Publisher: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Defence Strategic Communications

Defence Strategic Communications

Frequency: 2 issues / Country: Latvia

Academic journal “Defence Strategic Communications” serves as an academic forum where scholars and practitioners share knowledge and ideas about Strategic Communications specifically from the defence perspective. “Defence Strategic Communications” publishes original papers, review papers, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, case studies, empirical research, technical notes and book reviews. The Journal welcomes two kinds of contributions: full-length analytical articles ranging between 8000-10000 words, and commentaries/book review essays between 3000–5000 words. Authors are requested to submit their papers in an electronic/soft format to the following email address: linda.curika@stratcomcoe.org.

ROBOTROLLING 2/2018

ROBOTROLLING 2/2018

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; Russian-language; English-language; VK; media; social media; open and free society; malicious activity; bots; Baltics; Poland; twitter;

Anonymous users stole the show this quarter. Never before have we observed such high levels of activity from anonymous accounts. At the same time, bot activity in Russian-language conversations about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has emerged from its winter slumber. In the wake of the Skripal poisonings in the UK in March, Russian-language bot and anonymous activity about NATO more than doubled. Mentions of NATO on VK, in contrast, have been stable and declining during the whole period. Social media companies are working to end platform misuse. But malicious activity is evolving. Today, anonymous accounts are dominating the conversation. These accounts are either operated manually, or they have become advanced enough to fool human observers. The responses from open and free societies to the problem of online malicious activity have neither been strong enough, nor consistent enough. Figures presented in this issue reveal a disparity between the conversation quality in English and Russian-language spaces. Currently, the Russian-language conversation about NATO in the Baltics and Poland has six times the proportion of content from bot and anonymous accounts. As Twitter has taken steps to remove bots, the disparity has only widened. We assess that 93% of Russian-language accounts in our dataset are operated anonymously or automatically. In no way does this conversation mirror opinions of citizens. Journalists, policy makers, and advertisers take note!

ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

ROBOTROLLING 3/2018

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: NATO; social media; anonymous account; online conversation; English-language message; platform misuse; Baltic; Poland; Russian-language; Reddit; Twitter; English language; Donald Trump;

President Trump’s whirlwind tour of Europe in July provoked ferocious discussion about NATO on social media. Anonymous human-controlled English-language accounts, expressing positions in support of or in opposition to the US President, dominated online conversations. Compared to the levels observed in the Spring issue of Robotrolling, the volume of English-language messages has more than doubled. The increasing proportion of anonymous accounts active during key political moments indicate that anonymity is being abused to cloak manipulation on social networks. We call on social media companies to keep investing in countering platform misuse. The social media companies Reddit and Twitter have released lists of accounts identified as originating from the notorious St Petersburg ‘troll factory’—the Internet Research Agency (IRA). In this issue, we present the first quantitative analysis comparing English- and Russian-language posts from these accounts. The IRA bombarded citizens in Russia and its neighboring states with pro-Kremlin propaganda. For English, fake accounts posed as Trump supporters, and argued both sides of the Black Lives Matter controversy. Russian-language material closely echoed and amplified the narratives popularized by Russian state-media. Amongst the accounts identified by Twitter, 26 also posted about NATO in the Baltics and Poland. Our algorithm correctly identified 24 of these as bot accounts. The other two accounts were anonymous human-controlled (troll) accounts.

RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

RUSSIAN SNAP EXERCISES IN THE HIGH NORTH

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian Federation; Western Military District; Northern Fleet; military exercise; OSCE;

On 16 March 2015 the Russian Federation began a combat readiness test (a ‘snap exercise’) of its Northern Fleet and force elements situated in its Western Military District. The scale of the exercise was much larger than originally announced, and coincided with the Norwegian exercise Joint Viking in Finnmark (the northernmost part of Norway), as well as with the US exercise Dragoon Ride. Since both exercises were announced well ahead of time, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian exercise was intended as a defensive move and/or response to them. There remains considerable debate as to whether the readiness exercise violated the Vienna Document, a confidence and security-building measure agreed upon with the OSCE. Norway stated at the time that it was monitoring the situation, and did not submit a complaint to the OSCE. However, the consistent use of such snap exercises to circumvent requirements for notification runs counter to the spirit of the agreement and undermines its provisions.

