№51: Careful What You Wish For: Nuclear Reductions and Conventional Deterrence in Europe after Crimea
№51: Careful What You Wish For: Nuclear Reductions and Conventional Deterrence in Europe after Crimea

Author(s): Łukasz Kulesa
Subject(s): International relations/trade, Security and defense, Military policy, Geopolitics, Peace and Conflict Studies
Published by: PISM Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
Keywords: NATO; Russian annexation of Crimea; nuclear reductions; nuclear weapons; Russian Federation; European security;
Summary/Abstract: As NATO contemplates changes in its deterrence posture amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, questions regarding the relationship between the Alliance’s nuclear and conventional dimensions have gained importance. Some experts propose that the Allies should spend their scarce funds on conventional instruments of deterrence rather than on the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe. Still, the suggested shift of emphasis from nuclear to conventional would not be that easy to implement. Even with U.S. nuclear weapons removed from Europe, strengthening conventional deterrence in parallel could result in Russia increasing its reliance on its own nuclear weapons and bringing them closer to Alliance territory, further destabilising European security. Therefore, NATO should avoid making radical changes in its nuclear posture and concentrate on a calibrated beef-up of its nonnuclear presence along the eastern flank.

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