Grave Situation in Mostar: Robust Response required (ICG Bosnia Report No. 19)

Grave Situation in Mostar: Robust Response required (ICG Bosnia Report No. 19)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Mostar;

The violent events in Mostar on 10 February -- and the failure of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to either anticipate or control them -- constitute a mortal threat to the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the continued existence of the Bosniac-Croat Federation.

MONTENEGRO: Settling for Independence? (ICG Balkans Report N° 107)

MONTENEGRO: Settling for Independence? (ICG Balkans Report N° 107)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Montenegrin government and FRY President Vojislav Ko.tunica have presented different proposals to change the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. In August 1999, the Montenegrin government adopted a .Platform. that envisaged a very loose union, in a single state, with limited joint functions in areas such as monetary policy, defence and foreign policy. In December 2000, a revised platform was presented by Djukanović.s Democratic Party of Socialists and its coalition partner, the smaller Social Democratic Party (SDP). This differed from its predecessor in the key respect that it envisaged a union of two independent states, with separate international subjectivity and two UN seats. In response, in January 2001 Ko.tunica issued a counter-proposal for a functioning federation, with considerable powers devolved to the two republics. Ko.tunica.s proposal was endorsed by Serbia.s ruling Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).

AFTER MILOSEVIC. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace (ICG Balkans Report N° 108)

AFTER MILOSEVIC. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace (ICG Balkans Report N° 108)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: Unsatisfied Nationalism; Underperforming Economies; Undelivered Justice; Unreturned Refugees;

In this report , the International Crisis Group (ICG) makes many recommendations as to how best to move forward, some of them going well beyond the present cautious international consensus. The test for us in each case has not been what is currently acceptable in the diplomatic marketplace - though many of our recommendations should be - but what will contribute to lasting peace, bearing always in mind the need to apply consistent principles and to consider the wider consequences of every action. This report is built on the experience of five years of field-based analysis by the ICG. Since our first project commenced in Sarajevo in 1996, we have produced on the Balkans three book-length reports and over 140 other reports and briefing papers. This is the first time we have tried to look at the region as a whole, addressing all the outstanding issues, applying experience learned elsewhere , and identifying wherever possible common policy themes and approaches . It is an approach we have long been urging upon governments themselves ,who have too often responded in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion to problems crying out for a comprehensive approach.

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION: Reform or Rebellion (ICG Balkans Report 109)

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION: Reform or Rebellion (ICG Balkans Report 109)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In late February, violence flared in Albanian-inhabited villages in northern Macedonia close to the border with Kosovo. In mid March, the violence spread to Macedonia’s second largest city, Tetovo. The rebels claimed to be defending themselves against Macedonian security forces, i.e. their own government, and to be fighting for Albanian national rights in Macedonia. The coalition government in Skopje promptly raised the alarm, blaming Kosovo Albanian elements for exporting rebellion to Macedonia, and calling for the NATO-led forces in Kosovo (KFOR) to seal the border. The rebels claimed they were local Albanians, numbering 2,000 and recruiting dozens of volunteers from the surrounding area every day. Now that the dust around Tetovo has settled, the government and parliament need to face squarely, without panicking, a large political question: Are the Macedonians and Albanians in the country committed to integrated living? Or, should they accept nationalist logic and prepare to negotiate federalisation?

NO EARLY EXIT: NATO's continuing Challenge in Bosnia (ICG Balkans Report N°110)

NO EARLY EXIT: NATO's continuing Challenge in Bosnia (ICG Balkans Report N°110)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

As the civilian international agencies and local democratic forces continue to tackle obstructionist elements, the presence of SFOR to provide a 'safe and secure' environment is more crucial than ever. Recent rioting by Dayton's Bosnian Serb and Croat enemies in Banja Luka, Trebinje and Mostar - and the increasing incidence of attacks on refugees seeking to return to their homes - demonstrate that radical elements have become more desperate and dangerous. Experience has shown that the credible display of force by SFOR is necessary to deter such violence. In addition, more arrests by SFOR of persons indicted by The Hague Tribunal would improve the political and security situations, while making it clear that individuals, not nations, bear responsibility for wartime atrocities.

