Series:Helsinške Sveske

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Universal and Collective Rights of Minorities

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №04: Universal and Collective Rights of Minorities

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia;rights and freedoms; minorities; round-table; multicultural; cohabitation; autonomy;

In view of the key importance of inter-ethnic relations and status of national minorities in Serbia for development of democracy, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Centre for Regionalism, the Vojvodina Club and Centre for Multiculturality have organised the round-table "National Minorities in Serbia" on 8 and 9 September 2000 in Novi Sad. Participants in this round-table were representatives of several dozen NGOs from Vojvodina and Serbia, representatives of political parties, prominent public personalities and experts for minority rights and ethnic relations. In a two-day debate participants in the round-table underscored that peace, tolerance and democratization of the society represent the basic prerequisite of the exercise of individual and collective rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Considering that a social community in the Republic of Serbia has a markedly heterogeneous cultural character and the fact that it is faced with pronounced ethnification of politics and intolerant nationalism, our discussion confirmed that the majority nation, that is, the ruling political establishment, were to be blamed for such a poor status of inter-ethnic relations. Hence the current political authorities cannot be relieved of responsibility from catastrophic consequences of internal conflicts and external and internal isolation. After analysing institutions and real social and political processes and actions of the most influential political protagonists, it was established that we all must insist on comprehensive implementation of ideas and legal-constitutional norms determining the Republic of Serbia as a state of equitable citizens, and the one guaranteeing corresponding standards in attainment and exercise of collective rights of national minorities in Serbia. Unfortunately during our discussion we identified through a host of examples a pronounced gulf between proclaimed norms and concrete reality in the sphere of protection of national minorities rights, notably in development and expression of their cultural identity. After the SFRY disintegration, the problem of "new minorities", notably Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, emerged in Serbia. This problem entails official recognition of those minorities and concrete legal regulation of their status and rights. During preparations for the 2001 census scientific and cultural institutions and representative bodies should lay the groundwork for facilitating the free declaration of nationality by citizens. This particularly applies to Bosniaks, who have been deprived of that right to date. It is also expected that the democratic opposition of Serbia shall take a clear public stand on manner of resolution of minority problems, and incorporate pertinent proposals into their program of changes, offered as an alternative to the current regime. We brought into prominence the need to revive earlier initiatives for adoption of the Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia, aimed at removing current shortcomings and imprecise points, and boosting harmonisation of domestic legal and political practice with the European standards on the Protection of Minorities. Our discussion indicated that the Republic Serbia in its relations with almost all neighbouring countries disregards the issue of minorities, and that this negligence is in turn reflected in the status of minorities and has a negative impact on relations between the majority and minorities. The role of ecological issues was discussed in the context of good-neighbourly relations, for they alike the minority issue clear the way for establishment of broad and efficient communications. Considering regional trends within the context of Europe those two issues can play an important role in the inclusion of Serbia in the project of European regions. Participants think that the Stability Pact is a conceptual framework for analysis of the most important problems and devising models of their resolution.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; "Otpor"; movement; resistance; activism; political organisation; socio-political consciousness; Orthodox Church; pro-european orientation; ethnicity; minorities; RS; regime;

The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor", in or beyond politics

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №05: "Otpor" - više ili manje od politike

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; "Otpor"; movement; resistance; activism; political organisation; socio-political consciousness; Orthodox Church; pro-european orientation; ethnicity; minorities; RS; regime;

The popular movement Otpor (Resistance) is a phenomenon which has left its mark on Serbia’s political stage at the very end of the last decade of the 20th century. Having been established in 1998, it attracted media attention, launched various actions and, especially, grew in numbers and organized structurally at the height of a police crackdown against its members in the spring of 2000. Otpor has played a major part in persuading the ‘silent majority’ to go to the September 2000 polls in order to bring forward the end the neo-socialist regime. Although the full significance of the part played by Otpor can only be assessed on the basis of comprehensive and reliable information about the events and activities leading to the September 24 election results which greatly facilitated the October 5 overthrow, such data as were available fully justify the assessment given above. This study is the result of an empirical questionnaire-type survey carried out in the latter part of October 2000. Irrespective of whether Otpor as such will continue to grow and operate – for the situation has changed radically since its formative days – its organization and the attitudes and frame of mind of its members are a topic which it not without interest. At present, Otpor is highly popular among the general public and is often seen as possessing charismatic attributes. However, it has been pointed out that unreserved praise is sometimes a sign that the recipient is about to perform his swan-song; undivided flattery as a rule is counterproductive in the case of those social actors, especially large political organizations, who are perceived as serious obstacles to groups already controlling large resources of society or at least those who aspire to increase their control of such resources. The absence of any public criticism of Otpor so far may mean that it is regarded as someone who has played his role and is now expected to exit the stage as a relative autonomous political factor; this, of course, does not mean that certain factions and individual members of Otpor may not be recruited by some political parties and other interested organizations. After all, Otpor is still needed as a reserve echelon until the December republican elections in Serbia to throw its weight behind certain political goals such as loosening the grip of the defeated extreme left- and right-wing groupings on these resources, or at least to help the so-called democratic opposition to remain together as the challenge of its political adversaries weakens. However, generally speaking, the absence of any principled opposition to Otpor leads us to the conclusion that its effective influence is less and less; we must bear in mind that the extent of criticism levelled against somebody is a most reliable indicator of his influence on public life. Needless to say, all foretelling is risky; we have all been surprised by events we considered the least likely of a number of possibilities at the time of their prediction. At least we hope that the material presented here will give a true picture of the organization because we believe that it was collected during a period coinciding with the organization’s developed stage.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and The World

