The Mind Beyond the Head: Two Arguments in Favour of Embedded Cognition

Author(s): Andrea Roselli / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2018

In this paper I defend situated approaches of cognition, and the idea that mind, body and external world are inseparable. In the first section, I present some anti–Cartesian approaches of cognition and discuss the intuition they share that there is a constitutive interaction between mind, body and external environment. In the second section, I present the fallacy of the Cartesian theater of the mind and explain its theoretical premises. In the third section, I present a spatial argument against it, and argue that some case studies could give support to the idea of the mind stretching over the boundaries of the skull. In the fourth section, I present a temporal argument, and argue that even in this case the idea of an interaction between our cognitive life and the external world has at least a very strong intuitive palatability.

Consciousness and Unconsciousness of Artificial Intelligence

Author(s): Eugene Piletsky / Language(s): English Issue: 11/2019

This paper presents the author’s attempt to justify the need for understanding the problem of multilevel mind in artificial intelligence systems. Thus, it is assumed that consciousness and the unconscious are not equal in natural mental processes. The human conscious is supposedly a “superstructure” above the unconscious automatic processes. Nevertheless, it is the unconscious that is the basis for the emotional and volitional manifestations of the human psyche and activity. At the same time, the alleged mental activity of Artificial Intelligence may be devoid of the evolutionary characteristics of the human mind. Several scenarios are proposed for the possible development of a “strong” AI through the prism of creation (or evolution) of the machine unconscious. In addition, we propose two opposite approaches regarding the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious.

L’intersubjectivité dans l’espace virtuel et le corps charnel virtuel. Essai d’une recherche phénoménologique

Author(s): Serhii Hryshkan / Language(s): French Issue: 1/2018

In this article I propose, on the basis of the phenomenological description, a new concept called “virtual living body” and I show its significance for studying the intersubjectivity in the virtual realities. The article consists of three parts. Firstly, I conceptualize “virtual living body” as the sphere of the objects of the world which are used by the functional analogy of our living body. This sphere is accurately distinguished from two other spheres: the living body and not instrumentalized objects of the world. Secondly, I show that the virtual living body is a necessary condition for intersubjectivity and intersubjective communication in a virtual reality, analogously like the living body is a necessary condition for intersubjectivity and intersubjective communication in general. Thirdly, I consider, on the basis of this concept, a specific form of intersubjective communication in a virtual reality called “flame war” and compare it to the master-slave dialectic of Hegel.

Kognitywista czyta Homo Deus

Author(s): Mateusz Hohol / Language(s): Polish Issue: 774/2019

Unsupervised Learning and the Natural Origins of Content

Author(s): Tomasz Korbak / Language(s): English Issue: 3/2019

In this paper, I evaluate the prospects and limitations of radical enactivism as recently developed by Hutto and Myin (henceforth, “H&M”) (2013, 2017). According to radical enactivism, cognition does not essentially involve content and admits explanations on a semantic level only as far as cognition is scaffolded with social and linguistic practices. I investigate their claims, focusing on H&M’s criticism of the predictive processing account of cognition (dubbed the bootstrap hell argument) and their own account of the emergence of content (the natural origins of content). I argue that H&M fail on two fronts: unsupervised learning can arrive at contentful representations and H&M’s account of the emergence of content assumes an equivalent bootstrapping. My case is illustrated with Skyrms’ evolutionary game-theoretic account of the emergence of content and recent deep learning research on neural language models. These arguments cast a shadow of doubt on whether radical enactivism is philosophically interesting or empirically plausible.

Relacja umysł–ciało: poza dualizmem i fizykalizmem

Author(s): Mateusz Karwowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 3/2019

In contemporary discussions concerning the relation of the mind to the body, two positions are contrasted with each other: physicalism and dualism. Even if these are not the dominant approaches to the mind-body problem, the fact is that most other positions arise as attempts to find a compromise between these two. This article argues that physicalism and dualism have more in common than is usually assumed. Both accept the key intuition motivating Cartesian dualism, i.e. the view that in the ordinary language we can describe physical and psychological reality in such a way that physical description does not imply anything concerning psychological and vice versa. The argument presented in this paper attempts to show that such descriptions are not possible. This means that there is no sense in talking about two distinct realities: physical and mental. It follows that there is no problem of the mind–body relationship, because the body is a living organism that owes its identity to having the powers and abilities that are the basis for talking about the mind. In addition, the approach proposed here solves the problem of other minds.

