Series:DEM. POLICY COUNCIL - Policy Briefs

№01 Understanding and Breaking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitutional Deadlock: A New Approach for the European Union and United States.

№01 Understanding and Breaking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitutional Deadlock: A New Approach for the European Union and United States.

Author(s): Bodo Weber,Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; constitution; Dayton accords; Bonn Powers; Serb Republic; OHR; Milorad Dodik; independence; international community; EU; US; constitutional reform;

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is currently in a severe crisis that could yield total political paralysis,and perhaps eventual disintegration of the state. The international community in BiH has no discernable strategy. While rejecting Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik’s desire for eventual RS independence and international acquiescence to it, there has been no effective response. The international community’s acquiescence leaves BiH in a “neither secession nor success,” limbo. Unable to align its desire for a reduced commitment to the ugly on-the-ground reality, the EU nevertheless has clung to its standard script of progress and “transition” brought about solely through EU inducements – a theoretical nirvana of carrots without need of sticks. This lack of strategic engagement has fostered political decay. BiH requires far more tailored reform than the off-the-peg acquis communautaire, which treats BiH as if it were Slovenia. Last December, the desire to proclaim “success” at any cost by initialing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) led to an ignominious surrender on police reform – a surrender that has now proved futile, as reform is once more blocked. Even if the SAA is signed later this year, it will not transform BiH into a functional state. The stumbling block for BiH is its constitutional order. Robust international engagement through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), equipped with its executive “Bonn Powers” has allowed a project of state-building from above over the past decade. This has resulted in a number of institutions, laws, and reforms that have helped BiH recover from its 1992-1995 war. But the durability of these accomplishments in the face of hostility from established political elites is questionable – as the degeneration of the past two years has shown. The BiH political elite forms an oligarchy, and while the Dayton order suits no faction leader perfectly, it is the second-best option for all of them. Dayton’s Annex IV deters linkages among citizens who consistently profess similar priorities and concerns. With weak international engagement, Dayton BiH defaults toward de facto partition. Until there is a constitutional order capable of allowing BiH to advance toward the EU under its own steam, all the Dayton instruments, including the High Representative with Bonn Powers, must be maintained – and strengthened. The EU holds the carrots and the HR wields the sticks. Creative thinking regarding new sticks is urgently needed.

№02 DPC POLICY BRIEFS: Sliding toward the Precipice: Europe’s Bosnia Policy.

№02 Sliding toward the Precipice: Europe’s Bosnia Policy.

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,James Lyon,Eric Witte / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; constitution; Dayton accords; EU; Milorad Dodik; Haris Silajdžić;

Over the past three years, Bosnia’s political environment has noticeably worsened: the current trajectory could lead to attempts at secession and renewed conflict. Among Bosnians, perceived threats to personal safety and livelihood have risen to new post-war heights as international listlessness has permitted Bosnian politicians to believe they can pursue wartime objectives without challenge. For years the European Union has claimed that reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is heading in the right direction, albeit slowly. EU officials point to the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) signed on 16 June 2008 as evidence of progress.But Bosnia has not only stagnated over the past three years – it has been sliding backwards at an accelerating pace. To be sure, Bosnia is not at the brink of war, but it has slid well down the slope in that direction. As the situation deteriorates, the cost of international engagement to end the threat and place the country on stable footing will climb, perhaps exponentially. The November 10 meeting of EU foreign, development and defence ministers (GAERC) provides an opportunity to take the first steps toward checking this emerging crisis. In the short term the EU should bolster international capacity to deter anti-Dayton actions by nationalist politicians that could tip Bosnia into the abyss. Then, in order to move Bosnia beyond crisis management, they should signal that fundamental constitutional reform will be the focal point of international involvement in the EU’s forthcoming mission, which will join the EUSR with the EC Delegation. This would set the stage for action by the broader Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international steering board for OHR that meets later in the month.

№09 Making the Market on Constitutional Reform in BiH in the Wake of the EU Initiative.

№09 Making the Market on Constitutional Reform in BiH in the Wake of the EU Initiative.

