Jugoslavija i projekti kolektivne bezbjednosti 1950–1960.
Yugoslavia and Collective Security Projects 1950–1960

Author(s): Ivan Laković
Subject(s): Military history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism, Cold-War History
Published by: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije
Keywords: Yugoslavia; Collective Security Projects; NATO; USSR; USA
Summary/Abstract: During the early post-war years, Yugoslavia has been considered as one of the most faithful and ideologically righteous Soviet allies, the one of the opinion that USSR had played the most important war role, and that it had proved to be the natural and unquestionable leader of the forthcoming world revolution. Although the eastern bloc, which existed on the basis of ideological uniformity and, more importantly, clear supremacy of the Red Army, hasn’t been organized as a formal alliance until 1955, it had all the attributes of a functional military-ideological organization with strong subordination and hierarchy. Yugoslav projections of the future bonds of security and military cooperation have always included a membership in the eastern family and, until infamous 1948 Information Bureau Resolution; nothing seemed to be able to change them. After the break with the East, Yugoslavia tried to preserve its internal system while gaining support from the West, particularly the USA. Its position of ideological closeness to the East had been considered a desirable model for the rest of the bloc, therefore western countries have backed it up with economic, financial and military aid program. But, although fully dependant on this aid, Yugoslavia showed a high level of resistibility to all the western efforts to formally bond it with NATO institutions, do sing the measure of its opening to the extent that would provide western protection without transferring any part of national sovereignty to the alliance. Although there were moments when it seemed that a sense of threat on the eastern borders could lead to closer mutual relations, when it came to realization both sides refrained from making any resolute steps towards it, and opportunities remained unused. Yugoslavia succeeded in its intention to stay formally neutral, while the West was willing to allow it. Staying away from two major collective security systems did not mean that Yugoslavia a priori rejected all the systems of that kind. While rhetorically not rejecting the possibility of being part of than actual project of EDC, it also showed its real integrative capacity in the process of forming the Balkan Pact with Turkey and Greece. The mentioned projects, on the other hand, had not presented a threat for its foreign- and military-policy autonomy since the former have not even passed the ratification in the NATO countries, while the latter, important for the effect of its conclusion on the USSR, remained without any real operatively-functional role.

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