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Италия и Балканитѣ (по случай общоевропейската война)
A print of the Military Journal, September 15, 1915, referring to Italy's policy on the Balkans.
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A print of the Military Journal, September 15, 1915, referring to Italy's policy on the Balkans.
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The sacralised Soviet victory over Nazism is a central element of the politics of memory, as utilised by the Russian state today. It constitutes an important theme in the Kremlin’s ideological offensive that is intended to legitimise Russia’s great-power ambitions. The messianic myth of saving the world from absolute evil is supposed to cover up the darker chapters of Soviet history and to legitimise all subsequent Soviet or Russian wars and military interventions, starting with Hungary, through Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and ending with Ukraine and Syria. According to the current neo-Soviet interpretation, all these military actions were purely defensive and justified by external circumstances. The glorification of the “Yalta order” and the justification of the use of force in foreign policy is intended to legitimise Moscow’s pursuit of its current strategic aims, first and foremost of these being hegemony in the post-Soviet area and revision of the European security architecture. The war mythology and Russia’s great-power ambitions continue to resonate with the wider Russian public; thus contributing to legitimisation of the authoritarian regime in the eyes of a large swathe of society and offsetting the effect of growing socio-economic problems. The myth of a wartime ‘brotherhood of arms’ has a smaller impact on other post-Soviet states, which have increasingly been distancing themselves – especially since 2014 – from Moscow’s neo-imperial historical narrative. The use of historical myths as a form of soft power finds even less resonance in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, low susceptibility in the West to Russian historical propaganda does not diminish the gravity of the challenge posed by Russian information-psychological warfare, resorting to historical falsehoods and specious analogies between the current international situation and political-military tensions of the 1930s.
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Sakralizacja sowieckiego zwycięstwa nad nazizmem stanowi centralny element rosyjskiej polityki historycznej i jeden z wątków w ofensywie ideologicznej obliczonej na legitymizację współczesnych ambicji mocarstwowych Rosji. Mesjanistyczny mit zbawienia świata od absolutnego zła ma wybielać bądź unieważniać ciemne karty historii Związku Sowieckiego oraz legitymizować wszystkie późniejsze wojny, łącznie z interwencjami wojskowymi na Węgrzech, w Czechosłowacji czy Afganistanie, aż do udziału we współczesnych konfliktach – agresji przeciwko Ukrainie i interwencji w Syrii. Zgodnie ze współczesną, neosowiecką wykładnią wszystkie one miały charakter defensywny i były uzasadnione zewnętrznym kontekstem. Faktyczna apoteoza ładu jałtańskiego i usprawiedliwianie przemocy w polityce międzynarodowej mają służyć realizacji współczesnych interesów strategicznych Moskwy, do których należą przede wszystkim hegemonia na obszarze posowieckim i przebudowa europejskiej architektury bezpieczeństwa. Mitologia wojenna i ambicje mocarstwowe są wciąż nośne w społeczeństwie rosyjskim i pomagają legitymizować autorytarny reżim mimo pogłębiających się problemów społeczno-ekonomicznych. W mniejszym stopniu mit wojennego „braterstwa broni” oddziałuje na kraje posowieckie, coraz bardziej dystansujące się – zwłaszcza po 2014 r. – od neoimperialnej narracji historycznej Moskwy. W najmniejszym stopniu historyczna soft power Kremla znajduje oddźwięk w Europie i USA, co nie umniejsza wagi stojących przed Zachodem wyzwań związanych z prowadzoną tam przez Rosję wojną informacyjno-psychologiczną opartą na falsyfikowaniu historii i konstruowaniu paraleli między współczesną polityką międzynarodową i napięciami lat trzydziestych XX wieku.
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MIXER, Milan Radanović: Gorske bekrije pred bogom i sudom; CEMENT, Saša Ćirić: Pogled s Tašmajdana; VREME SMRTI I RAZONODE, Hamed Abud: Želim da vozim tenk
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MIXER, Vladan Jovanović: Iz istorije srpske albanofobije; ŠTRAFTA, Haris Imamović: Genocid, ništa lično; VREME SMRTI I RAZONODE, Vladimir Đurišić: Slavija, Bojan Samson: Poetska patologija
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Nacionalna svijest teško izlazi na kraj s mitovima koje joj suprotstavlja ili nameće nacionalizam. Kritička povijest, osobito u malih naroda, često je osuđena na poraz ili na izgnanstvo. Srpska historiografija pokušavala je odavno već prikazati četništvo kao nacionalni i oslobodilački pokret. Nedavno je ono priznato čak kao oblik antifašizma. Javno mnijenje je u takvim prilikama izloženo obmanama, ponekad ih samo proizvodi ili podržava.