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and the World

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Hague Tribunal;ex – Yugoslavia; war crimes; international law; UN; security council; US; victims of war; protection; Serbia; NATO; Carla Del Ponte; Vojislav Koštunica; Slobodan Milošević; intellectuals;

Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: The Hague Tribunal Discord Between Us and The World

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №07: Haški Tribunal, naš nesporazum sa svetom

Author(s): Milivoj Despot,Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Hague Tribunal;ex – Yugoslavia; war crimes; international law; UN; security council; US; victims of war; protection; Serbia; NATO; Carla Del Ponte; Vojislav Koštunica; Slobodan Milošević; intellectuals;

Much was written and said about the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal). And as it usually happens with respect to momentous events, essential things about the Hague Tribunal were committed, notably in view of the fact that in recent wars in the territory of ex- Yugoslavia many crimes were committed and that their perpetrators and accomplices are to be brought to justice and punished. But according to some weird logic, much hyped are opinions of many politicians and some jurists, that the Hague Tribunal is not an institution of justice, but rather a foreign political instrument for trying Serbs, and as such "it should be totally disregarded and vilifed". Exceptions from this general line of thinking were public discussions on the Hague Tribunal staged by some renowned NGOs and institutions and published in some dailies and magazines. The Hague Tribunal was established as an adequate response of international community to drastic violations of international law. During recent wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia, war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. The authorities in place hushed up those crimes, downplayed atrocities and covered up the truth. A very small number of people knew what had really happened. As trials were not held before national courts, the International Criminal Tribunal was set up to establish facts in lawful proceedings, to make them public and bring to justice perpetrators of the crimes. There is also another question: Do the trials before the Hague Tribunal have a special significance? Diplomatic means and sanctions were used to put en end to war and ensure peace. But neither were successful. The Dayton and the Paris accord stopped the war, but did not consolidate the peace. Consolidation of peace is not a declaration, but a process. In that process a specific place was accorded to the Hague Tribunal. Within general efforts aimed at re-establishing peace and security in the territory of former Yugoslavia, decisions of the Hague Tribunal have a repressive importance regarding war criminals and a preventive importance regarding every high-ranking politician and military officer. In the second half of the Twentieth Century, international law, thanks to momentous transformation of legal provisions relating to conduct of states and individuals in armed conflicts, and under strong influence of affirmation of human rights stipulated by international covenants, established international individual criminal responsibility of those who gravely violated humanitarian law relating to armed conflicts. If the Hague Tribunal carries out its repressive and preventive tasks and consequently contributes to international justice and legality, stances on war and peace shall be different. In those terms the practice of the Hague Tribunal complements future efficiency of permanent International Criminal Court. Irrefutable legal assumption is that the Hague Tribunal acts as an authorised ad hoc international criminal court and that its decisions should consolidate respect of human rights, peace and international justice. Its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, its orders and warrants transmitted to the states, members of the UN, and obligations of those states to comply with those orders, are in keeping with the international law. Awareness of the obligation that perpetrators of crimes must be handed over to the Hague Tribunal, leads to the replacement of the legal assumption by the truth.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; Vojvodina; NGO; minorities; refugees; nationalism; radicalization; ethnicity; financial standing; inequality; mind-set;

Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Minorities and Refugees In Vojvodina

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №08: Manjine i izbeglice u vojvodini

Author(s): Vladimir Ilić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; Vojvodina; NGO; minorities; refugees; nationalism; radicalization; ethnicity; financial standing; inequality; mind-set;

Presence of over half a million refugees and displaced persons in Serbia is a palpable and live criticism of our recent national program and its implementation. Their fate demonstrates that the nation is not homogenous, that there are no common national interests, but rather different goals with different price tags. It bears stressing that the price paid by the aforementioned population groups was the highest one. Conduct and fate of refugees and their choices, if any, in a drastic way indicate disastrous failure of the idea of annexation of so-called Western Serb countries to the ethnic Serb state. In those terms they are the most convincing critique of domestic nationalism, for they indicate consequences thereof better than any other population groups. If one is to believe different facts and figures, more than three fourth of refugees and displaced persons until recently wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, and only one fifth expressed their wish to return to their homes. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia through its continuing project "I want to go home" helped a sustained return of a large number of refugees, in the face of inertia and political obstacles in several involved countries. Moreover the NGO through this survey tried to look into ways of future return of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №09: In the Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units

Author(s): Stipe Sikavica,Budimir Babović,Miloš Vasić,Filip Švarm / Language(s): English

Keywords: Yugoslavia; army; Serbia; regime; Slobodan Milošević; war-time; peace-time; "serbization"; nationalities; transformation; police forces; international dimension; paramilitary groups;

Even if one were to maintain that some psychological, political and professional features of Yugoslav Army resembled those of the armies of some European states undergoing transition, then one must also admit that the Yugoslav Army does not have its counterpart anywhere in the world when it comes to the YA origins, background, war experience and the current political engagement. One could say without any exaggeration that it is a phenomenon among the armies of the world, as much as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a phenomenon among other countries in the world. At least this assertion applies to the state and its army during the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was created not through transformation, as the versions of the domestic (both active and retired) military professionals imply (see, for example, Veljko Kadijević, My perception of the war, Beograd 1993 page 113) but by simple downsizing and (mere renaming) of the former Yugoslav People's Army to the Serbian-Montenegrin combat and high officers cadres. That process evolved in a frightening wanton war destruction and wandering “of the armed force of all our peoples and nationalities” from Karavanka mountains in Slovenia to Danube and Drina. The Army of Yugoslavia after ten years of its existence is still searching for its own identity.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №10: Unlearnt Lesson - Central-European Idea and Serb National Program

