0.00 €
Keywords: Crimea;Crimea annexation; Russia; Ukraine; society
The annexation of Crimea has been a propaganda gain for the Kremlin, helping to augment supportfor the ruling elites. However, the protests of minorities opposing the annexation—Crimean Tatars andUkrainians—has prompted Russians to begin harsh repressions. On May 18, the Crimean Tatarscommemorate the anniversary of the Stalinist deportation of their nation in 1944, which led to massdeaths among the deported population. Although the Crimean Tatars are a relatively small minority atthe peninsula, they are politically well organised and will not accept the Kremlin’s praise of the Soviet(including Stalinist) era, or the current authoritarian system based on neo-imperial and neo-Sovietideology.
More...
Keywords: Azerbaijan; Iran; Turkey; Asia; Central Asia; Eurasia; Middle East; Middle East and North Africa
The Middle Eastern map of political alliances, affiliations and animosities is being constantly redrawn, but certain elements endure. The revolutionary turmoil in the region, now on full display in Syria, together with mounting tensions over issues such as Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, are the most pertinent issues that are bringing to the fore the deep, structural differences inherent in the Turkish-Iranian-Azerbaijani triangle. After what seemed as a period of growing Turkish-Iranian affinity in the past decade, the relations between Ankara and Tehran are on a downward trajectory. Turkey found it impossible to continue with the policy of „zero problems with neighbours” in the light of the events in Syria—it sided with the Sunni opposition, thus antagonizing not only the regime in Damascus, but also its most valued ally, Iran. In addition, Turkey seems to have re-calibrated its position on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, using it to signal the lack of support for Tehrans anti-Western policies. In case of Azerbaijan, religious affinity with Iran seems to count less than the underlying geopolitical choices. On top of that, a secular Azerbaijan finds itself in a sharp ideological conflict with a teocratic Iran, and is deeply concerned with Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetorics and actions. Whether a regional crisis will unfold is largely dependent on the ability of all three countries to forestall the escalation of the existing problems into much graver feuds.
More...
This brief presents the main conclusions related to Bulgaria from a comparative study of support programs and reintegration of children - victims of trafficking in the six member states of the European Union, conducted in 2011 and 2012. The survey was carried out by the Center for the Study of Democracy within the project ARECHIVIC in collaboration with partner organisations from Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary and Sweden. With regard to Bulgaria the main approaches, mechanisms and deficiencies in policies and programs for the reintegration of children - victims of trafficking are presented and some recommendations for their improvement are suggested.
More...
Keywords: Odessa Oblast; Saakashvili
Two years after the Revolution of Dignity, Odessa Oblast, one of Ukraine’s key regions in economic and political terms, is still strongly polarised as regards its residents’ views on the future of their country. The political circles rooted in the Party of Regions have maintained their influence to a great extent due to increasing dissatisfaction with the central government’s activity and with the economic crisis which has strongly affected the public. Politicians linked to the ancien régime remain the most important political players. Some pro-Ukrainian circles had pinned their hopes for change in the region on the nomination of the former Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, for governor of Odessa Oblast on 30 May 2015. At the beginning of his rule this politician made widely publicised promises to combat corruption, to improve the quality of the administration services, to develop infrastructure and to attract foreign capital. However, more than half a year has passed since he assumed office, and it is difficult to speak about any spectacular successes in reforming the region. Saakashvili has above all become a player on the national forum, supporting the presidential camp in their struggle with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, among others. However, his nomination has made Odessa Oblast more important for Ukraine, above all in political and symbolic terms. This is because Odessa Oblast is the best manifestation of the condition of the Ukrainian state two years since the Revolution of Dignity – rudimentary reforms or no reforms at all, strong resistance to any changes from the administration, strong local political-business connections, the lack of consolidation among post-Maidan groups and corruption inherent in the system.
More...
Keywords: 16+1; China; economic policy
When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.
More...