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Tokom svih osam godina ratnih sukoba na tlu bivše Jugoslavije, zapadnu, a pre svega američku politiku karakterisale su konfuzija, uljuljkivanje u neosnovane nade, odlaganje i izbegavanje odluka; nedostatak fokusa i odlučnosti. Najverovatnije da razlog za ovakvo ponašanje Sjedinjenih država treba tražiti u činjenici da se 1991. Jugoslavija nalazila pri dnu liste prioriteta Stejt departmenta.[1] Bilo je to vreme velikih previranja u svetu. Kraj Hladnog rata, pad komunizma i ujedinjenje Nemačke bili su nesumnjivo događaji čiji je epohalni i globalni značaj uveliko nadilazio sitničave etničke razmirice jugoslovenskih lidera. Naročito s obzirom na to da je Jugoslavija u to vreme smatrana kandidatom koji je, u poređenju sa drugim bivšim komunističkim zemljama, imao najveće šanse za bezbolnu tranziciju, kako prema parlamentarnom sistemu i otvorenoj tržišnoj ekonomiji, tako i ka integracijama sa evropskim ekonomskim i političkim institucijama. Usredsređeni na velika globalna zbivanja i uvereni u sposobnost Jugoslavije da obavi svoju mirnu tranziciju, zapadne diplomate su potcenile latentnu mogućnost da sitničave svađe eskaliraju u ogromno nasilje.
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2014. je godina doista bogata obljetnicama – počevši, primjerice, s 2050 godina od vjenčanja Antonija i Kleopatre (i Pascal i Hegel su, poznato je, bili suglasni u tomu da bi svijet bio drukčiji da je „Kleopatrin nos bio kraći“, ali, zapravo, baš tada vjerojatno započinje mukotrpan proces osvještavanja egzistencije „svijeta“), pa sve do 20 godina otkako je „Pulp fiction“ doživio premijeru (kronologijski se između ovih godišnjica, uza sve ostale, može smjestiti još i 300 godina Bachove kantate „Mein Herze schwimmt im Blut“, 225 godina od početka Francuske revolucije, 125 godina od Heideggerova rođenja, 75 godina otkako je RCA započela sredovitim televizijskim programom, 60 godina od Brechtova „Kavkaskoga kruga kredom“, 40 godina od Nixonove ostavke…). Ipak, stogodišnjica Prvoga svjetskog rata kao da je progutala sve druge – vjerojatno i zbog općeproširene fiksacije na „okrugle“ brojke (a na jubilarne obljetnice naročito).
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Često zaboravljamo kako fašizam dejstvuje: kao čista i sjajna alternativa ovozemaljskim dužnostima svakodnevice, kao svetkovina potpuno iracionalnog protiv razuma i iskustva. Fašizam karakterišu oružani odredi koji ne liče na oružane odrede, ravnodušnost prema pravilima rata protiv naroda koji se smatraju inferiornima, veličanje „carstva“ posle otimanja teritorija.
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U vezi sa otcepljenjem Krima od Ukrajine, aktualizovano je poređenje Krima i Kosova. Američka i evropska administracija, većina američkih i evropskih eksperata za međunarodno pravo, međunarodne nevladine organizacije i dve-tri lokalne organizacije za ljudska prava smatraju da se Krim i Kosovo ne mogu porediti.
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Nedavno sam izlazeći iz Radio Eho Moskve, na prašnjavom trotoaru Novog Arbata naleteo na našeg poznatog međunarodnog analitičara.
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Politička kriza koja je zahvatila Jugoslaviju imala je snažan međunarodni odjek, naročito od prvih sukoba u leto 1990. Ta kriza je pogodila zemlju koja je u vreme prestanka Hladnog rata odista gubila na značaju u međunarodnoj političkoj areni, ali koja nije bila ni sasvim izvan „radara“ velikih svetskih sila. Naprotiv, interesovanje za Jugoslaviju i njenu budućnost raslo je sa eskalacijom krize u njoj. Sa sve većim osamostaljivanjem republika broj aktera koji su bili sagovornici stranih vlada sa jugoslovenske strane se povećavao, budući da je pragmatičan pristup međunarodnih krugova podrazumevao da se razgovara sa stvarnim nosiocima vlasti u Jugoslaviji. To je, istovremeno, bila prilika za formiranje stavova o novim liderima i, uopšte, o toku jugoslovenske krize.
