"Błąd krymski" jako efekt myślenia grupowego? Polska wobec aneksji Krymu w 2014 roku

Author(s): Agnieszka Orzelska / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 39/2015

The ease with which Russia managed to surprise the political elites of the West with the events of early 2014 is dumbfounding. On the eve of the annexation of the Crimea, no one in the public space in Poland warned against the upcoming turn in the policies of Moscow. Representatives of the highest Polish authorities responsible for the security and foreign policy were clearly surprised with the developments. Undoubtedly, the “Crimean error” indicates that information that had been flowing from Russia for a long time was ignored as it did not fit into the policy adopted by the Polish authorities. From today's perspective, multiple signals can be indicated about the upcoming profound changes in the immediate environment of Polish security.When examining why the Polish authorities did not notice the upcoming shift in the politics of Russia, we should take into account the group thinking syndrome, described by Irving Janis. In this approach, group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints. This term has gained popularity in social psychology, but has also provided important research tools for the analysis of foreign policy, treated as a separate area in the context of international relations.

"Soft Power" in the Service of Foreign Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation

Author(s): Jelica Kurjak / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 0

"Територіальне питання" у відносинах між Японією і Росією та спроба його вирішення в 50-60-х роках ХХ ст.

Author(s): Sergiy V. Reznichenko / Language(s): Ukrainian / Issue: 2/2010

Author, drawing on scientific researches of domestic and oversea historians, materials of press, exposes essence problems of "norths territories", process of its origin and position of the USA in its decision.

# V4 2015: neľahké hľadanie odpovedí na európske výzvy

Author(s): Tomáš Strážay / Language(s): Slovak / Publication Year: 0

Vyšehradská skupina, tak ako napokon celá Európska únia, čelila aj v roku 2015 výzvam prichádzajúcim z vonkajšieho prostredia a v menšom meradle tiež takým, ktoré súviseli s jeho vnútorným fungovaním. Napriek pokračujúcemu rusko ukrajinskému konfliktu sa dominantnou témou vo vyšehradskom i európskom (nielen zahraničnopolitickom diskurze) stala migračná a utečenecká kríza. Postoj k nej ovplyvňoval tak vnútornú dynamiku Vyšehradu, ako aj jeho vnímanie v rámci EÚ. Vyšehradské krajiny čelili zhoršenej reputácii v očiach niektorých členských krajín Únie, ktoré kritizovali ich nesolidárny postoj v otázke redistribučných kvót. Prirodzene, značná časť vyšehradskej agendy sa niesla v znamení kontinuity, čo sa týka slovenského aj českého predsedníctva. Významnými oblasťami spolupráce tak boli naďalej napríklad energetika či bezpečnosť a obrana. Spolupráca s krajinami východného susedstva a západného Balkánu tvorili piliere formátu V4 plus, ktorý sa rozšíril o ďalších partnerov. Jedným z významných zadaní pre obe predsedníctva bolo vyvažovať spoluprácu s nevyšehradskými krajinami s vnútornou súdržnosťou V4. Potvrdilo sa, že vyšehradská spolupráca zostáva imúnna voči vnútropolitickému vývoju v jednotlivých krajinách. Hoci májové prezidentské i októbrové parlamentné voľby v Poľsku znamenali diametrálnu zmenu v oblasti poľskej vnútornej politiky, na vzťahoch v rámci V4 sa to neprejavilo.

#someonetellcnn: The Agonistic Relationship between South and North Media Memories

Author(s): David Katiambo / Language(s): English / Issue: 10/2017

The international media stand accused for creating a negative retrospective memory about Africa through misreporting. Social media is providing an alternative channel to air counternarratives. Through Discourse Theoretical Analysis this paper uses the agonistic democracy theory to explain how Twitter is enabling Kenyans to create an optimistic prospective memory as a counter narrative to Western media’s negative retrospective memory about Africa. Mouffe’s concept of “agonism” will be utilized to conceptualize how uncivil attacks are enabling Kenyans to fend off international media misreporting. The paper unpacks how Kenyans on Twitter (KOT) used incivility against CNN to to create a national agonistic memory ahead of the 2015 Africa visit by President Obama. The paper analyses incivility at #SomeonetellCNN as a form of collective remembrance, meaning not only remembering what CNN had already said, the retrospective memory, but also remembering what CNN was expected to do, the prospective memory.