Author(s): Oscar Fernandez,Valery Perry,Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; Dayton accords; constitutional reform; EU; council of europe; high representative; US; Milorad Dodik; Dragan Čović; Sejdić-Finci;

The European Union (EU) initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), initiated by Germany and the United Kingdom in November 2014, has effectively sidelined the question of constitutional change for the foreseeable future. EU officials and member state diplomats have taken great pains to emphasize that none of the vaguely outlined (and yet to be defined) reforms in the “irrevocable written commitment” recently accepted by party leaders and voted on in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly will require any amendment to the Dayton constitutional order; statements by Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik echo this assertion. Whether the socio-economic reforms envisioned in the Compact for Growth and other elements can be achieved without confronting these structural issues remains to be seen. That it took two and a half months from the adoption of the initiative by the EU to secure the commitment is worthy of note, as is the fact that signatories to the commitment – notably HDZ BiH leader Dragan Čović – at the same time continue to advocate for major changes to the state structure.

№08 EUFOR: In Urgent Need of a Plan B.

№08 EUFOR: In Urgent Need of a Plan B.

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; EUFOR; UNSC; Plan B; Moscow; RS; veto;

The EU’s foreign ministers last week reaffirmed their support for EUFOR/Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), overcoming reluctance on the part of a number of EU members – France and Germany in particular – to extend the executive aspects of the mission. On November 11, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is scheduled to vote on extending EUFOR’s executive mandate, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, allowing it to use force to ensure international peace and security. The disposition of Russia, a veto wielding member of the permanent five members of the UNSC (“P-5”), is in question. This policy brief reviews the continuing need for EUFOR’s executive mandate in BiH and assesses concerns as to Moscow’s position prior to next month’s vote. It then considers the West’s potential fallback options.

№06 EU Policies Boomerang: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Social Unrest.

№06 EU Policies Boomerang: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Social Unrest.

Author(s): Bodo Weber,Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: EU policy; BiH; social unrest; Tuzla; protests; FBiH; police; fragmentation; politicization; incompetence; political opportunism;

The social discontent manifest in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), begun with violent protests in Tuzla on February 5, spread throughout the Federation, was a new phenomenon. But it was long in the making. As manifest in demands for non-partisan and technical governments, much of the general population has clearly lost hope that the country’s political system can represent them or deliver any meaningful change. Such misgivings are well-founded: the problem is structural and institutional, not simply a question of who occupies given offices. It is hard to see any solutions being arrived at institutionally – or the current political menu offering hope of meaningful change at the ballot box in October. The protests arose for legitimate reasons, were anti-incumbent and anti-establishment, not ethnic in nature, and appear to have spontaneously grown and spread. But existing political elites have sought to either redirect this anger or harness it, often with ethnic and ethno-territorial argumentation. This situation owes directly to the EU-led international posture of the past eight years. Hopes that the EU enlargement process would impel reform and progress by BiH’s political class were shown to be clearly misplaced by late 2006. Yet larger EU member states, especially Germany and France, as well as the European Commission and EEAS, hew to this failed policy to the present day, attempting to mold the Bosnian reality to their preference to avoid further responsibility and entanglement. The rules-free environment engendered by this policy allowed BiH politicians unlimited room for venality and irresponsible action (and inaction). Such a policy was bound to have a nasty confrontation with reality. It has finally arrived.

№07 Outline for a Common Western Policy Pivot on BiH.

№07 Outline for a Common Western Policy Pivot on BiH.

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; social unrest; protests; Tuzla; FBiH; political accountability; western policy; EU; Germany; dialogue; Zagreb; Croat question; America;

Recent popular unrest and protest in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), driven by a lack of political accountability and a dire socio-economic reality, caught all established interests – including the political elite and international actors – off-guard. While the initial instances of violence have thankfully not been repeated, the full political spectrum raced to deflect popular opprobrium by kindling ethnic fear, or harness it politically. The situation remains volatile. Even if the protest movement dissipates, the deep social frustrations that underlie it will continue to simmer and eventually find another outlet – with the potential for violence which could be diverted ethnically. The EU, which has steered the international approach toward BiH since 2005, has yet to develop a credible reaction. The European Commission’s proposal for more “Structured Dialogues” on a wider range of topics will just pile new failure upon a three-year history of counterproductive policy. Croatia’s still-underdeveloped policy proposals would combine the EC’s false hope in “pre-screening” with a co-optation of EU policy by an ethnically skewed Croat-centric focus.

№05 “Are we there yet?” International impatience vs. a long-term strategy for a viable Bosnia.

№05 “Are we there yet?” International impatience vs. a long-term strategy for a viable Bosnia.

