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In this paper we consider an argument that is very influential in the philosophical literature, the argument from causal role against the view that delusions are beliefs. The argument has two premises, that many delusions fail to play belief-roles and that playing belief-roles is necessary for a mental state to be a belief. We assess both premises and suggest that they can be resisted.
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Ambrus Gergely: Tudományos elmefilozófia L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2015. 319 old., 3490 Ft
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Self-deception cuts across the behavior of persons, organizations, and states. Self-deception amounts to wearing a weightless mask: While the wearer is unaware of it, spectators usually recognize it. As soon as the wearer becomes conscious of the weightless mask, self-deception ceases to exist. This gives rise to a paradox: How could it ever be possible for the person to succeed in hiding the weightless mask from his or her own conscious self? To solve the paradox, this paper proposes that self-deception involves “two structural choices”: 1) an agent identifies the optimal decision — but the agent may fail (as a result of temptation) to choose it, which gives rise to self-blame; 2) The agent under focus may choose to invent a misleader (a lie) to make the choice appear “as if” it were optimal in order to avoid self-blame. The quest for a blameless choice makes it possible for the person to succeed in hiding the weightless mask from the conscious self. Aside from solving the Self-Deception Paradox, the proposed two-structural choice theory sheds light on three kinds of self-deception: red herring, self-rationalization, and denial.
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Filosofska osnova joge je takozvani sankja-filosofski sistem. Među ortodoksnim — opšteprihvaćenim — indijskim filosofskim sistemima, tri imaju sasvim istaknutu, osnovnu važnost; oni približno obuhvataju suštinsku sadržinu i ostalih sistema. To su: veđanta, sankja i joga. Joga je poseban sistem, ali u svojoj fiiosofskoj utemeljenosti upotrebljava sankjino shvatanje. A sankja je: izlaganje unutrašnje strukture stvorenog, postojećeg sveta, »predračun, nabrajanje« njegovih sastavnih elemenata. Ujedno je ovo i samo značenje reči sankja. Sistem sankja ne ide dalje, samo razlaže i rezimira; bavi se isključivo materijalnim svetom, i zato ne razmatra ono što je van materijalnog sveta. U ovom smislu sistem joge (kao i vedente) prihvata sankjinu sliku, predstavu sveta kao svoju, ali samo kao osnovu za polazište, da bi nakon upoznavanja suštine materijalnog sveta krenuo dalje i svoj pogled uperio na krajnju suštinu. Vedanta već predstavlja neposredno koncipiranje krajnje, najkorenitije spoznaje. Ona je već, tako reći, vrhunsko učenje, izložen rezultat, apstraktno sumiranje moguće spoznaje. I naziv to odaje; vedanta: kraj Veda, odnosno krajnji zaključak, krajnji rezultat. Ona daje i sažeto izlaganje, na kraju Veda, postojećih tajnih učenja, Upanišada.
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Interpunkcija, ionako tsiromašna u našoj grafiji, mogla bi se glatko ukinuti. Ukinuti u pisanju. U čitanju, govorenju, naše pauze, naglasci, ubrzavanje ili usporavamje, intonacija, rutam, ponekad su izražajmiji i isadržajniji od riječd samih. Tekst se sastoji i od riječi, i njihovih modulacdja, i od prazmina među njiima. Riječi kćatkad trpe intonaciju i interpunkciju, neke milujemo i mazimo, druge šibamo i izbacujemo.
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I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the subject/self is. One aspect of consciousness left unexplored and unappreciated by panpsychist theories is pre-reflective self-consciousness/self-awareness. Theories of the self, inspired by phenomenology, that are serious about subjectivity, could be of use in arguing against the deflationary reductionism of the experiencing subject. These theories show that there is more to the subject of experience than just its experiences (qualities). Even without arguing for any precise account of the nature of the self, it can be shown what phenomenology of subjective character of consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness contributes to the combination problem debate.
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Artykuł przedstawia wzajemną przekładalność problemów, jaka zachodzi między teorią funkcjonalną w filozofii umysłu a niektórymi modelami teorii prawdy w języku, na podstawie artkułu Willfrida Sellarsa Truth and „correspondence“. Praca Sellarsa daje możliwość zastanowienia się nad klasycznym modelem korespondencyjnej teorii prawdy, która stanowi klasyczne źródło teorii reprezentacji. Sellars poddaje krytyce klasyczną relację obrazowania, będącą punktem wyjścia do refleksji nad językiem z jednej, a nad umysłem z drugiej strony. Zamierzam zreferować krytyczną rekonstrukcję korespondencyjnej teorii prawdy u Sellarsa. Następnie przedstawię własną propozycję autora, który zastępuje relację obrazowania relacją nazwaną, w myśl Traktatu logicznofilozoficznego.
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In Anaxagoras’ system, cosmic Mind is one, indivisible and immutable and thus cannot be divided into parts, into individual minds residing in living beings. The same Mind is in one living being as it is in another. Also, the soul is an individual entity, one soul in one living being. Mind does manifest itself in a living being, not as the soul, but through the soul. Mind must be constantly present in the individual soul for the soul to be capable of thought. Only in this sense could the soul’s dormant cognitive ability be called an individual mind. However, for man, only this life remains, although man is highest in the hierarchy among existing beings. Mind seems to make man alive and rational so that man can admire its handiwork, the order and harmony of the world. But this is where man’s cosmic role ends.