ROBOTROLLING 4/2019

ROBOTROLLING 4/2019

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Coordinated network of bots; Facebook; Twitter; Instagram; Youtube; Russian-language bot activity; English-language bot;

In this edition of Robotrolling, we expose a coordinated network of bots on Facebook, Twitter, and VK connected to a militaristic YouTube channel. Through our analysis, we discovered that the group of automated accounts is used to spread anti-NATO videos in the pro-Donbass information space. Our findings demonstrate that the video-sharing platform is a ripe target for robotic exploitation. During this period, the level of Russian-language bot activity decreased on Twitter. Meanwhile, English-language bot activity remained unchanged. On VK, the volume of messaging increased by 8%. Nearly a quarter of unique users engaging with NATO-related topics were identified as bot accounts. Russian- and English-language conversations about the NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland peaked on 13 August on both Twitter and VK. On Twitter, English-language bot and anonymous accounts targeted Poland, while the Baltic States received the majority of Russian-language bot attention. Events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Second World War attracted significant levels of fake engagement throughout the monitoring period. We observed two recurring anti-NATO narratives circulating in this context: (1) NATO is occupying the Baltic States and Poland, and (2) NATO supports fascism. Finally, this instalment of Robotrolling provides a glimpse into the flourishing world of commercial social media manipulation or, put simply, bots for hire. In a forthcoming report, we measure the inability of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter to counter online manipulation.

ROBOTROLLING 1/2020

ROBOTROLLING 1/2020

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; NATO presence in Poland and the Baltic States; Robotic accounts; Facebook; Twitter;

Inauthentic English- and Russian-language conversations on Twitter about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltic States peaked on 4 and 5 December, respectively, coinciding with the 2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting in London. Robotic accounts focused heavily on the meeting this quarter, particularly on English-language Twitter, which saw roughly 3 times the usual level of bot activity. On VK, an anomalous increase in activity from anonymous human-controlled accounts coincided with the meeting. Due to the contentious atmosphere surrounding the meeting in London, a considerable increase in the proportion of posts generated by bots was observed on English-language Twitter this quarter. At the same time, Russian-language bot activity on Twitter decreased to the lowest level observed thus far. In this issue of Robotrolling, we dig deeply into a sample of political pages amassed by a COE report on commercial social media manipulation in order to identify patterns in inauthentic activity on Facebook. We demonstrate that the 2019 elections in Ukraine were the primary focus of actors willing to pay for inflated social media engagement. Our analysis also reveals several shared traits among political manipulators on Facebook and provides a network visualisation that shows the connections between them. As a new year of Robotrolling begins, we review trends observed in VK groups over the past 18 months. A steady reduction in the proportion of content shared in communities dedicated to the so-called Novorossia region and the Donbass coincides with inauthentic content increasingly being posted in community spaces such as private groups or pages.

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

RUSSIA’S FOOTPRINT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Dimitar Bechev,Rufin Zamfir,Tihomira Doncheva / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia; Strategic interests; Western Balkans; Media; Albania; BiH; Kosovo; North Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia;

This is a summary of four reports published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in the framework of project “Russia’s Footprint in the Western Balkan Information Environment”. You can read full reports by clicking on links or visiting www.stratcomcoe.org: Russia’s Strategic Interests and Tools of Influence in the Western Balkans; Risks and Vulnerabilities in the Western Balkans; Russia’s Narratives toward Western Balkans: Analysis of Sputnik Srbija; Tracking Russia’s Narratives in the Western Balkan Media; The project investigates Russia’s tools of influence in the Western Balkans (WB), with a focus on the media landscape. The scope of analysis is Russia’s activities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project analyses Russia’s interests and influence toolbox, as well as identifies the vulnerabilities that make the Western Balkan countries susceptible to hostile influence. It also identifies the Kremlin’s narratives in the WB as well as looks at the role of local WB media in spreading those narratives. The report provides a basis for interested stakeholders to understand the methods and means that Russia uses to influence decision-making in the Western Balkans, as well as offers insights into the regional characteristics that facilitate Russia’s influence in the WB media space.