Keywords: coal energy industry in Germany; energy
Germany’s current energy strategy, known as the “energy transition”, or Energiewende, involves an accelerated withdrawal from the use of nuclear power plants and the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to the government’s plans, the share of RES in electricity production will gradually increase from its present rate of 26% to 80% in 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to fall by 80–95% by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels. However, coal power plants still predominate in Germany’s energy mix – they produced 44% of electricity in 2014 (26% from lignite and 18% from hard coal). This makes it difficult to meet the emission reduction objectives, lignite combustion causes the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to reach the emission reduction goals, the government launched the process of accelerating the reduction of coal consumption. On 2 July, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published a plan to reform the German energy market which will be implemented during the present term of government. Emission reduction from coal power plants is the most important issue. This problem has been extensively discussed over the past year and has transformed into a conflict between the government and the coal lobby. The dispute reached its peak when lignite miners took to the streets in Berlin. As the government admits, in order to reach the long-term emission reduction objectives, it is necessary to completely liquidate the coal energy industry in Germany. This is expected to take place within 25 to 30 years. However, since the decision to decommission nuclear power plants was passed, the German ecological movement and the Green Party have shifted their attention to coal power plants, demanding that these be decommissioned by 2030 at the latest.
More...
Keywords: migration; Ukraine; crisis
Before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the scale of labour outward migration of Ukrainians had been characterised by a slight downward trend. Back in 2014, an increase in the number of Ukrainians who migrated to Russia was observed, although no similar increase was recorded for EU countries (excluding Poland). The year 2015 brought a more rapid surge in the number of Ukrainians migrating to the EU, again mainly to Poland. Due to the lack of current EU-wide data[1], estimates can be made based only on data compiled by national statistical offices in countries which are the most popular with Ukrainian migrants. In Poland, as of October 2015 Ukrainians held 52,000 valid residence cards. Much greater migration dynamics have been observed in the case of temporary migration – the number of declarations which enable an individual to take up a temporary job in Poland, issued in the first half of 2015, was a staggering 400,000. This means a more than twofold increase – in the whole of 2014 372,000 declarations were issued to Ukrainian citizens. No similar increase has so far been observed in other EU states, including Italy and the Czech Republic, which have always been popular destinations for Ukrainian migration. In late 2014, 233,000 Ukrainian migrants were registered in Italy (in late 2013 the figure was 191,000), whereas in the Czech Republic the number of Ukrainian migrants remains stable – 104,000 in June 2015.
More...
Keywords: Azerbaijan; international relations; Eurasia
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West, launched two decades ago, has helped it become a relatively strong and ambitious actor on the international stage. It has become a key country in the region from the Western (USA and the EU) and Turkish points of view, as well as an important partner in the energy sector. The strategic EU concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, also supported by the United States, is among the initiatives based on cooperation with Azerbaijan.Surprisingly, however, Azerbaijan’s increased ambition and importance have caused its policy to diverge ever farther from the expectations and plans formulated by the West. The changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, occurring in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, have forced Azerbaijan to revise its assessment of its position in the region. The main impetus for Azerbaijan’s actions is fear of Russia, as well as the weakness of the West which has become particularly apparent in the recent stages of the Ukrainian crisis.
More...
Keywords: Zapad; Russia; Belarus; NATO
The Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2017 (West-2017) exercises, scheduled for 14–20 September, have for many months been the core of an information war between Russia and NATO, in which Ukraine and Belarus have also participated. The media have presented these exercises as allegedly the biggest military undertaking carried out in recent years by the armed forces of the Russian Federation (together with its Belarusian ally) in the immediate vicinity of the borders of NATO states, which could form the basis for the annexation of Belarus and/or a strike at Ukraine. And although it is hard to dispute the scale and breadth of these exercises, they are only a small part of Russia’s preparation for a potential military showdown with NATO. The real engagement of troops in these exercises will not be the largest, in terms of the scale and the force employed, or the most important in the Russian army’s preparation to carry out its plans during wartime in (from its perspective) the western strategic direction. The training exercises reported in the media, which have mainly been carried out on Russian training grounds from May to August this year, have not been an essential element of these preparations in 2017. These exercises, held jointly with the Belarusian component (in operational terms the Belarusian army should be considered as an integral part of the Russian armed forces in the western strategic direction), were nominally merely a preparatory stage to the Zapad-2017 exercises. The exercises involving Russian troops alone should be considered as more important, especially those checking the combat readiness of the units which have been newly created or expanded in the last three years. Compared to the period in which the previous exercises (Zapad-2013) were held, Russia’s military potential in the western strategic direction, especially its land forces, has doubled in size.
More...
