko-italijanski odnosi i stvaranje Balkanskog pakta 1953. godine

Jugoslovensko-italijanski odnosi i stvaranje Balkanskog pakta 1953. godine
(Yugoslav-Italian Relations and Creation of the Balkan Pact in 1953)

  • Author(s):Miljan Milkić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Cold-War History
  • Page Range:602-616
  • No. of Pages:15
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Italy; Balkan Pact; Trieste; NATO
  • Summary/Abstract:Relations between Yugoslavia and Italy in the period preceding the signing of the Balkan Pact in 1953, due to wider international circumstances, have largely depended on the policy of Great Powers. Creation of the Yugoslav and Italian foreign policy in this period was under the infl uence of strategic reasons and position of two countries within the NATO defence plans. Unsettled border issue concerning the disputable territory of the city of Trieste was the main obstacle to normalization of cooperation and the issue which placed Yugoslav-Italian relations in a wider international context. Foreign-policy decision-makers on both sides had to make their decisions in accordance with and at the dictate of arrangements that were a part of security interests of the Balkans and Europe. Alliance established by Yugoslavia with the Balkan NATO members, Greece and Turkey, placed Italy in inferior position in relation to the NATO and threatened its leading role in defence of the Mediterranean. Expectations of the Italian government to assume leadership within the NATO South Wing were in contradiction with the interests of the only Alliance members from the Balkans. After the negotiations started with Yugoslavia toward the founding of the Balkan Pact, these countries, out of consideration for the new ally, became additionally cautious toward Italy. Preparations for the signing of the Balkan Pact were blocked at one point because of the Trieste issue. The pressure of Western powers on the Italian government to prevent it from blocking the negotiations and on the Yugoslav government to enter into the alliance of Balkan states led to the creation of the Balkan Pact between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey on 28 February 1953.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Nekoliko pitanja jugoslovensko-turske saradnje

Nekoliko pitanja jugoslovensko-turske saradnje
(Some Issues of Yugoslav-Turkish Cooperation)

  • Author(s):Ratomir Milikić
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Diplomatic history, Political history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989)
  • Page Range:617-627
  • No. of Pages:11
  • Keywords:Yugoslavia; Turkey; Balkan Pact; Eastern Bloc
  • Summary/Abstract:This paper deals with some aspects of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Turkey during the turbulent Cold War years. The author explains how rather reserved cooperation and exclusively diplomatic relations developed into versatile bilateral cooperation. Economic exchange reached a fair level, followed by cultural cooperation. The basis for Yugoslav-Turkish relations was common fear of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc countries. The Balkan Pact which passed though two phases of its development – the Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the Bled Mutual Agreement Pact – enjoyed NATO’s ardent support, primarily from the U.S. administration which extended various forms of assistance to Ankara since Turkey became a NATO member. However, even in the period of greatest harmony, gathering of sensitive information in both countries never ceased, nor was mutual lack of confi dence ever surpassed because Yugoslavia and Turkey feared that the other country’s social system might have an adverse influence. Although the two countries parted in the understanding of foreignpolicy priorities, the short period of close relations served as a foundation for further improvement of cooperation in many fields, primarily in economic activities, where Yugoslavia and Turkey found each other as reliable and solid partners.
  • Price: 6.00 €
Podaci o autorima

Podaci o autorima
(Notes about authors)

  • Author(s):Author Not Specified
  • Language:Serbian
  • Subject(s):Essay|Book Review |Scientific Life
  • Page Range:13-19
  • No. of Pages:7
  • Summary/Abstract:Notes about authors
  • Price: 4.50 €
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