(001) NEW WORLD ORDER: THE BALANCE OF SOFT POWER AND THE RISE OF HERBIVOROUS POWERS

Author(s): Ivan Krastev,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2007

The largest survey of public opinion in the world shows support for a more multipolar world and a greater role for ‘herbivorous powers’ – countries not widely perceived as military superpowers. There is mistrust of the Cold War powers as well as Islamist-inspired Iranian autocracy. More people want to see a decline rather than an increase in the power of Russia (29% decline, 23% increase), of China (32% decline, 24% increase), of the United States (37% decline, 26% increase), and of Iran (39% decline, 14% increase). On the other hand, there is strong support for an increase in the power of fast-developing powers such as South Africa, India and Brazil. The European Union is the most popular great power. Uniquely among great powers, more people across all continents want to see its power increase than decrease. This demand for more European power extends to many former European colonies. Whilst American soft power has declined, the rise of China has led to the resurgence in support for American power in Asia. Increasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe is paralleled by a demand for a greater American role. Outside Europe, ‘the West’ is still seen to some extent as a single actor: countries suspicious of American power tend also to be against EU power.

(002) A POWER AUDIT OF EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Author(s): Mark Leonard,Nicu Popescu / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2007

In this project, we have tried to implement some practices which will guide our future activities as the ECFR takes its work into new policy areas. First, we have tried to look at several dimensions of European power. We have explored how Moscow sees the EU and uses its power to influence it; how each member state relates to Russia; as well as the links between Moscow and EU institutions. This report draws on data gathered by a team of researchers from all 27 EU member states. Each conducted a survey of their country’s economic, political and military relations with Russia. Secondly, we have tried to avoid the euphemistic phrases and diplomatic practices that cloak tensions within the EU and between the EU and third countries. In order to promote a common European approach, we have illustrated some of the areas where the policies of individual member states have undercut common European objectives. The goal is not to stigmatise particular countries. Future reports on European foreign policy issues will put the spotlight on the policies of other states. Thirdly, we have done our best to understand the issues from the perspective of policymakers. A senior EU official complained to one of the authors about the propensity of outside observers to simplify complex issues and to imply that the only thing standing in the way of a successful EU foreign policy is the stupidity of officials. We have tried to heed this plea and have not offered any easy, ready-made solutions. We are grateful to the many officials who have provided us with useful guidance at every step of the research process, in particular those who took part in a round-table discussion of the interim findings, attended by officials from all EU institutions and a majority of EU member states.

(003) POLAND’S SECOND RETURN TO EUROPE?

Author(s): Pawel Swieboda / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2007

Donald Tusk, the new Polish Prime Minister, wants to bring Poland back to the heart of Europe, rebuilding ties with Germany and France to create a ‘Weimar Triangle’, lessening tensions with Russia, and trying to make the country a genuine player in European foreign policy. The new Government will try to rebalance ist relationship with the United States, slowing down the move towards missile defence and withdrawing its troops from Iraq. Although there will be a change of style on contentious issues like Russia, the new government will still be an ‘assertive partner’ opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; unlikely to join the euro; and likely to put up a fi ght against reform of the EU budget.Co-habitation with President Lech Kaczyński will create tensions but the government has the constitutional powers and the moral clout to set the agenda.

(004) AFGHANISTAN: EUROPE’S FORGOTTEN WAR

Author(s): Daniel Korski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The international community has a second chance in Afghanistan. The appointment of a new UN special envoy and the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest offer a chance for the coalition partners to adopt a new strategy and avert disaster. The problems are well known. The rule of Hamid Karzai’s government extends only weakly outside of Kabul. The Taliban insurgency will continue to grow stronger as winter ends. Despite the billions of euros spent, most ordinary Afghans have yet to see the benefits in terms of security, access to justice and delivery of basic services. All these difficulties have been exacerbated by European and American policy disagreements. In their key criticisms of each other Europeans and Americans each have a valid point. While Americans tend to treat a political problem as a military one, Europeans have lagged behind the US in terms of financial and military commitments, and have even failed to co-ordinate their own activities. In the run-up to Bucharest there will be an opportunity for both partners to strike a new ‘grand bargain’ where Europeans agree to increase their investment in exchange for a change in American strategy. A new common approach should be based around a strategy for political inclusion, increased resources, and stronger international leadership. This new strategy should be cemented in a new Bonn-type conference, which would bring together heads of states from the US, UN, EU and all of Afghanistan’s regional partners.