ROBOTROLLING 2/2020

ROBOTROLLING 2/2020

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bot activities; social media; disinformation; pro-Kremlin social media accounts; COVID-19 pandemic; pro-Kremlin bots; online manipulation of information;

Bot activity this quarter fixated on the global COVID-19 pandemic, with conversations about the virus captured by our dataset peaking in March. Pro-Kremlin social media accounts amplified a false story, originally shared by a Russian politician, that Poland closed its airspace to Russian planes delivering humanitarian aid to Italy. Though we found that bots commanded the Russian-language conversations about COVID-19, their content was no more viral than examples from recent Robotrolling reports. Throughout this quarter, we observed a considerable reduction in both the number of unique users and volume of messages. Inauthentic English- and Russian-language activity experienced a similar decline. Since late March, Russian-language activity on Twitter and on VK has been abnormally low. On VK, the conversation about NATO in the Baltics and Poland is currently being conducted in groups with regional or nationalist profiles. Notably, the large Russian state-run media outlets we frequently observe on the platform have engaged far less with the subject in recent months. Additionally, we observed a halving of posts from bot accounts this quarter. Finally, in this edition of Robotrolling, we delve into the role of pro-Kremlin bots in spreading disinformation about COVID-19 throughout March. In our analysis, we identify striking differences between how bots engaged with COVID-19 in the Russian- and English-language information spaces.

ROBOTROLLING 3/2020

ROBOTROLLING 3/2020

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bot activities; information space; NATO military exercise; social media; online manipulation of information;

Inauthentic activity in the Russian-language information space this quarter targeted NATO military exercises, peaking on 8 June with the commencement of BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea. Conversations amplified by both automated and anonymous accounts portrayed NATO’s summer exercises as exceptionally aggressive and demonstrative of the alliance’s ambitions to expand into Belarus and Ukraine. Throughout this quarter, we observed a significant increase in English-language bot activity. This flurry of activity was triggered by public statements suggesting the US move nuclear weapons, troops, and military equipment from Germany to Poland for permanent deployment. While the volume of Russian-language automated activity on both Twitter and VK shrunk this quarter, the percentage of conversations amplified by bot voices increased. Statebacked media outlets Sputnik and RT were popular sources of information among both English- and Russian-language audiences. The latter two sections of this report concentrate on the deleted account dataset published by Twitter in June 2020. First, we compare our list of previously identified bot accounts with those published by Twitter, which is visualised in Figure 5. Second, we evaluate Twitter’s capacity for combatting inauthentic activity on its platform, concluding that rates of identification, suspension, and deletion of accounts are unnecessarily slow.

ROBOTROLLING 4/2020

ROBOTROLLING 4/2020

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; bot activities; social media; disinformation; presidential elections in Belarus; increased fake activity; NATO; fake social media accounts;

This quarter, the disputed presidential election result and nationwide protests in Belarus were the main targets of inauthentic Russian-language accounts, resulting in a cluster of spikes in fake activity in August. Pro-Lukashenka users concocted an external threat from NATO by pushing false claims of NATO buildup along the Belarusian border and shared rumours of impending intervention. Automated users asserted that NATO posed an internal threat in Belarus as well, alleging that the demonstrations are “puppeteered” by the West. The situation in Belarus coincided with the most pronounced uptick in attention from identifiably human Russian-language accounts. Compared to the previous report, the portion of messages attributed to identifiable humans increased from 14% to 18% on Twitter and from 26% to nearly 30% on VK. This increase in legitimate engagement in NATO-related discussions of Belarus drove down the percentage of bot users to the lowest figure we have observed, 15% on Russian Twitter and 19% on VK. English-language activity focused on Polish affairs, both independently and in relation to the ongoing protests in Belarus. Inauthentic English-language discussions peaked with announcements of US troop relocation from Germany to Poland. In September, former US vice president Joe Biden made critical comments about Hungary and Poland, triggering the highest volume of automated retweets from English-language bots this quarter. Finally, in this instalment of Robotrolling we take a look at the supply side of fake social media accounts. The second iteration of the COE’s social media manipulation experiment tracks variation between the responses of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and TikTok to inauthentic engagement. Strikingly, the report found that Instagram is 10x cheaper to manipulate than Facebook, TikTok has virtually no self-regulatory defences, and it remains easy to manipulate US senators’ accounts, even during an election period.

ROBOTROLLING 1/2021

ROBOTROLLING 1/2021

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Kristina Van Sant / Language(s): English

Keywords: Robotrolling; decrease of bot activities; social media; disinformation; Twitter; fake news; online manipulation of information;

This quarter, we observed a significant drop in both authentic and inauthentic engagement with the topic of NATO in Poland and the Baltics. The number of bots and the volume of messages they disseminated decreased among both English- and Russian-language communities on Twitter and VK. Spikes in bot activity this winter coincided with NATO military exercises. Inauthentic accounts placed particular emphasis on unfounded claims of disorderly conduct among NATO soldiers and the alleged effects that military exercises have on local civilian populations. Throughout this period, inauthentic accounts also amplified claims of turmoil within the alliance and fears of military buildup along the border of Kaliningrad. While Russian-language bot activity was focused primarily on military affairs, English-language bot activity was centered on US affairs in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, particularly debates over how the Biden administration will impact US-Polish relations and transatlantic security more generally. In this issue of Robotrolling, we also discuss the steps Twitter has taken to protect its platforms from attempts to incite violence, organise attacks, and share misinformation following the riot at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. This regulatory enforcement resulted in the removal of tens of thousands of accounts connected to QAnon conspiracy theorists. Our analysis is accompanied by a visualisation of the English-language accounts mentioning the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics, demonstrating the impact these account removals will have on the information space.