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The paper comments and elaborates upon five pages of P. F. Strawson’s Individuals (1959, 230 – 234), together with his ‘Entity and Identity’ and ‘Universals’. The focus is on Strawson’s understanding of individual non-particulars as types or universals, and on his contention that the most obvious non-particular entities (‘well-entrenched nonparticulars’) are the broadly conceived artefacts including the works of art. The narrow focus is on the implications of Strawson’s suggestion that ‘an appropriate model for non-particulars of these kinds is that of a model particular―a kind of prototype, or ideal example, itself particular, which serves as a rule or standard for the production of others’ (1959, 233). The paper analyzes the relation between Strawson’s position and the issue of artefacts and their (largely missing) ontology. It also asks about some less obvious affinities between the problem of the non-particulars (and their entrenchment) and Strawson’s concept of a person.
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The main purpose of the paper is to criticize materialism in the philosophy of mind and to search for alternative approaches to the problems of mind, consciousness and body. According to the author, materialism does not present a satisfactory explanation of the mental life of human beings, because it fails to explain phenomena such as conscious experience, sleep, unconsciousness, death. These phenomena point to the fact that consciousness is not identical with the body and can be detached from it. The author adopts the conclusion that the solution to the problem of consciousness is closely connected to the problem of identity of a human individual. A human being plays certain social roles, he or she possesses a body, he or she possesses a mind, but is not identical with them. In its essence, the human being is identical with consciousness.
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V týchto niekoľkých filozofických reflexiách s a chcem špeciálne zamerať na problém vedomia vo filozofii mysle. Je však zrejmé, že tento problém nie je izolovaný od ostatných psychofyzických problémov, ale práve naopak, podmieňuje ď alšie explanácie mysle, tela a ich vzájomných vzťahov.
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Fenomén subjektivity ľudského prežívania sa v súčasnosti javí ako jedna z najkomplikovanejších otázok v procese skúmania a vysvetľovania ľudského vedomia.
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Existential and functional dependence of consciousness on brain activity, on the body within its surroundings and evolutionary perspective are two fundamental theoretical "touchstones" of the paper. Consciousness is characterized as a quality and capacity of a living organism varying in degrees and types through evolution, fylogeny and ontogeny. Conscious creature is aware of its body and self, it represents the "inner" and "outer" worlds in the form of images, thoughts, feelings, beliefs etc. Evidence for both theses is taken from empirical research on brain-consciousness-behaviour lesions, paleoarcheology, comparative anatomy and morfology, embryology etc. Author considers the coevolutionary research strategy, based on mutual cooperation between humanities and science, of great importance in studying and explaining consciousness, Paper argues towards the possibility of an objective systematic theory of consciousness.
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Synonymické prekrývanie pojmov vedomia, uvedomenia, mysle, o ktorom som sa zmienila v predchádzajúcej časti, vyúsťuje do konceptuálnych problémov a nedorozumení.
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U ž v predchádzajúcich častiach som naznačila, ž e riešenie základnej otázky filozofie mysle, otázky o povahe mysle a jej funkciách, je úzko späté s vymedzením pojmu mysle. V stručnom prehľade "izmov" v rámci filozofie mysle sme sa mohli stretnúť s dualistickou, sémantickou, behavioristickou, fyzikalistickou, funkcionalistickou a inou charakteristikou pojmu mysle. A v spätosti s pojmom mysle s chápaním javu mysle ako nehmotnej substancie, dispozície k správaniu, fyzikálnej alebo fúnkcionálnej vlastnosti mozgu atď.
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Problémy vyplývajúce zo striktnej identifikácie mentálnych stavov s fyzikálnymi stavmi mozgu podnietili v sedemdesiatych rokoch vznik funkcionalistického náhľadu na myseľ. Funkcionalizmus sa objavuje v nespočetných podobách: striktný, metodologický, homunkulárny, slabý, teleologický, strojový, kauzálny atď.'
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V rámci filozofie mysle predstavujú teórie identity materialistickú1 alternatívu riešenia problému povahy mysle a jej vzťahu k telu. Podobne ako v prípade behaviorizmu aj teórie identity vychádzajú z kritiky (karteziánskeho) dualizmu a rozmanitých foriem mentalizmu alebo idealizmu.
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Jedným z dôsledkov kritiky dualistických teórií mysle bol nástup behaviorizmu ako ďalšieho z radu „izmov" vo vzťahu k objasneniu povahy a poznateľnosti mentálnych javov.
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Chápanie vzťahu medzi pojmom a fenoménom mentálneho (mysle, vedomia) a fyzikálneho (tela, mozgu), na ktorých ambivalentnú povahu som poukázala v predchádzajúcej časti, sa premietlo do celého radu „izmov": dualizmu, monizmu, materializmu, idealizmu, fyzikalizmu, funkcionalizmu, computacionizmu, inštrumentalizmu atď.
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