(007) CAN THE EU WIN THE PEACE IN GEORGIA?

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Mark Leonard,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The EU has established itself as the main diplomatic broker in the conflict between Russia and Georgia. It should use this position to help forge a positive peace from a war which threatens the foundations of the European security order. Russia has used its conflict with Georgia to display its military power, reclaim a sphere of influence and frighten its neighbours. Rather than looking for punitive measures, the EU should respond to Russia’s demonstration of force with much stronger engagement for democracy, prosperity and security in the broader region - keeping tough measures towards Moscow on the table if Russia resists.This war was caused in part by the dysfunctionality of the previous ‘peace-keeping’ process in Georgia. The EU must work hard towards ensuring that any new arrangements are not unilateral and do not merely legitimate Russia’s de facto control. The EU should promote an international peace-keeping mission and offer to deploy a civilian reconstruction mission dealing with development, building confidence and security between both sides, and tackling wider political issues. It should also encourage the United Nations to set up a commission of enquiry to help establish the truth on the causes and conduct of the war.Instead of focusing on short-term sanctions against Russia, the EU should move quickly to raise its profile in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to help stabilise other conflict regions - paying attention both to old ‘frozen’ conflicts and potential new flashpoints. The EU should also make a special commitment to Ukraine: It should recognise its right to EU membership in the future, agree to a more liberal visa regime, offer a solidarity clause backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and move to integrate Ukraine into the EU’s energy market.

(009) BEYOND DEPENDENCE: HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIAN GAS

Author(s): Pierre Noël / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The gas relationship with Russia has become an extremely contentious issue among EU Member States. It is a major reason for the EU’s failure to develop the common policy approach towards Moscow it so badly needs. Yet the relationship is often misunderstood. Russia is the largest external gas supplier to the EU, but it is far from a monopoly provider. Since 1980, Europe’s diversification of its gas supply has seen Russia’s share of EU gas imports roughly halve, from 80% to 40%. Russian gas represents just 6.5% of the EU primary energy supply, a figure that has remained essentially unchanged over 20 years. And contrary to widely held belief, Russian gas exports to Europe are unlikely to increase significantly in the foreseeable future. So calls for Europe to diversify its energy supply even further miss the point. The problem is divisiveness, not dependence. Russian gas is divisive because Europe’s gas market is dysfunctional and segmented. Most of the EU’s imports of Russian gas go to a few countries in western Europe, where supply is diversified, while several Member States in central and eastern Europe consume relatively little Russian gas but have no other external suppliers. Only the emergence of a single competitive European gas market can create real solidarity between consumers and ‘Europeanise’ the current large bilateral contracts between European importers and Gazprom.To address the specific concerns of central and eastern European Member States, the EU should build on the 2004 directive on security of supply in natural gas, and help these Member States devise and implement national action plans for gas security.

(010) RE-WIRING THE US-EU RELATIONSHIP

Author(s): Daniel Korski,Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2008

The election of Barack Obama has seriously narrowed the policy differences between Europe and the US. While significant disagreements remain on ambition, priority and approach, both sides now agree to a large degree on the major challenges facing them. Moreover, the President-elect is likely to be America’s first “post-Special Relationship” leader, eager to see Britain play a role in making Europe work rather than to build an exclusive US-UK bilateral bond.

(011) SHAPING EUROPE’S AFGHAN SURGE

Author(s): Daniel Korski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2009

Unnoticed by many, the last few years have seen something of a European military surge in Afghanistan. Since late 2006, 18 of the 25 EU countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO’s Afghan mission, have increased their troop contributions, and as a result EU member states now account for 43% of ISAF’s total deployment. This military surge has been accompanied by a steady growth in European efforts to contribute to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, from development aid to police training – although not every EU member state is pulling its weight. These measures have made the EU a major stakeholder in Afghanistan. Yet the EU’s real impact on the country has been limited. In the face of a likely request from the Obama administration to do more, European governments should now formulate a hard-headed political strategy as a complement to the coming US military surge. The overall aim of this strategy should be to begin systematic outreach to Afghanistan’s insurgency groups. To prepare the ground, the 2009 presidential elections will have to be safeguarded from insurgent attack and fraud. After the election, EU governments should push for the twin processes of reconciliation and constitutional change. But European governments cannot revert to a purely civilian role. They should continue improving their training of the Afghan army and police, and assist US and local forces in emphasising “human security” in military operations. This should be backed up by well-funded and long-term aid commitments, the launch of a European provincial reconstruction team in Kabul, a developmentbased approach to counter-narcotics, and a revived Pakistan strategy.

