Series:POLICY MEMO

The EU and Belarus after the Election

The EU and Belarus after the Election

Author(s): Balázs Jarábik,Jana Kobzova,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarus and EU;

The crackdown that followed the presidential election in Belarus on 19 December 2010 reversed pre-election signals that had promised a relatively liberal atmosphere. After a rigged election result that gave President Alyaksandr Lukashenka an implausible 79 percent of the vote, more than 600 Belarusian citizens were arrested, including eight of Lukashenka’s nine opponents in the election. However, although he was able to survive the election, Lukashenka now faces economic pressures and a forthcoming struggle over the privatisation of state assets, which will be the most important test of his ability to keep both the elite and society under control. In that context, the post-election crackdown was a sign not of the regime’s strength but of its internal weakness. As the country’s internal struggles intensify, it would be a bad time for the European Union to isolate Belarus. // At the same time, however, the EU must react in order to regain credibility in its neighbourhood. In the past, the EU and the United States tried both isolating and engaging the regime. Although neither policy was a complete failure, neither was particularly effective. In addition to expressing solidarity with those still in prison, the EU must now devise a proactive strategy that changes Lukashenka’s options. Lukashenka is a great survivor who has shown skill in balancing between Russia and the West, but his position has been weakened. While Russia is also increasingly frustrated with its ally, the interruption of EU dialogue with Minsk increases the chances that Moscow will gain control of its neighbour’s economy. The EU now has an opportunity to regain the initiative in its relationship with Belarus. It should raise the stakes for both the regime and Russia through a combination of targeted and ‘smart’ isolation, selective sanctions and engagement.

THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: 2011 REVIEW

THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: 2011 REVIEW

Author(s): Richard Gowan,Franziska Brantner / Language(s): English

Over the last year, three major crises – Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria – tested Europe’s ability to shape decision-making at the UN. The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire showed that China could be persuaded to support democracy and that Russia by itself lacked the leverage to hold up the Security Council indefinitely. The Libyan debate demonstrated the persistence of Western power in the UN system, even though the EU split over how to act. Ironically, although Europe was more united over Syria, this failed to translate into action as the non-Western powers reasserted themselves. Support for European positions on hu-man rights votes in the General Assembly stayed roughly level, but the EU also won important votes about gay rights and its own status as a bloc at the UN. // The picture of the UN that emerges from these events is one of an institution in flux. While the UN has recently seemed to be drifting into bloc politics, this year coalitions formed on a crisis-by-crisis basis. This may foreshadow the emergence of an increasingly multipolar UN dominated by fluid diplomatic alliances. Although it sometimes struggles to maintain its own unity, the EU now has opportunities to build coalitions of states that can deliver action on human rights and crisis management – if it can overcome its own internal divisions.

SAVING THE EURO: WHAT’S CHINA’S PRICE?

SAVING THE EURO: WHAT’S CHINA’S PRICE?

Author(s): François Godement / Language(s): English

Although Europe needs external lending and the show of confidence it brings, its attempt to persuade China and other emerging economies to enlarge the resources of the EFSF is likely to bring only limited results. However, there are various other scenarios under which China and other investors may lend to Europe. The best case scenario from Europe’s point of view is that it would increase the lending capacity of the EFSF or the ECB and turn them into a super borrower and lender. But this scenario is unlikely to become a reality because it requires a “big bang”-like reinvention of European public finance for which there is no commitment. More likely is that the ECB will underwrite a new IMF fund dedicated to the support or rescue of European member states. This would mean a larger Chinese contribution in IMF decisionmaking. Alternatively, China could seek to lend to Europe in renminbi, thus transferring the exchange risk to the European borrower. Such a deal would also offer China an unprecedented guaran-tee against any depreciation of the euro. Finally, the euro could collapse altogether and the IMF could be called in – the worst case scenario. In any case, Europe should acknowledge the interdependence between it and China and therefore its need for external capital.

THE END OF THE PUTIN CONSENSUS

THE END OF THE PUTIN CONSENSUS

Author(s): Ben Judah / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU and Russia; Vladimir Putin;

The “Putin consensus” of the 2000s is over. Although Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is certain to win a hollow victory in the Russian presidential elections in March, the current electoral cycle has weakened his authority and shown the fragility of his regime. Russia is undergoing a process of re-politicisation and is entering a phase of “late Putinism” that is likely to be characterised by elite divisions, continued protests and a gradual ebbing away of popular support. The protest movement that erupted after the falsified vote in the parliamentary election in December has not yet challenged Putin’s grip on power but is nevertheless a symptom of an increasingly unstable Russia. The European Union should see the current crisis as a clear signal that the Putin system will not last forever. Since December, the Kremlin has already faked counter-demonstrations, harassed the media, indulged in ritualistic but corrosive anti-Westernism, and splurged on social spending to try to re-consolidate support. Putin has also talked of reform, but his weakness will more likely make him more dependent on his oligarchic allies. The EU should begin a long-term dialogue with the Russian opposition focusing on improving anti-corruption practices inside the EU and take measures such as passing a pan-EU “Magnitsky List” to threaten those involved in egregious human rights abuses and corruption with visa bans and asset freezes.

SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO RUSSIA: Belarus and the Zapad military Exercises

SO FAR FROM GOD, SO CLOSE TO RUSSIA: Belarus and the Zapad military Exercises

Author(s): Fredrik Wesslau,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Belarus;

Fears that Russia may use Zapad 2017 as cover to carry out a hybrid operation in Belarus are overblown. Moscow has other levers with which it can coerce Minsk, and it neither needs nor is interested in another military adventure at the moment. // President Lukashenka realises that relying solely on Moscow is dangerous and wants instead to diversify his strategic options by inching closer to Europe. But there are limits to how much Lukashenka can, or even wants to, approach the West. His survival depends fundamentally on maintaining an economic lifeline to Moscow. He knows that taking significant amounts of Western money comes with requirements of structural reforms that would undermine the basis for his rule. // The European Union should support the gradual strengthening of Belarusian sovereignty, build further links, and step up engagement. This will bring Belarus closer to the West, as well as create more opportunities to influence Minsk on human rights and democracy. A policy of isolation would only push Belarus further into Russia’s tight embrace.

DON’T CLOSE BORDERS, MANAGE THEM: How to improve EU Policy on Migration through Libya

DON’T CLOSE BORDERS, MANAGE THEM: How to improve EU Policy on Migration through Libya

Author(s): Mattia Toaldo / Language(s): English

Keywords: migration Africa-Europe;

Two years after the start of the refugee cri s i s , migrat ion flows via Libya to Europe are increasing, while deaths in the Mediterranean have skyrocketed. Current policies have failed to reduce the number of migrants reaching Europe’s shores. // The EU and its member states need to rethink their basic assumptions about migration and break popular taboos about the movement of people if they are going to reduce flows. The first step is to cast away the idea that borders can be completely closed to economic migrants. // The EU and its member states need to manage flows, rather than aiming to cut them to zero. To do this, legal migration channels should be opened so that illegal channels can be shut via a series of readmission agreements. // Through a coalition of the willing, EU member states can implement this policy, which should also involve establishing safe and quick procedures to guarantee asylum to refugees; reinforcing the Libyan economy and its local communities; building respect for the rule of law and human rights; and finally, broadening the scope of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya.

Spain after the Elections: The “Germany of the South”?

Spain after the Elections: The “Germany of the South”?

Author(s): José Ignacio Torreblanca,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

As Spain votes, it finds itself at the centre of the two major crises with which the European Union (EU) is currently struggling: the euro crisis and the Arab Spring. Should it fail to resolve the euro crisis, the European project will be politically and economically paralysed for a long time. Should Europe fail to support the Arab revolutions, on the other hand, the EU will be faced with a series of drifting countries on its southern rim. Yet the collapse of the eurozone and failure on the Mediterranean are not inevitable. Spain could play an important role in solving both crises – if the rest of Europe helps it to do so. // First, through Mariano Rajoy’s plan to turn Spain into the “Germany of the South”, Spain can help to heal the divisions between northern and southern Europe. This will in turn give Spain credibility to make sure that, as Germany and others take necessary steps towards political union, they do so in a way that is open and fair and benefits the whole of Europe. Second, by taking the lead on European foreign policy in the Mediterranean and by associating itself with the Weimar Triangle’s defence agenda, Spain can make a contribution to European foreign policy. Such a proactive strategy would be good for both the EU and Spain.

Ukraine after the Tymoshenko Verdict

Ukraine after the Tymoshenko Verdict

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yuliya Tymoshenko;

The trial and sentencing of the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in 2011 is a double challenge to the European Union – testing both its credibility and the transformative capacity of its soft power. Kiev ignored clear warnings from Brussels and key member states, and then failed to deliver on promises of compromise. // The EU-Ukraine summit on Monday 19th December offers the chance to stop the rot in relations with Kyiv. // In a new policy memo published by ECFR, ‘Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict’, Andrew Wilson argues that instead of lecturing Ukraine on human rights the EU needs to show that it means business.

Re-Writing the US-EU Relationship

Re-Writing the US-EU Relationship

Author(s): Daniel Korski,Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English

In 2005, as the dust settled on one of the most fractious periods in transatlantic relations, the then German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder called for a debate about new transatlantic institutions in a speech at the Munich Security Conference. He argued that NATO could no longer be the central institution in a relationship that spanned everything from climate change and genetically modified (GM) foods to joint actions in Afghanistan and the Balkans. The thrust of his message was undeniably correct, but the timing was not ideal. Just two years after the invasion of Iraq, Europeans and Americans were willing to work together again at an operational level, but political divisions were still raw. And there were still great differences, at the level of analysis and solutions, on some of the biggest global issues, such as international terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, climate change, and the International Criminal Court.