Keywords: Chechnya; Caucasian Jihad; 'hidden' separatism
1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. The fighting has become less intensive every year, and the militants, worn out by years of warfare, are unable to take the initiative and seriously challenge the federal troops stationed in Chechnya. However, even if the militants have lost strength, this does not mean that the conflict is over. The region's history and the increasingly tense situation in the other Caucasian republics bordering Chechnya suggest that instability will probably continue for many more years.2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. At present, it is not only a Russian-Chechen conflict, but also an internal clash between the separatist militants and those Chechens who are co-operating with Moscow. The conflict also has an increasingly apparent social background. Finally, the militants' ideology has also changed: today they are fighting not so much for national liberation as for the Islamic cause.3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. The latter seek to 'liberate' the entire North Caucasus and establish sharia law in the region. 354. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism. Today, it manifests itself not through armed struggle, but through demands for ever-wider autonomy within the Russian Federation ('hidden' separatism). Such demands have been raised by the formally pro-Russian government of Chechnya, led by Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov. The objective is to acquire real, rather than formal, independence from Moscow, especially in the economic sphere. An analysis of the current situation in the republic leads to the conclusion that this objective has already largely been achieved; today Chechnya in many areas remains outside the Russian legal system and enjoys extensive internal autonomy. 5. A renewed outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya seems unlikely in the immediate future, the main reason for this being that the Chechen people are tired of the long war. In the longer term, however, it appears inevitable that the Chechens will rise against Moscow again, fighting either for national liberation or for Islam. In the former case, the movement will be probably led by the current, formally pro-Russian government. However, it is also possible that by that time, the Caucasian Islamists will have gained enough strength to become the driving force behind a new, massive uprising against Russia, whose objective will be to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus.
More...
Keywords: Serbia-Kosovo negotiation; international agreement; European Union; West; territory exchange; reviewing the borders; normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations;
The negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement to normalise relations between the two states are to enter a new phase in September. Although the negotiations, which have been going on since 2011 under the oversight of the European Union, may have prompted the incorporation of the Serbian minority and the territories it inhabits into Kosovo’s institutional system, they have been at a standstill for three years. The authorities in Prishtina are unwilling to agree to further concessions to the Serbs until Belgrade recognises Kosovo’s independence, at least on a de facto basis. Any compromise will come at a high political cost for the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo, due to hostility on the part of the public and the opposition in both states. Meanwhile, the EU and the US are putting pressure on Belgrade and Prishtina to reach an agreement by no later than mid-2019. The Serbian and Kosovar elites cannot ignore this pressure as they largely owe their political positions to support from the West, and for this reason the authorities in both states wish to play for time and prolong the talks. They are doing this by periodically escalating tensions and putting forward solutions that are unacceptable to the other party or the international community. One example of this was the proposals made in July by the presidents of Serbia and Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučic and Hashim Thaçi, to exchange territory and change borders, which caused a great deal of controversy inside and outside the countries. Moreover, divisions between countries in the West, which do not have a united strategy regarding the negotiations, may hamper moves to reach a compromise. The United States is pushing for a quick resolution of the dispute, even if this means reviewing the borders. However, Germany is opposed to that solution as it fears that this would strengthen separatist movements throughout the entire Balkans. Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians will try to exploit these divisions, while the success of the process of normalising Serbian-Kosovar relations will in fact depend upon effective pressure from the West.
More...
Keywords: Russia; Iran; geopolitics; relations with United States; cooperation in Syria; Sunni extremism; strategic partners; Middle East;
Russia’s relations with Iran are almost entirely based on geopolitical assumptions. Both states are interested in weakening the position the United States holds in the region; both have a common enemy in the form of Sunni extremism. Combined with the successful cooperation in Syria, which is not devoid of elements of rivalry, these priorities make Russia and Iran strategic partners in the Middle East.
More...
Keywords: Cyberterrorism; security threats; internet; cyberthreats; cyber attack;
If the seriousness of a given “emerging security threat” is measured by the number of recent analyses devoted to it or the proliferation of experts studying it, then cyberthreats must now surpass the dangers of offline terrorism and energy security. While all issues “cyber” attract a high level of policymaker attention, another threat seems to have been forgotten and marginalised: cyberterrorism. To an extent, the evolution of cyberterrorism mirrors that of “regular” terrorism, which erupted as the “weapon of the weak,” and after a state-sponsored phase seems to be returning to its sub-state or even “lone wolf” roots. Cyberthreats, on the other hand, originally of a sub-state nature, are now mostly in the domain of state entities that have not yet made the decision to launch state-sponsored cyberterrorism.
More...