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; long-term strategy; international activity; Butmir; visa liberalization; international relations; EU; US; OHR; secession; third entity; election; stabilization;

The international community’s collective approach toward Bosnia and Herzegovina has failed to gain any traction, as it remains based on false assumptions. The governments comprising the Peace Implementation Council’s Steering Board (PIC) have not been able to summon the will to confront the actual challenges Bosnia poses, preferring to operate from the off-the-shelf EU integration playbook. As a result, 2009 saw a further deterioration in the overall political situation. American political credibility in Bosnia was dented by the failed “Butmir process” last October, during and after which the US ceded direction of its policy to the EU. The Obama administration is struggling to devote sufficient attention to Bosnia’s worsening situation and continues to eschew the most plausible tool to deal with a fragmented EU – a presidential special envoy. The collective international posture lurches between frenetic diplomatic activity in search of a short-term deliverable and passivity. This modus operandi has allowed Bosnian political actors with unfulfilled agendas, most prominently Republika Srpska Premier Milorad Dodik, to operate without constraint, even calling the survival of the stateinto question. Policies among PIC members differ, but most are in a passive role, absent any clear leadership. Russia has acted as an enabler for Dodik. Germany has twin pillars of its current Bosnia policy: reducing the international commitment in Bosnia, and fixation on policy coordination with Russia. Turkey, meanwhile, has ramped up its diplomatic engagement since Butmir, with an emphasis on the relationships between Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia. It is the only member of the PIC that has engaged consistently, and can point to some results. Meanwhile, the Dayton Agreement’s enforcement instruments, the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR, have been allowed to wither due to lack of political will to employ them. The current policy therefore contains a contradiction: the Dayton Annex 4 Constitution is expected to remain for the foreseeable future, but its enforcement mechanisms might disappear in less than a year.As the October general elections approach, the spectrum of possibilities, from improvement to furtherworsening of the situation, is wider than at any point since Dayton was signed. While Dodik seeks to portray himself as electorally invincible, there is evidence to suggest that he has peaked and could face a voter backlash. The Croat political spectrum is divided, while the current rules-free atmosphere has allowed flirtation with the RS to support a “third entity”. The Bosniak political spectrum is more fragmented than ever, with the emergence of new populist political party led by media tycoon Fahrudin Radončić. One of the two tools of choice for Bosnian politicians, patronage, may be constrained by the economic crisis. But the other, fear, is more salient than ever, as the absence of a long-term international strategy has allowed uncertainty about the future to take hold. Recent incidents in Široki Brijeg, Sarajevo, and Tuzla all point to the potential for both planned and spontaneous outbursts of violence. The international default setting remains to talk down any such possibility. Bosnia is suffering a deterrence failure. Little forward movement on the 5+2 objectives and criteria or on constitutional reform is likely between now and the formation of a new government after the elections. However, in the coming months, Western governments can help create the conditions for progress in 2011 and beyond. This will require some policy reversals on both sides of the Atlantic. But these would create a context in which the difficult and broad societal compromises necessary to achieve a self-sustaining democratic Bosnia can be forged.

№04 How to pull out of bosnia-herzegovina’s dead-end: A Strategy for Success.

№04 How to pull out of bosnia-herzegovina’s dead-end: A Strategy for Success.

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH; dead-end; strategy; EU; US; EUFOR; constitutional reform; EUSR; Balkans; NATO; Haris Silajdžić; Milorad Dodik; Dayton accords;

The international community’s 13+ year effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina is failing. A continuation of the current trajectory will ultimately result in renewed conflict. Bosnian citizens now harbour greater fear of conflict than at any point since Dayton. Both the EU and the US have a lot to lose. Growing international frustration is evident in wishful thinking and desperation. While the EU has reduced its peace implementation force (EUFOR) to mere symbolic levels, the international community desperately embraces vague three-party agreements among nationalist leaders. Many hope that a transition from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to a “reinforced” EU Special Representative (EUSR) will “restore momentum” to Bosnia’s European perspective. State-building and reform processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina ground to a halt in 2006 and have since slid backwards. Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik and Bosniak member of the State Presidency Haris Silajdžić helped drive this downward spiral. Yet while their actions and rhetoric generated angst and insecurity, they are the logical products of deeper structural problems. The Dayton constitution makes leveraging fear politically profitable and politicians unaccountable. Bosnian politicians pursue their self-aggrandizing, maximalist goals at the expense of the general welfare.Thanks to the absence of credible options, most citizens feel unrepresented in government. This must be remedied for the country to work. The international community can reverse out of this dead-end only if the EU and US act in concert to prevent further generation of the fear and insecurity that fuels politics in Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. They must then pursue constitutional reforms with broad popular legitimacy, creating incentives for responsive government. Otherwise, the country cannot even begin to meet EU standards. High-level US re-engagement is also essential to arresting Bosnia’s downward slide. In any event, the international community’s oversight role is far from over. Acceptance of this need for long-term engagement is required.

