Izbor sudaca Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske – iskustva, prijepori i moguća rješenja
Election of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia - experiences, disputes and possible solutions

Author(s): Gordan Struić
Subject(s): Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Public Law, Evaluation research
Published by: Fondacija Centar za javno pravo
Keywords: Public law; constitution; Constitutional Court; judges; election of judges; requirements; procedure; Republic of Croatia;
Summary/Abstract: The paper analyzes the conditions and procedure for the election of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia and, by describing the experience of previous elections, and indicates the disputes and problems that arise in practice. Also, it refers to the election of constitutional judges as one of the guarantees of their independence and offers a comparative view of the election in several European countries. The author concludes that in the last ten years two key steps were made in the direction of a more transparent procedure of the election of constitutional judges. First, by amending the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in 2002, in accordance with the constitutional changes in 2000 and 2001, which set down the detailed rules of procedure (public interviews with candidates, making a list of candidates, proposal of the competent working body, voting etc.). Second, by changing the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in 2010, which stipulates that the judges of the Constitutional Court shall be elected by the two-thirds majority of all the representatives in the Croatian Parliament. Considering the doubt whether to completely change the model of the election or to further improve the existing one, the author prefers the second approach suggesting voting by open ballot and terms without the possibility of re-election. Finally, the author looks into possible solutions to prevent and/or to resolve problems in cases of inability to achieve a two-thirds majority for the election of constitutional judges.

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