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №10: Unlearnt Lesson - Central-European Idea and Serb National Program

Author(s): Charles Ingrao,Lazar Vrkatić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; national program; ethnicity; multiethnicity; trials; war crimes; political ideas; conservative; duke Mihailo; Vojvodina; taxes; Slobodan Milošević;

Neville Chamberlain spoke for millions of his contemporaries when, at the height of the Munich Crisis, he lamented the prospects of going to war over ‘a faraway country’ inhabited by ‘people of whom we know nothing’. The prime minister was, of course, speaking to his fellow Britons about Czechoslovakia. But he could have just as easily used these same words to characterize the Anglo-American world’s knowledge - or concern - about the lands and peoples of the entire region between Germany and the former Soviet Union. A half century later we still know very little about what the Germans call Mitteleuropa, and even less about its history. Even today, as the world press reports recent events in the former Yugoslavia in terrible detail, it has never explained why there is such intense ethnic conflict throughout Central Europe. One tragic consequence of their ignorance has been the incessant, but incorrect allusion to "age-old hatreds" that helped desensitize America’s public and politicians to Slobodan Milošević’s carefully orchestrated campaign of ethnic genocide. We have many excuses. The region's languages are dissimilar to anything we speak. Its multiplicity of intermingled ethnic and linguistic groups challenges the most curious. It boasts no great power to attract our admiration or concern. And, it is not especially strategic or important to us. It may have been only a century ago when Bismarck warned that "the Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier", but his advice has guided the statesmen of the West for centuries. But our lack of knowledge or commitment does not mean that we have not played a major role in shaping its past, present, and - as it now seems - future. Although it is true that Central Europe has many endemic problems, the current crisis stems in great part from the West's imposition of its own values and solutions on a region about which it knows little - and cares less. Unfortunately, those in the public sector who mold and make this country’s policy have shown little interest in reading serious historical scholarship. As a result, crucial insights have been lost to the frantic schedules of journalists, who prefer to get their "historical background" from the flip clichés and breezy accounts other journalists. Nor have historical insights gained currency among politicians, who have less time and inclination to read much more than a daily news summary, the requisite opinion polls, and the occasional journalistic account. Thus President Clinton’s memorable remark at a press conference in 1995, in which he justified his belated decision to intervene militarily in Bosnia by proclaiming that he now understood the situation, having just read reporter Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts. Even those social scientists who serve as area specialists for central Europe have tended to restrict their historical background to the previous generation or two, failing to see how anything that occurred before World War II could possibly inform our understanding of the events of the last decade; hence the broad currency given to political scientist Susan Woodward’s Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, which convincingly ascribes the events of the last decade to a failure of that country’s governmental leaders and institutions, without regard to underlying, historically-informed cultural forces that might have prompted that collapse. The devaluation of history by the public, press, politicians, and social scientists presents a formidable challenge to us as historians. Surely we have a vocational interest in reminding them of our ability to discern the continuity between the past and present as an instrument for determining the likely course(s) of future developments. To this I would add a second, moral imperative to repay the tax- and tuition-paying public that sustains us by contributing to the formulation of public policy. The past decade has exposed us to the tragic alternative. In the aftermath of Srebrenica, Operation Storm and the successful NATO intervention, there has evolved a broad consensus that attributes the war, genocide and the subsequent need for costly, long-term Western intervention to our failure to learn from the lessons of history. I would suggest that part of our responsibility lies in a failure of historians to teach these lessons beyond the narrow confines of the Ivory Tower. Perhaps most remiss have been Habsburg scholars, who have failed to share what they have learned about the multiethnic experience in a "western" institutional environment that upholds the rule of law and codes of professional conduct. To Balkan and Habsburg historians alike, I say that it is not so difficult for a reasonably intelligent person to understand how we have gotten to this terrible juncture in Central Europe, or to envision where we are heading. The answers to our questions are not unteachable, just untaught. Looking over the events of the past decade, I would suggest a number of historically informed insights that bridge the gap between scholarly discourse and the lay public’s self-professed factual ignorance and conceptual confusion.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: The Balkans Rachomon

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: The Balkans Rachomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): English

Keywords: Balkans; historiographic revisionism; post-socialist regimes; Yugoslavia; patriotism; nationalism; Serbia;

The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: The Balkans Rachomon

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №11: Balkanski rašomon

Author(s): Todor Kuljić,Olivera Milosavljević,Olga Manojlović-Pintar / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Balkans; historiographic revisionism; post-socialist regimes; Yugoslavia; patriotism; nationalism; Serbia;