ALBANIA: The State of the Nation 2001 (ICG Balkans Report N°111)

ALBANIA: The State of the Nation 2001 (ICG Balkans Report N°111)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report describes the current situation in Albania, paying particular attention to relations with the country’s Balkan neighbours, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece. The recent upsurge in fighting in the Presevo Valley of southern Serbia and in Macedonia has damaged the reputation of all Albanians in the region and has once more raised the spectre of a Greater Albania. Consequently, the Albanian government has been at pains to stress that it does not support the ethnic Albanian insurgents and wishes to see the territorial integrity of Macedonia upheld. To this end, Tirana has requested NATO’s assistance to secure the Albania-Macedonia border, and has called for a solution to the crisis through dialogue.

A FAIR EXCHANGE: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability (ICG Balkans Report N° 112)

A FAIR EXCHANGE: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability (ICG Balkans Report N° 112)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Aid conditionality is an effective tool because the FRY’s shattered economy relies on donor support for numerous social programs, as well as electricity, debt relief, restructuring, and, in the winter, heating. The events leading up to Milosevic’s arrest in the early hours of 1 April 2001 demonstrated the viability of conditionality-based policies. This report argues that major donors should use their leverage by conditioning assistance on concrete actions from the FRY government to fulfil its obligations on three issues vital to regional stability.

MACEDONIA: The Last Chance for Peace (ICG Balkans Report N° 113)

MACEDONIA: The Last Chance for Peace (ICG Balkans Report N° 113)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In the past three months, since mid March 2001, Macedonia has stared into the abyss of inter-ethnic conflict, pulled away from the precipice, squandered opportunities for a political settlement, then returned as if sleepwalking to the brink of civil war. The downward spiral was interrupted on 11 June, when the Macedonian government and the ethnic Albanian rebels agreed to a ceasefire. The following day the government abruptly endorsed a peace plan proposed by President Boris Trajkovski. For their part, the NLA guerrillas expressed a readiness to halt their insurgency but want to see concrete steps towards improving Albanian rights.

MONTENEGRO: Resolving the Independence Deadlock (ICG Balkans Report N° 114)

MONTENEGRO: Resolving the Independence Deadlock (ICG Balkans Report N° 114)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Montenegro‘s authorities remain committed to independence. However, the hopes of the republic‘s ruling parties that the election on 22 April 2001 would bring a comfortable victory, to be followed swiftly by a referendum and independence, were not realised. The narrow victory for the pro-independence parties only confirmed the depth of division over the republic‘s status. Plans for an independence referendum were postponed until early 2002. With some difficulty, the pro-independence ruling parties formed a minority government backed by the radically proindependence Liberal Alliance, which demands rapid progress towards a referendum. However, the lack of a broad consensus on the status issue or on the rules and conditions for a referendum makes it difficult to press ahead with independence plans under current circumstances.

BOSNIA’S PRECARIOUS ECONOMY: Still not open for Business (ICG Balkans Report N° 115)

BOSNIA’S PRECARIOUS ECONOMY: Still not open for Business (ICG Balkans Report N° 115)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The spurt of growth that came with post-war reconstruction is now faltering. The numbers of people unemployed and/or living in poverty are rising. Tax and customs evasion remains rife, undermining the power and legitimacy of governments whose coffers are often empty and need regular replenishment by donors. The debt caused by budget deficits is mortgaging Bosnia’s future. Smugglers and traffickers in goods and people easily and regularly violate Bosnia’s stillporous borders. The black economy remains predominant in Republika Srpska (RS), and is relatively widespread in the Federation as well. The privatisation of strategic enterprises – which should be a major engine of growth – has yet to take place. Increasing numbers of young and educated Bosnians are queuing in front of Western consulates seeking a way to a better future outside the country. Those already living abroad show no sign of returning. Three hundred and forty strikes in 2000, numerous demonstrations over the late or non-payment of pensions, and frequent roadblocks set up by dissatisfied workers testify to a deep economic crisis and simmering social unrest.