Wielkie pytanie

Author(s): Julia Fiedorczuk / Language(s): Polish Issue: 781/2020

Is the Realization of the Emotional Artificial Intelligence Possible? Philosophical and Methodological Analysis

Author(s): Oksana Chursinova,Oleksandra Stebelska / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2021

The article dwells upon the need for a thorough philosophical and methodological analysis of the nature and functions of the human’s emotional and sensual sphere in order to identify the possibilities of its implementation by means of artificial intelligence. Computers have become part and parcel of our lives, so full-fledged communication requires empowering them to recognize and express emotions. Due to the result of critical analysis, the authors state that implementation, and not simulation, of emotions in any computing system is currently problematic and, to some extent, impossible. The reason for this is connected both with the blurring in the scientific and philosophical literature of the very concept of ‘emotion’, and the subjective and qualitative nature of the person’s experience of reality, the rootedness of their emotional and sensual sphere in the physical, social and cultural being, the unconditional connection of emotions and the internal personal space of the person.

Thinking about Semantic Information

Author(s): Marcin Miłkowski / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2020

In his recent book, Daniel Dennett defends a novel account of semantic information in terms of design worth getting (Dennett, 2017). While this is an interesting proposal in itself, my purpose in this commentary is to challenge several of Dennett’s claims. First, he argues that semantic information can be transferred without encoding and storing it. Second, this lack of encoding is what makes semantic information unmeasurable. However, the argument for both these claims, presented by Dennett as an intuition pump, is invalid.

Comment on “Thinking about Semantic Information”

Author(s): Daniel C. Dennett / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2020

Marcin Milkowski provides an insightful overview of work on information theories over the years, from Gabor and Shannon to Wolpert and Kolchinski. He accurately summarizes my work, distilling four claims that I made in BBB, and argues that my arguments in favor of the last two of these are invalid. 3. The amount of semantic information carried or contained in any delimited episode or item is also not usefully measurable in units but roughly comparable in local circumstances. 4. Semantic information need not be encoded to be transmitted or saved (Dennett, 2017, p. 128). […]

HERMENEUTICS OF RECOLLECTION: GADAMER AND RICOEUR

Author(s): Aleksandar Ostojić / Language(s): English Issue: 4/2021

This paper analyzes the notion of recollection in Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur’s thought, in the context of time distance as “obstacles” towards understanding the past. Particular attention is paid to the understanding the phenomenon of “Death” as a time gap between the past and the present. In connection with this problem, we find efforts of philosophical hermeneutics on the one hand and historicism on the other. Differences between historicism and hermeneutics can be outlined in relation to the role that memory plays in the process of understanding in Gadamer and Ricoeur. What does Death mean in terms of understanding for history, and what for hermeneutics? How can we understand temporal distance? Is it possible and necessary to overcome it? What is the role of recollection and how does it participate in understanding? – these are some of the main issues that will be addressed in the text. Finally, the task of the text is to offer the meaning and significance of the hermeneutics of recollection in relation to the mentioned questions, through the interaction of the thoughts of the two authors.

Phantasía, affectivité et inconscient

Author(s): Tamás Ullmann / Language(s): French Issue: 2/2020

The aim of the article is to analyse the role that fantasy plays in the philosophy of consciousness. The article distinguishes first 3 conceptual models of the functioning of fantasy: (1) imagination as a weak version of perception; (2) productive imagination as a fundamental faculty; (3) fantasy as an archaic layer of consciousness. After presenting Husserl’s phenomenological theory of imagination and fantasy, the article focuses on three fundamental problems: (1) atmospheric fantasy and day dreaming; (2) fantasy and auto-affection; (3) the origin of phantasma that proves to be the most enigmatic question. The author argues for the possibility of establishing a link between Kantian schematism and Husserlian genetic phenomenology. This link is supposed to explicate the origin of phantasma. That is the way we can work out the concept of schematised affectivity.

Affective imagination: the shared awareness of our dreams

Author(s): Delia Popa / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2020

What is the relationship between imagination and affectivity? The hypothesis discussed in this paper is that, far from being a constant basis for our acts of imagination, affectivity rather interrupts and re-orients them toward new directions that cannot be consciously anticipated. Instead of understanding the affectivity of imagination as rooted in direct impression, I propose to understand it in terms of sudden infraction and contingent exposure to something that does not belong to the sphere of our conscious acts. While imagination and affectivity operate at two different levels of our subjective life, my aim is to show that their interference opens new world-perspectives and connects us to a larger human community. By cultivating contradiction in the life of our sensibility, imagination intensifies emotions that reveal the social and the cosmological dimension of our affectivity.

L’excroissance des bords: désalignement transcendantal et phantasia

Author(s): Pablo Posada Varela / Language(s): French Issue: 2/2020

This article seeks to enlighten the deep connection between three concepts: 1. The phantasia-affection, 2. What Marc Richir called, in his first book (1977) “the beyond of the Copernican reversal” and, finally, 3. Architectonics in its phenomenological effectiveness. Firstly, we introduce the concept of “transcendental misalignment”, thereby underlining the intrinsically hyperbolic structure of acts of representation. Mereology will then allow us to trace the difference between phantasia-affection (as a concrete whole) and the imagination-affect complex (as a fragmentable whole). Finally, it is the force of mereological concrescence that relates affection to its (mereological) exposure to a plurality of worlds. It is with the help of Rainer Maria Rilke and Antonio Machado, that we will illustrate architectonics as the multistratification of experience itself. The subject experiences indeed the irreducibility of registers, i.e., their fundamental non-concrescence.