The author presents the main and general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe in the 1990s, drawing attention to the various features of revisionism in former socialist countries (Russia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) and their attitude to Socialism. The necessary scientific re-examination of the past is separated from its ideological reinterpretation inspired by revived nationalism. The attention focuses on Serb and Croat revisionism, that is, on its moderate versions (‘medium compass’ revisionism), as found in the works of the Yugoslavia historians Branko Petranović and Dušan Bilandžić. Digest: Contemporary historiographic revisionism exhibits a number of components: a critical attitude to historiography on the part of the winner (the communists); a clearer understanding of the essence of past events owing to greater distance from them and to the availability of new sources; a pragmatic reinterpretation of the past inspired by narrow or broad party or national motives. Revisionists in former socialist countries find their principal source in revived nationalism which seeks to play down one’s own fascist past by uncritically attacking anti-Communism and anti-totalitarianism. Instead of being confronted, the dark shadows from one’s own past are being shown in a new light. This paper draws attention to state-sponsored and academic revisionism, and lays bare its chief motives and rhetoric in several European countries. The object of this comparative study is to show up the triviality of domestic revisionism. The revisionism in the works of B. Petranović and D. Bilandžić written in the 1990s is discussed at some length to show up the contradictions characterizing their writings before and after the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the pattern of their revision fired by awakened concern for their respective ‘endangered’ nations. Selective memory and orchestrated forgetfulness were major catalysts of the civil war in Yugoslavia, with revisionist historiography enlisted to justify the new national objectives. The author believes that one can master one’s past only by confronting its dark aspects and hopes that a critical appraisal by domestic scholars of own nationalism will not be overly delayed by customary tardiness. Is contemporary historiography in former Yugoslav republics under the prevalent influence of any of the following components: a) an inevitably maturer scientific outlook on the past brought about by sounder theory and improved methods, and made possible by the discovery of hitherto unknown archival material of prime importance; b) a rather understandable shift of accent in interpreting key historical events, that is, a fuller and broader understanding of their historical function resulting from changes in the epochal consciousness and from the disappearance of the authoritarian patterns of the one-party socialist regime, or; c) a pragmatic revision of the past prompted by broader or narrower ideological, party or personal interests or motives? Which of the above components are discernible in the leading historians and can they be differentiated in more detail? In trying to answer these questions we shall take a look at: a) some general characteristics of historiographic revisionism in Europe and in former socialist regimes at the end of the twentieth century as an important aspect of reinterpreting the recent past; b) narrower regional characteristics, that is, the chief nationalistic motives of revisionism in the contemporary historiography of former Yugoslav republics, and; c) concrete revisionist components in the works of the Yugoslavia historians D. Bilandžić and B. Petranović.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №12: Minorities in transition

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №12: Minorities in transition

Author(s): / Language(s): English

Keywords: transition; minorities; rights and freedoms; Balkans; EU integrations; nationalism; multiculturalism; discrimination; cultural autonomy; refugees;

Referring to minority rights, we refer to an endeavor to establish equality. What minorities want is what all of us want. It is promotion and development of minority rights that indicate to aspirations to bring about social equality so that each individual has same rights as the other. Minority rights are not something one should be afraid of, they are no threat whatsoever to a society's indivisibility, its integrity. Minority rights are, as I've said, an endeavor to establish equality, for there is no indivisibility unless there is equality. We are anxious to safeguard our society, we care for law and order, and that what equality is about. Unfortunately, we have social inequality in terms of human rights. We have weak, divided societies that - politically unstable as they are - might threaten international piece and security. So, by encouraging minority rights we, in a way, encourage peace and security. It is the European Commission's generosity that made this conference possible. Therefore, let me remind you, that funds supporting activities such is this one are provided by citizens of the European Union. These public funds, therefore, reflect their aspirations and the wish to uphold minority rights in this region. This conference also reflects cooperation between the Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. I take pride in working together with the Helsinki Committee in Serbia. I see it as a most reliable organization that overdid itself at extremely hard times of this country's history. I think the Committee in Serbia has always had the right stuff and deserves to be both commended on and recognized for its courage, integrity and dedication to key principles. This prompts me to tackle the issue of civil society. Usually, whenever there is a political overturn civil societies have to cope with a special tension. Such was the tension ensuing Czechoslovakian velvet revolution. As you know, new people came to power, the people that used to advocate human rights. So, once elected, they thought there was no longer need for the Chapter 77 or the Helsinki Charter. However, people from the Helsinki Committee said, "Stop for a moment, there is such need and very much so”. For, who should protect rights of those that were hurt? Who should watch out for the way the government and people in power behave? Who should keep an eye on the respect of human rights and the government's attitude towards international standards? There certainly are problems in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They are many, and can only be settled if there are intellectual and moral resources, through support and assistance of various non-governmental organizations that keep a sharp lookout at steps taken by the state and attitudes of people in power, and watch out for respect of commitments the state took upon itself by signing international documents. No state that lacks a strong civil society can plume itself when it comes to the situation in the domain of human and minority rights.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №12: Minorities in transition

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №12: Tranzicija i manjine

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: transition; minorities; rights and freedoms; Balkans; EU integrations; nationalism; multiculturalism; discrimination; cultural autonomy; refugees;

Referring to minority rights, we refer to an endeavor to establish equality. What minorities want is what all of us want. It is promotion and development of minority rights that indicate to aspirations to bring about social equality so that each individual has same rights as the other. Minority rights are not something one should be afraid of, they are no threat whatsoever to a society's indivisibility, its integrity. Minority rights are, as I've said, an endeavor to establish equality, for there is no indivisibility unless there is equality. We are anxious to safeguard our society, we care for law and order, and that what equality is about. Unfortunately, we have social inequality in terms of human rights. We have weak, divided societies that - politically unstable as they are - might threaten international piece and security. So, by encouraging minority rights we, in a way, encourage peace and security. It is the European Commission's generosity that made this conference possible. Therefore, let me remind you, that funds supporting activities such is this one are provided by citizens of the European Union. These public funds, therefore, reflect their aspirations and the wish to uphold minority rights in this region. This conference also reflects cooperation between the Helsinki Federation and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. I take pride in working together with the Helsinki Committee in Serbia. I see it as a most reliable organization that overdid itself at extremely hard times of this country's history. I think the Committee in Serbia has always had the right stuff and deserves to be both commended on and recognized for its courage, integrity and dedication to key principles. This prompts me to tackle the issue of civil society. Usually, whenever there is a political overturn civil societies have to cope with a special tension. Such was the tension ensuing Czechoslovakian velvet revolution. As you know, new people came to power, the people that used to advocate human rights. So, once elected, they thought there was no longer need for the Chapter 77 or the Helsinki Charter. However, people from the Helsinki Committee said, "Stop for a moment, there is such need and very much so”. For, who should protect rights of those that were hurt? Who should watch out for the way the government and people in power behave? Who should keep an eye on the respect of human rights and the government's attitude towards international standards? There certainly are problems in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They are many, and can only be settled if there are intellectual and moral resources, through support and assistance of various non-governmental organizations that keep a sharp lookout at steps taken by the state and attitudes of people in power, and watch out for respect of commitments the state took upon itself by signing international documents. No state that lacks a strong civil society can plume itself when it comes to the situation in the domain of human and minority rights.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: The Past as a challenge to the law

