Търсене и извличане на политически ренти при концентрация на икономическа власт
Political-Rent-Seeking and Rent-Extraction In Terms of Concentration of Economic Power

Author(s): Ivan Todorov
Subject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, Economy, Business Economy / Management, Economic policy, Fiscal Politics / Budgeting, Socio-Economic Research
Published by: Университет за национално и световно стопанство (УНСС)
Keywords: Monetary policy rule; Fiscal policy rules; rent-seeking; rent-extraction
Summary/Abstract: The research analyzes the impact of the normative rules for limiting discretion on the concentration of power and the possible negative side effects. The fiscal policy rules ("Fiscal rules" - object of the PF’s Act) occur an inelastic supply of offers for public goods providing. The monetary policy rule ("Currency Board" - subject to the provisions of the BNB’s Act) allows carrying out monetary policy operations through the Fiscal reserve account. It is used as a strategic complementary tool in risk aversion manner of the authorized body (Ministry of Finance). Combination of aggregate rules and gaps in the regulatory framework at a lower level,including the lack of functioning capital budgeting, the concentration of economic power could materialize in rent-seeking and rent-extraction process.

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