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30 godina samostalnosti Hrvatske i Slovenije: Mentalna priprema za ratove devedesetih počela je u Srbiji najmanje 10 godina pre prvih oružanih sukoba. Revidiranjem događaja iz Prvog i Drugog svetskog rata u kojima su stvorene obe Jugoslavije, rušeni su temelji zajedničke države. Govori istoričarka Dubravka Stojanović. Razgovor vodi Svetlana Lukić.
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Trideseta godišnjica tzv. Krvavog Uskrsa na Plitvicama, koji se vodi kao službeni početak nikad proglašenog rata u Hrvatskoj, vlasti su obilježile u sred trećeg vala pandemije. Posve uobičajeno, s par prigodnih govora, s medijima koji su bili puno zainteresiraniji za sukob između predsjednika i premijera oko toga tko će biti na čelu Vrhovnog suda i s dobacivanjem radikalnih nacionalista koji su premijera vrijeđali zbog koalicije s SDSS-om, personificiranim u liku Milorada Pupovca. Istovremeno, dan ranije u Aržanu, rodnom mjestu Josipa Jovića kojeg službena historiografija vodi kao prvog poginulog branitelja svečano je obilježen početak gradnje memorijalnog centra koji će nositi njegovo ime. Josip Jović je, uz sedmoricu ranjenih, bio jedini čovjek koji je poginuo tog Uskrsa na Plitvicama u uniformi specijalne policije MUP-a Hrvatske, dok je s druge strane na strani pobunjenih Srba, poginuo Rajko Vukadinović. Iako kratkotrajan sukob, on se logično obilježava kao početak rata u Hrvatskoj, a u svemu što se oko njega događalo i događa možemo vidjeti kompletnu ratnu i poratnu stvarnost Hrvatske. S jedne strane, miting istine na Plitvicama, odluka da se tamošnji nacionalni park pripoji samoproglašenoj SAO Krajini, upad paravojske u hotele i upravu Nacionalnog parka i to u vrijeme dok se tamo odmaraju turisti, pokušaj hrvatskih vlasti da vrate otuđeni dio teritorija pod svoju kontrolu, balvani na cesti, zasjeda, okršaj i na koncu pobjeda hrvatskih vlasti te uspostava policijske stanice Republike Hrvatske na Plitvicama, sve uz nekoliko ljudi koji će kasnije odigrati bitne uloge u ratu i poraću.
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U ovoj, 2021. godini, navršavaju se dva jubileja od značaja za srpsko-hrvatske odnose. Prvi je stogodišnjica od usvajanja i proglašenja Vidovdanskog ustava 1921. godine (koji je imao širi značaj, ne samo u kontekstu srpsko-hrvatskih odnosa, ali je obuhvatao i njih), a drugi je trideseta godišnjica od početka ratnih sukoba u Hrvatskoj 1991. godine (pri čemu ni taj sukob nije ostao samo srpsko-hrvatski). Dva jubileja, oba ispunjena mnogim nepomirljivo suprotstavljenim stanovištima, od toga kakva je Jugoslavija trebalo da bude do toga da uopšte nije ni trebalo da je bude. Između dve okrugle godišnjice nalazi se čitava jedna istorija u kojoj su postojali kvalitativno najrazličitiji vidovi međusobne interakcije: od savršene irelevantnosti srpske odnosno hrvatske etničke identifikacije za međusobne odnose do njenog podizanja na pijedestal najvažnijeg sadržaja.
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Prošlo je 30 godina… Nikada se za to vreme prošlost nije tako direktno sudarila sa sadašnjošću kao ove godine. Na 20. godišnjicu početka agresije na BiH došli smo u Sarajevo nas pedesetak stranih novinara i fotografa, koji smo uz Sarajlije delili mračne dane istorije Bosne i svedočanstva rata, opsade i masovnih zločina, koji su se sada ponovo vratili u Evropu. Bili smo tu da s njima razbijemo zaborav i amneziju Evrope, koja je bila željna da izbriše svoju sramotu i to tragično poglavlje svoje istorije, i koja se bila ponovo uljuljkala u nadu o Fukujaminom kraju istorije i večnom miru.