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №13: Prošlost kao izazov pravu

Author(s): Vladimir V. Vodinelić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: legal responsibility; authoritarianism; past; rule of law; Serbia; regime; personal data; protection; exceptions; state security service; legal system;

Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №21: Serbo-Albanian Dialogue 2005: The Future Status of Kosovo

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №21: Srpsko-albanski dijalog 2005: budući status Kosova

Author(s): / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: future status of Kosovo; conference; politics; Serbia; Albania; North Macedonia; Croatia; democratic society; regional stability; minority; international standards; decentralization; security;

The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia organized a two-day conference “The Future Status of Kosovo” on June 13-14, 2005 in Prishtina. The conference not only stood for the third in the series of Serb-Albanian dialogues the Committee has staged over the past eight years, but also for the final and most important segment of the US Institute for Peace-supported project “Belgrade - Prishtina: Steps to Build Confidence and Understanding.” The idea behind the conference was to provide – on the eve of the announced startup of negotiations on Kosovo’s status – a realistic insight into the complexity of this major regional issue. The book’s contents – authentic discussions of the conference participants – practically figures for a public debate on a reality and real problems. Regardless of many a different stand, the conference participants, Serbs and Albanians alike, attempted to conceptualize a policy that moves towards a lasting solution and regional stability. A policy as such implies a sober assessment of Kosovo’s reality, as well as of possibilities, problems and constraints. The two-day conference, echoing more in Prishtina and somewhat less in Belgrade, assembled a number of outstanding political and public figures from Prishtina – Albanians, Serbs and people from Kosovo’s other ethnic communities, all of them concerned with their own future and ready to acknowledge major changes in the Kosovo society in the past six years. The same were the considerations of the participants from Belgrade, the people standing for Serbia’s alternative politics, and of Podgorica’s officials. Representatives of the international community and regional neighbors, Macedonia and Croatia, also partook in the conference and creatively contributed to the exchange of views. “Key international players were clear that that the startup of the talks about Kosovo’s future status is on the international agenda this year. And now it is on political leaders and institutions to demonstrate that they aim at building a stable, tolerant, multiethnic and democratic society in Kosovo, a society in which all communities will be living together in peace and in peace with their neighbors. It is time for all sides to let go short lived politics, join in a dialogue about real problems in good faith, with passion and constructiveness, and take all measures we know are necessary. This conference is a good start in the right direction. We need more such dialogues, said Soren Jessen Petersen, the UN Secretary General Special Representative, addressing the conference. The conference was organized in five panels: “Kosovo in the Context of Regional Stability,” “Minorities and International Standards in Kosovo,” “Decentralization and its Implications in Kosovo,” “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” and “Status of Kosovo.” The first panel, “Kosovo in the Context of Regional Stability” chaired by Professor Enver Hasani, broached key security aspects, the role of Kosovo’s future army under civilian control, regional security challenges not only in the event of Kosovo’s independence, but also of Montenegro’s, the state of a ff airs in Kosovska Mitrovica as a major problem to be solved, etc. “Unconditional safety of minority communities is a key standard preconditioning stability and the pace of solving future status of Kosovo,” concluded, inter alia, the second panel “Minorities and International Standards in Kosovo,” chaired by lawyer Azem Vllasi. The discussion also highlighted that the return of all displaced persons and refugees was a priority task of all Kosovo institutions and factors. As for Kosovo Serbs, their integration into Kosovo society, as many put it, is their right, the same as their right to live safely in their homes is a fundamental human right without any alternative solution whatsoever. According to Vera Markovic, who chaired the third panel “Decentralization and its Implications in Kosovo,” the discussion that resembled a parliamentary debate indicated that political power was being gradually institutionalized. “It’s most encouraging that different positions on the decentralization plan do not divide the political sphere into Serbian and Albanian parts, but into groupings that include both Albanian and minority parties…I would say that the debate on decentralization testifies that Kosovo society obviously endeavors to let go the issues related to ‘outer freedom’ or freedom from domination and come to grips with the question of ‘inner freedom’ that cannot but benefit all minorities, ethnic and political alike,” said Vera Markovic. What marked the panel “Post-Con fl ict Rehabilitation,” but the entire conference as well, was the stance that position of minorities was a measure of any society’s democratic potential. In this context, as Dr. Olga Popovic-Obradovic put it, still rather high interethnic tensions make the situation in Kosovo extremely complex. Referring to preconditions of post-conflict rehabilitation, she singled out the issues brought forward by panelists, ranging from acknowledgment and condemnation of crimes and the policy that has given birth to it, lustration and individual accountability to culture as a lasting value linking people and nations. Summing up the “Status of Kosovo” panel, its chair, Sonja Biserko, said that the view that prevailed – at the panel and throughout the conference – was that some form of Kosovo’s independence was unquestionable. However, the panel itself, she added, was more focused on the sum and substance of Kosovo’s independence. It is impossible to ignore the past, the recent past in particular, as it brought about the situation under discussion. In other words, what should be recognized are not only developments in the recent past, but also the fact that the Greater Serbia project that generated ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration persists as an illusion to come true once the international constellation changes. Therefore, Serbs should reconcile not only with Albanians, but also with all neighbors – Croats, Bosniaks and, in a manner of speaking, with some minorities in Serbia proper, according to Biserko. The conference ended by adopting a declaration welcoming the international community’s intention to tackle the future status of Kosovo as a priority issue of its agenda. Taking into account that the Contact Group has already defined the framework for negotiations that should ensure regional security and stability, and open the door to Western Balkans’ association with and ultimate membership of the European Union, “cognizant that such approach by the international community and favorable circumstance should not be allowed to pass by, and confident that this provides a unique momentum for all regional leaders to prove their political wisdom, constructiveness and genuine commitment to true interests of peoples and citizens,” participants in the conference, “call on Belgrade and Prishtina, as two directly involved parties, to engage in a substantial dialogue with maximum good will and to fully cooperate with representatives of the international community; request political actors on both sides to acknowledge Kosovo’s reality as the starting point for negotiations, while constantly bearing in mind legitimate interests of Serbs, Albanians and other communities in Kosovo, and to insist on the respect and full implementation of all international documents and standards dealing with human and minority rights,” quotes, inter alia, the unanimously adopted declaration.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №23: Women and Children - 4. Serbia in the Modernization Processes of the 19th and 20th Centuries