UKRAINE-NATO PARTNERSHIP: TIME OF AWARENESS OF REALITIES, NEEDS AND NEW APPROACHES // Annex 1. NEUTRALITY, EUROPEAN SECURITY, PARTNERSHIP: EXPERIENCE OF AUSTRIA, IRELAND, FINLAND, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN // Appendix 2. MAIN FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION // UKRAINE-NATO PARTNERSHIP: NEW REALITIES - NEW REQUIREMENTS // REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO AND ALLIANCE COUNTRIES: JAMES APPATURE, LAURIE LEPIC // REPRESENTATIVES OF NEUTRAL EUROPEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES: Gerhard JANDL, Carolina HONKANEN, Michel CODURI // INDEPENDENT EXPERTS: James GREEN, Edward LUCAS // REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MFA AND MO OF UKRAINE: Alexander ALEKSANDROVICH, Vladimir MOZHAROVSKY // PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO IN THE CONDITIONS OF UKRAINE'S NON-BLACK POLICY: ACTUALITY, STATUS, PROSPECTS // REALITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE'S COOPERATION WITH NATO IN THE CONDITIONS OF NON-BLOCK STATUS // NEUTRALITY IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC DIMENSION: HISTORY AND THE PRESENT // STATE AND PROSPECTS OF MILITARY TECHNICAL UKRAINE'S COOPERATION WITH NATO // ARE THERE ANY ALTERNATIVES FOR NON-BLOCK UKRAINE'S PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO? // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EURO-ATLANTIC COOPERATION OF UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF NON-BLOCK // FOREIGN POLICY, NATIONAL SECURITY, NON-BLOCK STATUS AND PARTNERSHIP: EXPERT ASSESSMENTS // FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY POLICY OF UKRAINE: PUBLIC OPINION
More...
1. Political competition // 1.1. Positions of key political players // 1.2. Russian military threat as consolidation factor // 2. Economic situation // 2.1. Exchange rate // 2.2. State budget // 2.3. International aid // 3. State decisions // 3.1. HR policy
More...
Public Policies // Economic Analysis // Political Competition
More...
Keywords: BiH; development; action plans; open government partnership; civil society;
On September 24, at the United Nations Headquarters, the Open Government Partnership formally welcomed Bosnia and Herzegovina as the 65th country to join the OGP. The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is an international voluntary initiative established on the principles of transparency, accountability and public participation. Launched in 2011 with the aim to provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens, the OGP has grown from eight countries to the 65 participating countries today. In all of these countries, government and civil society are working together to develop and implement ambitious open government reforms. Today there are more than 2000 initiatives implemented by different countries under the OGP, with the purpose of making governments more accountable and open. Different countries joined the initiative at different times, so some of them are now implementing their second Action Plan, some are implementing their first Action Plan and the most recent members, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be developing their first action plans. It is expected that Bosnia and Herzegovina will submit its first Action Plan to OGP by June 2015. The purpose of this Policy memo is to outline key elements of action planning and suggest possible avenues for approaching the action planning process in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the following period, as the country is about to start working on its first Action Plan.
More...
Keywords: Rosja; Ukraina; wojna
Agresywna retoryka i nieprzyjazne działania Moskwy względem Mołdawii na tle inwazji na Ukrainę doprowadziły do znacznego przyspieszenia – obserwowanego od lat, ale dotychczas bardzo powolnego – procesu osłabiania rosyjskich wpływów w tym kraju. Kontekst wojenny umożliwił prozachodnim władzom w Kiszyniowie wykonanie posunięć (a niekiedy wręcz je do nich zmusił), przed którymi poprzednie gabinety powstrzymywały się m.in. w obawie przed reakcją Kremla. Kluczowe zmiany zaszły w energetyce – udało się ograniczyć znaczenie Rosji w zakresie dostaw gazu i zredukowano wpływ tamtejszych mediów. Kiszyniów stał się też asertywniejszy wobec Naddniestrza – m.in. zaostrzył ustawodawstwo wymierzone w separatystów czy obniżył wolumeny gazu dostarczanego do tego regionu. Rządzący zdołali także rozpocząć publiczną dyskusję m.in. na temat zasadności członkostwa Mołdawii w WNP, stanu sił zbrojnych czy – zapisanej w konstytucji – neutralności państwa. Równolegle inwazja na Ukrainę doprowadziła do załamania relacji handlowych z Rosją i przyspieszyła odpływ mołdawskich migrantów zarobkowych z tego kraju.
More...