PEACE IN PREŠEVO: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution? (ICG Balkans Report N° 116)

PEACE IN PREŠEVO: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution? (ICG Balkans Report N° 116)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

This report traces the political process that achieved this transfer of authority over 1,200 square kilometres of territory, focusing on two issues. First, it considers the reforms that are still needed to achieve lasting peace in the Presevo area. Second, it considers the hopeful claim from some quarters that this transfer of authority, based on unprecedented cooperation between NATO and the new regime in Belgrade, may offer a model for tackling other disputes in the wider neighbourhood. The circumstances of peacemaking in Presevo were unique and cannot be emulated elsewhere. Recent events, moreover, illustrate that declarations of victory by Western observers remain premature. The insurgency in southern Serbia reflected real and deeply rooted problems, both local and regional. Conditions for reconciliation are in place, but the process itself has hardly begun. The longer term prospects for peaceful reintegration now depend on effective follow through by the Serbian authorities assisted by ethnic Albanian leaders and the international community.

SERBIA’S TRANSITION: Reforms under Siege (ICG Balkans Report N° 117)

SERBIA’S TRANSITION: Reforms under Siege (ICG Balkans Report N° 117)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Kostunica’s DSS led the attacks against a group of reform-oriented, relatively pragmatic politicians centred mostly around Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic Party (DS). The severity of the DSS attack dealt a heavy blow to the coalition and changed the face of Serbian politics. Although the two sides may soon patch up their differences, the fallout from the events surrounding the ‘Gavrilovic Affair’ will be widespread and could affect the pace and extent of political and economic reforms, as well as Yugoslavia’s cooperation with the international community and its neighbours. So too the lack of civilian control over the Yugoslav Army (VJ) has become more apparent. In regional terms, at stake in the current struggle within DOS are the continuation of FRY funding for the Army of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Belgrade’s stance towards UNMIK, and the question of further cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

THE WAGES OF SIN: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (Balkans Report N° 118)

THE WAGES OF SIN: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (Balkans Report N° 118)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

By recognising Republika Srpska (RS) as a legitimate polity and constituent entity of the new Bosnia, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement embraced a contradiction. For the RS was founded as a stepping stone to a Greater Serbia. and forged in atrocities against - and mass expulsions of non-Serbs. … Almost six years after Dayton, these hopes lie unfulfilled and partly forgotten. … Converted to Dayton constitutionalism, and fortified by the election of a respectable nationalist to the Yugoslav presidency in Belgrade, the rebranded SDS remains as unwilling as ever to define „its state“ as the rightful home of Bosnians of all faiths. The riots organised in May 2001 to prevent the reconstruction of historic mosques razed during the war and the government‘s continuing refusal, even after Milosevic.s transfer to the ICTY in June, to cooperate with The Hague ought to have made plain that the RS remains true to its wartime self. Vague international threats to punish the RS on both scores led only to token concessions by the authorities.

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism (ICG Balkans Report N° 119)

BIN LADEN AND THE BALKANS: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism (ICG Balkans Report N° 119)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Keywords: mujahidin;

Given the presence of ex-mujahidin in Bosnia, the tens of thousands of former military and paramilitary fighters in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia who are Muslims by tradition, if not for the most part by observance, and the large deployments of U.S. and other troops in the region, some (though by no means all) senior Western sources describe the potential terrorist threat as significant. In this context, international officials and organisations in parts of the region, as well as certain governments, have taken extra security precautions, and clamped down on individuals and groups suspected of possible links to terrorist networks. In this context, it is important that the international community should not be distracted by the wave of anti-Muslim opinion and propaganda that has washed through Serbia, Macedonia, and the Serbcontrolled parts of Bosnia. In these countries, and also in Albania, Western capitals must reward governments. overall democratic performance, not the volume of their denunciations of terrorism.

KOSOVO: Landmark Election (Balkans Report N° 120)

KOSOVO: Landmark Election (Balkans Report N° 120)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 17 November 2001, people from Kosovo turned a page in their history by voting in multiparty elections for new self-government institutions. The conduct of the election was generally judged to have been a clear improvement on the municipal elections of October 2000. Levels of violence were much lower, even though more voters took part. In the run-up to the election, a key issue was whether or not Serbs would participate. The SRSG engaged in a round of frenetic negotiations with Belgrade leaders that eventually bore fruit just a fortnight before the vote. While an agreement was reached which enabled Belgrade to claim that they had won concessions, but without UNMIK compromising the principles contained in UNSCR 1244 or the Constitutional Framework, Albanian leaders were incensed by the agreement and by the key involvement of Belgrade in the process.