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №23: Žene i deca - 4. Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka

Author(s): Vera Gudac-Dodić,Momčilo Isić,Dubravka Stojanović,Sanja Petrović Todosijević,Olivera Milosavljević,Andrej Šemjakin,Radmila Radić,Aleksandra Vuletić / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Serbia; 19th and 20th century; status of women; children; influence of elite; village; kindergarten; upbringing of children; religious school;

"Helsinške sveske" pod naslovom Žene i deca proizišle su iz projekta Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka. Saradnici koji su ovaj projekat začeli devedesetih godina prošlog veka pronalazili su razne izdavače za zbornike radova u kojima su saopštavali rezultate svojih istraživanja. Tako su se prva dva zbornika pojavila u izdanju Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije; treći u izdanju autora, koje je potpisala Dubravka Stojanović, dok se četvrti zbornik pojavljuje u okviru pomenute edicije Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji. Hronološka granica istraživanja pomerena je već u drugom zborniku unazad: obuhvaćen je i XIX vek, što znači: srpska država i društvo u celom modernom dobu. U isto vreme, sužen je sadržaj istraživanja. Za razliku od prvog zbornika, koji ima multidisciplinarni karakter, jer su istraživana razna područja (ekonomija, politika, prosveta i obrazovanje, kultura), u narednim zbornicima preovlađuju istoričari koji se bave društvenom istorijom a u fokusu istraživanja je jedan problem: položaj žene, uticaj elita, žene i deca. U oba slučaja, istraživanja su podjednako delimična: ona ne predstavljaju celinu ni u hronološkom smislu ni u smislu obuhvaćenosti svih aspekata relevantnih za problem koji je istraživan. Na ovakav pristup modernizacijskim procesima u Srbiji XIX i XX veka uticalo je više činilaca: stanje istraženosti; teorijske osnove istraživanja; raščlanjenost istorijskog procesa, to jest njegova periodizacija, kako bi se uočila njegova dinamika i glavne karakteristike.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №24: Vojvodina's Identity

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №24: Vojvođanski identitet

Author(s): Bojan Kostreš,Ranko Končar,Saša Kicošev,Dimitrije Boarov,Alpar Lošonc,Jovan Komšić,Tomislav Žigmanov,Milka Puzigaća,Pavel Domonji,Boško Kovačević,Slobodan Budakov,Bogoljub Savin,Antal Bozoki,Danica Stefanović,Vladimir Ilić,Dušan Mijić,Živan Berisavljević,Boris Varga,Milorad Đurić,Duško Radosavljević / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: Vojvodina; identity; demography; economy; inter-ethnic relations; foreign policy; autonomy; political identity; media; communication; multi-ethnicity;

Krajem juna u Novom Sadu je, u organizaciji Skupštine Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine i Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji, održan okrugli sto na temu: "Vojvođanski identitet danas". Čvrsti u uverenju da se preko vojvođanskog identiteta osvaja i širi prostor etničke tolerancije, što je za Vojvodinu, kao etnički najpluralniji deo Srbije, od strateške važnosti, organizatori su želeli da, podstičući javnu debatu, daju doprinos afirmaciji vojvođanskog identiteta. Potiskivan i osporavan, vojvođanski identitet zaslužuje javnu pažnju i podršku. Utoliko više, ukoliko se imaju u vidu i njegovi snažni integrativni i razvojni potencijali. Ti su potencijali značajna tačka oslonca i svim onim akterima koji budućnost Vojvodine i Srbije vide u ujedinjenoj Evropi. Knjiga koju čitalac drži u rukama, kao i rasprava na okruglom stolu, deo su šireg projekta Helsinškog odbora: "Vojvođanski identitet – problemi i perspektive", koji je realizovan zahvaljujući razumevanju i podršci Švajcarske ambasade u Beogradu.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №25: PEOPLE ON SOCIAL MARGIN - Human Rights in Psychiatric Hospitals (September 2006 - March 2007)