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The wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia have had severe and longterm consequences, which Montenegro too still faces today and only to a limited degree. Also, almost all states of the former Yugoslavia face the challenge of addressing systemic violations of human rights, which is reflected in the process of building functional democratic institutions that should establish a responsible attitude towards the recent violent past. Such a relationship is inconceivable without establishing the truth about the fate of persons who are still listed as missing due to the armed conflicts of the 1990s. The states of the region continue to owe the families of 9,969 missing persons a full and impartial investigation into the circumstances under which their loved ones were killed or went missing, and they fail to carry out responsible sentences in accordance with the gravity of the crime committed. In Montenegro, the legislative framework does not recognize the families of persons considered missing as civilian victims of war, whereas the system of reparations is flawed and discriminatory. Given the recorded activities of Montenegro in the armed conflicts during the 1990s, as well as the court-established facts indicating the role of Montenegrin citizens in these events, a proactive approach by Montenegrin institutions is crucial in determining the fate of missing persons. Victims’ communities have high expectations from these institutions, which is proportional to the participation of the armed forces under the direct or indirect control of the state of Montenegro in the waged wars. Unfortunately, the disproportionate commitment of Montenegrin decision-makers and institutions to this issue remains. The process of searching for the missing is difficult and conditioned by the political situation in the countries of the region. Although the need to find out the truth about the fate of persons who disappeared during the armed conflicts is expressed, above all, among their family members, and sporadically appears on the agenda of meetings of statesmen in the region, in practice, there are obstacles to the search for missing persons. These obstacles range from the inadequate capacities of state bodies involved in the search for missing persons, through insufficient financial resources, to a lack of political will to substantially improve regional cooperation, which also includes the determination to make the search for missing persons more efficient. In general, there is not enough information on this issue in Montenegro, and it is also marginalized in public discourse. Therefore, this publication, as an alternative report, offers an overview of international standards and national legislation, reviewing the results and challenges of the search for missing persons during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but also proposes recommendations for improving efficiency in this area.
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Russia’s revisionist policy, which culminated in the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, tore down the foundations of the Euro-Atlantic security system based on the international law and principles listed in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Despite Russia’s repeated violations of its commitments, NATO has been unilaterally honouring the Act, including by not stationing permanent substantial combat forces in the eastern part of the Alliance. However, given the current security situation, NATO should declare that it does not feel bound by the self-imposed military limitations of the Act. Honouring them is of no benefit in relations with Russia, impedes a response to the Russian threat, and creates unnecessary risk.
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It is 100 years since we were supposedly getting over the war to end all wars, World War I, and forming the League of Nations with the purpose of preventing such a conflict and slaughter happening again. Regrettably, the only good that came out of it was the proposal to form the League of Nations; it was not much more than an idea though otherwise stillborn and we needed another World War before something solid resulted, the United Nations with some teeth, although they need sharpening. It was the time that the Chinese Communist party was formed and has just celebrated its centenary. What have we done in the time, apart from multiplying ourselves by a factor of 3, and perhaps upsetting the planet on the way. There are exciting scientific advances, of course, some of which we must use to address the wasteful manner in which we live.
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It is evident that, almost two decades passed after the end of cold war period, and the world is divided into two main camps to name; the Centre and the Periphery. At the beginning of this article, it may be useful to look at the position of the states like Bulgaria and Romania from a broader perspective, which once were the members of the periphery in the Communist Block. Throughout the new reformation and restructuring phases of the global age, new world order has dictated certain unnamed rules that are vital for the future of global order and mankind. Current world order is completely different and the political, geographical or cultural principles of the cold-war era to classify the states into different groups are not relevant anymore. Description of south, north, west, second world, and third world has changed dramatically. Centre is composed of economically and militarily strong states, basically the representatives of hegemonic liberalism, no matter at which geographic location they occupy on the planet. On the other hand, Periphery is made by the states who were once the members of Second (communist block) or Third Worlds and some other states that are excluded from the centre for cultural, religious or ideological reasons. Now, there is a struggle among the peripheral states, trying to be a member of centre at all costs. The expansion of NATO and EU towards east to the expense of old Soviet territories in general and Russia in particular, need to be evaluated through the principles of a broader security perception.
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