Does the Folk Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness Exist?

Author(s): Michał Wyrwa / Language(s): English Issue: 71/2022

Philosophers and scientists refer to the special character of phenomenal consciousness, something supposedly obvious to all conscious persons. However, we had no empirical evidence about the folk view of consciousness until the first studies were carried out in the experimental philosophy of consciousness. According to the leading interpretation of these results, laypersons—people without academic knowledge about consciousness—do not notice the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. The aim of the article is to answer the question of whether we can trust these results. I show that there are serious doubts about the validity of the experimental philosophy of consciousness research. As a result, the leading interpretation should be rejected, and the question about the folk nature of the concept of consciousness must be regarded as open.

The Topicality of Hegel’s Concept of “Bildung” for Our Liberal Society

Author(s): Jure Zovko / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2022

In the following article, I will explain Hegel’s definition of modernity from the point of view of his understanding of “Bildung,” since this is a fundamental and newly relevant theme of Hegel’s philosophy nowadays. “Bildung” can be transliterated as education, but may also be interpreted as a general formative or developmental process, or cultivation (culture, respectively). With the term “Bildung” Hegel also refers to the formative self-development of the mind, its coming to individual as well as collective flourishing. The objective spirit manifests itself in the culture of humans. However, education in the sense of “Bildung” does not take place primarily through the transmission of information, values, norms, etc. by the teacher, but through “experience” [Erfahrung], which signifies the conflicting process by which a spiritual being discovers its own identity or self, while at the same time striving for self-consciousness, which is in the process of self-discovery. Through education, the human mind develops its capacity for understanding, reflection and judgment, and thus overcomes its natural intellectual, spiritual, normative, aesthetic, etc., poverty.

Moje przygody z filozofią

Author(s): Wojciech Sady / Language(s): Polish Issue: 2/2023

The question posed by the editors of this volume, “What is philosophy today?” is easy to answer: just look at the thematic compilations promulgated in The Philosopher's Index or online PhilPapers. Without much difficulty, we will find out what topics are currently most frequently covered by philosophers, which of those considered classics are most frequently commented on, and so on. And by looking at the citation lists, one can find out which living thinkers have had the greatest influence on others par- ticipating in the field.Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

Gunkel’s Deconstruction: Between the Fetish and the Need for a Dialectical Renewal

Author(s): Stanisław Chankowski / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2022

The purpose of the essay is to critically analyze the influence of J. Derrida’s deconstruction on David J. Gunkel’s book Deconstruction (MIT Press 2021). Gunkel’s handbook is aimed at making deconstruction a tool of critical thinking accessible to non-professionals. It turns out that accomplishing this task comes at the expense of precisely the critical potential of deconstruction itself. Gunkel is well aware that his arguments are sometimes superficial and overlook deeper problems that should be addressed. Such a failure takes the form of a fetishistic denial, which in psychoanalysis is summarized by the formula “I know well, but all the same.” In turn, deconstruction itself, insofar as it is separated from Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hegel’s dialectics, becomes an academic ideology. Restoring its proper subversive potential can only be done by returning to a philosophy of reflection, in which the thinker himself must ultimately consider his own position as an author and bring it under criticism. This is the path that Gunkel avoids, because he could then no longer be the author of a handbook on deconstruction, rather than someone who practices deconstruction.

WZORCE POZNANIA ROZPROSZONEGO

Author(s): Przemysław R. Nowakowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 1/2024

Even if the integration of distributed cognition with mechanistic conceptions of explanation can be seen as an interesting move and, if successful, leading to a non-trivial extension of cognitive science research, from the perspective of a distributed cognition theorist, the move should be seen as risky. In the paper, arguing against the proposal of Witold Wachowski (2022), I will try to outline the risks that the aforementioned integra- tion entails and propose an alternative solution, which consists in combining distributed cognition with network theory. This theory (in my opinion) allows for a more fruitful study of patterns of distributed cognition.

„WSTAŃ I WYJDŹ”. KONIEC DZIAŁANIA JAKO PROBLEM FILOZOFICZNY

Author(s): Robert Piłat / Language(s): Polish Issue: 1/2024

In this article, I discuss the conditions and criteria that determine and justify the end of action. Drawing upon philosophical and literary sources, I show the uncertain status of the end of an action. In the philosophy of action, much less attention has been paid to this problem than to the problem of the beginning of action. This is due to the moral and political implications of the beginning of an action, especially with respect to the connection between the beginning of action and free will. The end of action constitutes an equally crucial philosophical problem. I propose a performative interpretation of the act of ending. According to this interpretation, the rationale for ending an action is established explicitly, and it posseses normative power only in reflection.