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №25: LJUDI NA DRUŠTVENOJ MARGINI - Ljudska prava u psihijatrijskim bolnicama (septembar 2006 – mart 2007)

Author(s): Suzana Perović,Zoran Milojković,Marijana Obradović,Ljiljana Palibrk / Language(s): English,Serbian

Keywords: social margin; human rights; psychiatric hospitals; Kovin; quality of life; patients; law; mental health; mental illness; Vršac; Padinska Skela;

Arhitektonsko-tehnički uslovi, higijena i opremljenost u bolnicama u koje su smešteni psihijatrijski pacijenti na veoma je niskom nivou. Reč je o ustanovama koje imaju velike kapacitete, do 1000 bolesnika, koje su u suštini izolovane od društvene zajednice. Spavaonice su predviđene za smeštaj velikog broja ljudi. U bolnici u Kovinu, na akutnom odeljenju u sobama je smešteno više od 20 pacijenata. Visoki plafoni, nepostojeća toplotna i hidroizolacija, vlažni i memljivi zidovi, betonske podloge, prozori i vrata koji ne dihtuju, itd., često ne obezbeđuju ni minimum potrebnih uslova za smeštaj i lečenje bolesnika; nedostatak i prirodnog i veštačkog osvetljenja, nedovoljna provetrenost, hladni ili mlaki radijatori, deo su svakodnevnih uslova kojima su izloženi i bolesnici i zaposleno osoblje. U nekim odeljenjima (oligofreno odeljenje vršačke bolnice) životni uslovi se mogu definisati kao nečovečno ili ponižavajuće postupanje. Lečenje psihijatrijskih pacijenata u ovim ustanovama je neadekvatno, jer se, uglavnom, sastoji od farmakoterapije. Pacijenti nemaju mogućnost da učestvuju u izboru lekara, niti da donose bilo kakve odluke u pogledu terapije i načina lečenja kojem se podvrgavaju. Podaci iz medicinskih kartona nisu dostupni pacijentima, članovima porodice, niti zastupnicima ili advokatima pacijenata. Kada se nalaze u ulozi somatskih pacijenata, psihijatrijski pacijenti su diskriminisani u drugim zdravstvenim ustanovama. Zdravstveno osoblje u drugim ustanovama, za lečenje somatskih bolesti, odbija da tretira i leči psihijatrijske pacijente na isti način kako se leče drugi pacijenti. Veoma mali broj pacijenata, uglavnom onih koji posećuju dnevne bolnice u sklopu psihijatrijskih bolnica, ima mogućnosti da koristi i druge pristupe u tretmanu osim farmakoterapije. Za sve ostale, što znači za „veliku većinu,“ važi „skladištenje“ u psihijatrijske bolnice koje ih, praktično, izdvaja iz zajednice, čime se pospešuje njihovo brže propadanje. Veliki broj pacijenata u ovim bolnicama, faktički, živi u njima po 10 ili 20 godina, jer nema gde da ode iz bolnice i ne postoji adekvatnija institucija koja bi ove pacijente prihvatila i omogućila im postepenu integraciju u društvo. Osoblje u bolnicama (nemedicinsko, kao i srednji medicinski kadar i više medicinske sestre) nema adekvatnu obuku za rad u psihijatrijskim bolnicama i tretman psihijatrijskih pacijenata. Osoblje nije obučeno tehnikama ne-fizičkog i manuelnog obuzdavanja agitiranih pacijenata. Srednje medicinsko osoblje i nemedicinsko osoblje nije dovoljno nadzirano u popodnevnim i noćnim časovima. Mali broj zaposlenih ostaje u popodnevnim i noćnim smenama sa pacijentima i nema adekvatan nadzor nad njima. Osoblje je zbog uslova u bolnicama, neobučenosti, nedovoljnog broja zaposlenih, nepostojanja jasne procedure za reagovanje u kriznim situacijama, izloženo velikom stresu. Osoblje je posebno nezadovoljno zbog malih primanja, s obzirom na težinu posla kojim se bave i uslove pod kojima rade.

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HELSINŠKE SVESKE №26: Towards Building a Sustainable Kosovo Society

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №26: Ka izgradnji održivog kosovskog društva

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: status of Kosovo; society; politics; Serbia; Albania; national policy; EU integration; economic development; ecology;

The edition “Moving towards a Sustainable Society in Kosovo” provides insight into the activities the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia realized under the project of the same name. Serbia’s policymakers have managed to prolong the resolution of the Kosovo status for more than a year and thus fuel the regional vulnerability. Encouraged by Russia’s support and its embargo on the UN Security Council resolution that could have laid the foundations for Kosovo’s future status, the official Belgrade has been toughening nationalistic rhetoric and focusing on Kosovo as the top priority of the agenda of national interest. Such an attitude has turned the relations between Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo even more delicate. For, the drawn-out status debate has overshadowed key issues of the Kosovo society, economy and interethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs and other minority communities. Two panel discussions, “Human Security in Kosovo” and “Framed Trials of Kosovo Albanians,” the Helsinki Committee organized with the assistance of partner organizations from Pristine probably best testify the need for interethnic dialogue. This edition carries integral proceedings of those gatherings. The workshops – described in this edition – one in the Serb enclave of Plemetina and another in Pristine bringing together Serb and Albanian women are also illustrative of Belgrade’s attempt to choke any rapprochement between Serbs and Albanians and of such policy’s detrimental effects on Kosovo Serbs. The rhetoric of confrontation and the emotion-fueled delusion that Kosovo would remain a part of Serbia have dominated Serbia’s political and social scene for the past twelve months. This is why this edition also brings to the public eye relevant discussions in the Serbian parliament, the text of the “Resolution on the Need for Just Solution of the Question of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo Based on International Law” that was unanimously adopted in late July 2007, as well as major Kosovo-related addresses by highest state officials. However, Serbia does have a political alternative to such mainstream: the Liberal Democratic Party /LDP/, which entered the parliament following the January 2007 elections. The LDP alternative document on Kosovo, submitted for the parliamentary consideration, is also presented in this edition. Last but not least, some illustrative commentaries, run in the Committee’s magazine The Helsinki Charter – scrutinizing Kosovo developments along with other key issues of Serbia’s modernization and Europeanization – are here available to readers as condensed reading matter.