№03 Rethinking US Policy toward the Western Balkans

№03 Rethinking US Policy toward the Western Balkans

Author(s): James Lyon / Language(s): English

Keywords: Western Balkans; US policy; BiH; Kosovo; Serbia; Macedonia; Croatia; US; Presidentional Envoy; EUSR; Sarajevo; Nabucco pipeline; EU;

Euro-Atlantic policies towards the Western Balkans have reached the limits of their effectiveness, as countries throughout the region have hit a brick wall in the reform and European integration process. It is time to examine the effectiveness of the western alliance’s policy approach towards the Western Balkans and adjust it to meet new realities. The legacy of the wars of the 1990s means that for many Balkan states, the lure of EU integration is not as powerful as Brussels had envisioned. The failure of the Lisbon Treaty, combined with internal EU disagreement over regional and enlargement policy, has also sent a signal to the Western Balkans that EU enlargement is not as high a priority as Brussels wishes to project. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia are all stalled in the European accession process, and in the case of Bosnia, the hard-won progress of the past 13 years has been jeopardized amid increasing rumblings of the possibility of renewed conflict and an ethnic carve-up. The “soft power” of European accession, while necessary and desirable, has clearly reached its limits as an inducement to progress. The Balkans represent low-hanging fruit in any foreign policy calculation: stability can be achieved without substantial new resources. Preventing renewed conflict is relatively simple, yet requires a new and coordinated approach. Euro-Atlantic policy must focus on halting the backward slide, stabilizing the region, and finding new ways to move it forward. This requires robust US engagement in support of a credible and strategically coherent EU policy to bolster EU “soft power.” There is an increasing risk that the international community’s investment in the Western Balkans could unravel. The US has an interest and a special responsibility, as it has spent substantial prestige and treasure in stopping the wars, and stabilizing the region. Renewed conflict could split the EU, generate transatlantic ructions, create safe havens for terrorism and organized crime, and aggravate the Muslim world. Refugee flows would create humanitarian challenges as well. This paper examines the challenges facing the western alliance in the Balkans, the limits of international influence under current policy, and the options available to enhance progress in the region. It offers five policy recommendations that will, if implemented, substantially alter the policy dynamic and assist the Euro-Atlantic alliance to stabilize the region and move it forward in the European accession process without substantial new resources. It also argues that little progress will occur in the region until the United States resumes its leadership role.

But Is There a Strategy? Defining a Transatlantic Consensus to Catalyze Progress in BiH

But Is There a Strategy? Defining a Transatlantic Consensus to Catalyze Progress in BiH

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,Valery Perry,Toby Vogel,Bodo Weber / Language(s): English

Keywords: BiH and EU; state-development in BiH;

This policy note dispels with the facile and simplistic myth that the only way for the international community to engage in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is through either imposed solutions, or through an ownership policy of reliance on local elites - the current default setting. What the situation calls for is employing the coercive advantage of a transatlantic consensus to create an environment in which focused engagement by citizens to define a vision for a new social contract can be articulated. This top-down, bottom-up dynamic can be described as a “pressure sandwich” aimed at squeezing an elite that has no incentive to change the status quo.

But Is There a Strategy? Defining a Transatlantic Consensus to Catalyze Progress in BiH

Ali postoji li strategija? Definiranje transatlantskog konsenzusa za katalizaciju napretka u BiH

Author(s): Kurt Bassuener,Valery Perry,Toby Vogel,Bodo Weber / Language(s): Bosnian

This policy note dispels with the facile and simplistic myth that the only way for the international community to engage in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is through either imposed solutions, or through an ownership policy of reliance on local elites - the current default setting. What the situation calls for is employing the coercive advantage of a transatlantic consensus to create an environment in which focused engagement by citizens to define a vision for a new social contract can be articulated. This top-down, bottom-up dynamic can be described as a “pressure sandwich” aimed at squeezing an elite that has no incentive to change the status quo.