BOSNIA: Reshaping the International Machinery (ICG Balkans Report No. 121)

BOSNIA: Reshaping the International Machinery (ICG Balkans Report No. 121)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

After six years and billions of dollars spent, peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains far from complete. Reshaping (‚recalibrating‘, in local jargon) the international community (IC) presence is vital if the peace process is to have a successful outcome. Above all, however, the reform must acknowledge that if Bosnia cannot be put on its feet by evolution, nudged along by the High Representative, or by some negotiated constitutional settlement, then the IC must be ready to impose a more workable and democratic model than Dayton envisaged. This could involve creating a strong but fully representative central government, clearing away the counterproductive entity and cantonal structures, devolving substantial powers to the municipalities, and designing largely depoliticised structures for regional administration. It is not too soon for the PIC Steering Board to start consultations on post-Dayton structures.

MACEDONIA’S NAME: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it (ICG Balkans Report No. 122)

MACEDONIA’S NAME: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it (ICG Balkans Report No. 122)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On 16 November 2001, Macedonia’s parliament passed a set of constitutional amendments that were agreed in August, when Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Later that day, President Trajkovski clarified the terms of an amnesty for Albanian rebels, in line with international requests. So far as Macedonians are concerned, the Agreement contains a double weakness. First, it redresses long-standing minority grievances mainly by reducing the privileges of the majority. Secondly, its purpose of turning Macedonia into a ‘civic state’ – while admirable and necessary – makes Macedonia an anomaly in a region of emphatically ‘ethnic’ states, three of which uphold fundamental challenges to the Macedonian identity. Greece vetoes international acceptance of Macedonia’s name, Serbia denies the autonomy of its church, and Bulgaria (while accepting Macedonia as a state) denies the existence of a Macedonian language and a Macedonian nation.

KOSOVO: A Strategy for Economic Development (ICG Balkans Report No. 123)

KOSOVO: A Strategy for Economic Development (ICG Balkans Report No. 123)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Kosovo cannot have a stable future without sustainable economic development. This report considers the task of promoting such development. After surveying the present state of the economy, it assesses the international efforts so far to lay the groundwork for future prosperity. It also considers the prospects for the former socially owned sector, including plans for privatisation and prospects for restructuring and investment. These economic issues have a directly political dimension, one that affects all aspects of structural and institutional development in Kosovo. Potential investors have been deterred by the fact that they do not know which jurisdiction will finally apply. They need to have confidence that a future change in political status would not put their investment in question or fundamentally alter the environment where they would be doing business. Controversies over ownership have a similar deterrent effect.

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (I). Addressing Final Status (ICG Balkans Report No. 124)

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (I). Addressing Final Status (ICG Balkans Report No. 124)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In order to move towards a resolution of Kosovo’s final status, two distinct aspects need to be considered: an ‘external’ and an ‘internal’ dimension. The ‘external’ dimension involves devising a process to address final status, including all of the different actors with a stake in Kosovo’s future. The ‘internal’ dimension concerns the development of Kosovo’s own democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights, so as to prepare Kosovo for whatever final status may eventually be agreed. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, A Kosovo Roadmap, issued simultaneously and subtitled I. Addressing Final Status and II. Internal Benchmarks.

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (II). Internal Benchmarks (ICG Balkans Report N° 125)

A KOSOVO ROADMAP (II). Internal Benchmarks (ICG Balkans Report N° 125)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

In examining Kosovo’s final status, the International Crisis Group argues that the issue has two aspects, inseparable and overlapping but nevertheless distinct. The ‘external’ dimension involves the interests of, and relationships between, the different actors with a stake in Kosovo’s future, while the ‘internal’ dimension concerns the development of Kosovo’s own democratic institutions, laws and standards. These dimensions are duly treated in a pair of reports sharing a common title, A Kosovo Roadmap, issued simultaneously and subtitled I. Addressing Final Status and II. Internal Benchmarks. Together, these reports show two, parallel paths which need be negotiated simultaneously in order to reach the desired destination: a stable, democratic Kosovo, standing on its own feet, peacefully integrated in its region, and with a clearly defined place in the international community.