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HELSINKI FILES №36: Prevention of Violent Extremism among High School Students - Application and Potential of Instruments for Alternative Narrative Formation

HELSINŠKE SVESKE №36: Prevencija nasilnog ekstremizma među srednjoškolcima - Primena i potencijali instrumenta za formiranje alternativnog narativa

Author(s): Izabela Kisić,Jarmila Bujak Stanko,Zlatko Paković,Jelena Višnjić,Srđan Barišić,Pavel Domonji / Language(s): Serbian

Keywords: education; high school; students; violence; extremism; alternative narrative; instruments; psychology; customs; abortion; Cyrillic script; Hijab; gender;

Socijlano okruženje i obrazovni sistem u kome odrastaju mladi u Srbiji karakteriše snažan uticaj etnonacionalizma, balast ratne prošlosti, nedovoljno pristupačni edukativni programi koji promovišu kritičko mišljenje i ljudska prava i neadekvatni udžbenici građanskog obrazovanja. U takvom socijalnom, porodičnom, obrazovnom i neprofesionalnom medijskom okruženju, mladi teško dolaze do argumenata koji identitet ne svode samo na verski i nacionalni. Nametanje etnonacionalističkog koncepta odozgo (elite) i klerikalizacija društva, što su procesi koji traju od devedesetih, ne odnose se samo na mlade u većinskoj srpskoj populaciji, već su odavno zahvatili i manjinske zajednice. Uvođenje verskog obrazovanja kao alternative građanskom 2001. godine, ostavilo je posledice na nekoliko generacija mladih, uključujući i one koji su sada predavači i roditelji. Učvršćivanje etnonacionalističkog koncepta podstaknuto je i globalnim promenama tokom poslednje dve decenije. U te globalne faktore spadaju pre svega, uspon konzervativnih političkih stranaka i organizacija, pretnja terorizmom, ratovi, nesigurnost u socijalno-ekonomskom i bezbednosnom smislu, kao i konfuzija i strepnje zbog eskalacije lažnih vesti i krize u medijima. Nasilni ekstremizam u Srbiji se obično prelama kroz prizmu stranih ratnika koji se pridružuju ISIL, ili Al-Nusri u Siriji i Iraku. Tako je, prema zvaničnim podacima, 49 državljana Srbije otišlo da se bori u Siriji i Iraku. Srbija je, međutim, i zemlja Zapadnog Balkana sa najvećim brojem ratnika u Istočnoj Ukrajini na proruskoj strani. Prema podacima MUP Srbije, iz Ukrajine se do kraja 2017, vratilo 48 boraca. U izveštaju koga je objavio Regionalni savet za saradnju sa sedištem u Sarajevu, navodi se da bi Srbija uspešno primenila nacionalnu strategiju za prevenciju i borbu protiv terorizma, neophodno je da standardizuje pristup ekstremizmima, zasnovan na različitim ideološkim osnovama. Alternativni narativ morao bi da se odnosi na sve elemente ekstremizma i različiti sektori bi morali da budu uključeni u njegovo stvaranje, navedeno je u pomenutom izveštaju. Osim za strane borce, nasilni ekstremizam u Srbiji vezuje se za zločine iz mržnje i huliganizam u najvećim nacionalnim i verskim zajednicama. Iako se te grupacije međusobno sukobljavaju, postoje bitne sličnosti među njima. Elemente ideološkog diskursa nasilnih ekstemističkih grupacija koji dolaze iz različitih etnokonfensionalnih zajednica u Srbiji su: ekstremni nacionalizam koji uključuje tendenciju za menjanje granica (širenje teritorije ili pripajanje drugoj državi), snažna vezanost za verske lidere, odbacivanje evropskih integracija i vezivanje za druge međunarodne faktore, istorijski revizionizam – pre svega Drugog svetskog rata i istorije Jugoslavije, proganjanje tradicionalnih neprijatelja nacionalnih, verskih i seksualnih manjina, napadi na organizacije za ljudska prava i degradacija žena. Neke od radikalno konzervativnih grupacija su posebno popularne među studentskom omladinom. Izgradnja alternativnog narativa u odnosu na propagandu ekstremističkih organizacija postao je jedan od najvećih izazova za međuvladine međunarodne organizacije, kao i za lokalne aktere u prevenciji i borbi protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i terorizma. Često svođenje alternativnog narativa na instant rešenja, “gotove” odgovore i “kontra činjenice” solidno vizuelno upakovane, pokazuju se kao neefikasno i sve više kontraproduktivne, pa teško mogu da privuku razočarane mlade ljude koji se osećaju izolovanim i bez perspektive. Zapravo, takav pristup, svodi alternativni narativ, na kontra-propagandu bez dubljeg efekta i željene promene.

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