ROBOTROLLING 2/2021

ROBOTROLLING 2/2021

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim / Language(s): English

Keywords: Manipulation on social media platforms; Twitter; Russian-language bot activity; online discussions; information space; GDELT;

In this edition of Robotrolling we track the most significant increase in inauthentic Russian-language social media activity we have observed since we began in 2017. While the level of bot activity remains much lower than four years ago, the uptick is concerning. The increased activity coincided with the spring and summer military exercise season, and the period running up to the Russian Federation’s Zapad exercises, scheduled for September 2021. While fake activity increased in the Russian-language space, we observed no increase in English-language activity, either from bots or from human-controlled accounts. In this edition of Robotrolling, we introduce the Global Database of Events Location and Tone (GDELT). This database of news articles helps map how the conversation about NATO in Poland and the Baltics is covered by news media, and serves as a contrast to the environment observed on Twitter and VK. This contrast reveals that in April 2021—as Russian troops mobilized along the Ukrainian border—inauthentic Russian accounts were also disproportionately active online. We round off the issue with a discussion of how AI can help us better understand the global news environment in near-real time, based on conversations with StratCom COE expert Gundars Bergmanis-Korāts and GDELT-founder Kalev Leetaru.

ROBOTROLLING 1/2022

ROBOTROLLING 1/2022

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russia's invasion of Ukraine; fake pro-Kremlin social media activity; pro-Kremlin channels; Donbas region; false information; Twitter; NATO; pro-Ukraininan messaging;

In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the “genocide” of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative’s traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets.

Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine

Virtual Manipulation Brief: Russia's Struggle to Circumvent Sanctions and Communicate Its War Against Ukraine

Author(s): Rolf Fredheim,Martha Stolze / Language(s): English

Keywords: Russian language conversation; Invasion of Ukraine; Kremlin's messaging and political aims; VKontakte; RuTube; Telegram; Twitter; Social media and politics; NATO; Russia's war against Ukraine;

In this first issue of the Virtual Manipulation Brief, we zoom in on the Russian language conversation, and how it changed as a result of the decision to invade Ukraine. Sanctions hindered the Kremlin’s messaging on Western platforms, while the focus on domestic audiences pulled many propagandists to Telegram, VKontakte, and RuTube. The number of Russian Telegram users has increased by two-thirds, while four in five users of Facebook and Instagram have left Meta’s platforms. The increase in users understates the importance of Telegram. It acts as a reliable hub, where pro-regime voices can post (almost) without fear of platform censorship. Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan’s social media posting patterns reveal how communication has adapted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In response to sanctions, she, together with many journalists working for RT and Sputnik, moved to posting through Telegram. Telegram posts are automatically cross-posted to her Western platforms, meaning the messaging continues to flow at little or no extra effort. This method has the added benefit of evading attempts by Twitter to prevent the amplification of RT content. Such use of automation means the Kremlin’s messaging will not disappear on Western platforms, even when domestic audiences are the primary focus. The comparison of Russian-language messaging about NATO on VKontakte and Twitter shows how this combination of push and pull factors has dramatically altered the Kremlin’s reach. We estimate that the relative reach of pro-Kremlin messaging on VKontakte in March 2022 was a hundred times more than normal, compared to Twitter. The Virtual Manipulation Brief builds on our Robotrolling reports, tracking how Russian bots and trolls manipulate the flow of information online. It expands the area of focus beyond the conversation about NATO to Russia’s war against Ukraine. And it will look beyond Twitter and VKontakte to track how antagonists use other social media platforms to disinform the public. In this issue, we start by examining how social media usage in Russia changed since February. A comparison of heavily amplified content about NATO on Twitter and VKontakte exposes the Kremlin’s waning ability to control conversations on Western platforms. Finally, we show how the Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan moved her communication to Telegram to evade sanctions directed at RT.