(012) A POWER AUDIT OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS

Author(s): John Fox,François Godement / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2009

Europe’s approach to China is stuck in the past. China is now a global power: decisions taken in Beijing are central to virtually all the EU’s pressing global concerns, whether climate change, nuclear proliferation, or rebuilding economic stability. China’s tightly controlled economic and industrial policies strongly affect the EU’s economic wellbeing. China’s policies in Africa are transforming parts of a neighbouring continent whose development is important to Europe. Yet the EU continues to treat China as the emerging power it used to be, rather than the global force it has become. A “power audit” we have conducted shows that the 27 EU Member States are split over two main issues: how to manage China’s impact on the European economy and how to engage China politically. We assigned scores to Member States’ individual policies and actions towards China, and the chart overleaf translates this evaluation on to a horizontal axis for politics and a vertical axis for economics.

(014) THE LIMITS OF ENLARGEMENT-LITE: EUROPEAN AND RUSSIAN POWER IN THE TROUBLED NEIGHBOURHOOD

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2009

Over the past year, war in Georgia, the Ukrainian gas crisis and the burning of the Moldovan parliament have all dominated the front pages of European newspapers. But behind the headlines the story is just as bleak: politics in the “neighbourhood” is a toxic mixture of authoritarianism and stalled democracy, ongoing secessionist tensions continue to stoke fears of violent conflict, and the economic crisis is wreaking havoc throughout the region. The implications for the EU are profound. Renewed hostilities or economic collapse could see an influx of immigrants into eastern Member States. Several banks in western Member States are exposed to the imploding economies in the east. But beyond these immediate dangers, there is an emerging contest between the EU and Russia over the political rules that are to govern the neighbourhood. Since the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, Russia has been working tirelessly to draw the countries of the region into its sphere of influence while the EU has continued to pursue a technocratic strategy best described as “enlargement-lite” – offering the neighbourhood states the prospect of eventual political and economic alignment with the EU while dampening down any hopes of actual accession.

(020) DEALING WITH YANUKOVYCH’S UKRAINE

Author(s): Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

Over the last few years, the European Union’s relationship with Ukraine has been undermined by a split on both sides. On the European side, some wanted a reform-minded, western-leaning Ukraine, either as a good thing in itself, or in order to eventually transform or at least contain Russia. Others, meanwhile, were quite happy to allow Ukraine to stagnate in order to keep the thorny question of enlargement off the table. On the Ukrainian side, some saw their future lying in Europe, while others wanted to move closer to Russia. This double split has left Ukraine adrift. However, the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 creates a new situation. The political crisis of recent years may not be over – even after the replacement of his rival, Yuliya Tymoshenko, as prime minister, Yanukovych doesn’t yet fully control the government, let alone Ukraine’s powerful ‘oligarchs’ – but his return to power may represent a real opportunity for Europe.

(021) BEYOND WAIT-AND-SEE: THE WAY FORWARD FOR EU BALKAN POLICY

Author(s): Heather Grabbe,Gerald Knaus,Daniel Korski / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2010

In the midst of a huge economic crisis, European Union leaders may be tempted to put off any further decisions on enlargement. However, now that some of the Western Balkan countries have tested the EU’s commitment by formally applying for membership, the wait-and-see approach is unsustainable. The EU has kept six of the countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia – waiting for a decade. The EU has asked them to take on difficult and ambitious reforms to prepare them for membership.However, Balkan leaders are no longer even sure that the EU members really want them in the club. As a result, the EU’s credibility is fading in the region. If it continues to hesitate about the next step, its leverage could fade too. The EU should respond to these membership applications in a positive way while reinforcing ist accession conditionality. The most realistic way to do this is to employ the EU’s existing tools more fully and more effectively, and to better sequence the next steps towards accession. This would support reformers in the region without imposing any additional costs on the EU. The aim is to set out a clear, realistic and motivational programme to help the Balkan countries to get in shape for membership – which could take many years to achieve. This will strengthen governance and provide political momentum to help the region get through the current economic crisis and ist political fallout.

(027) THE EU AND BELARUS AFTER THE ELECTION

Author(s): Balázs Jarábik,Jana Kobzova,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

The crackdown that followed the presidential election in Belarus on 19 December 2010 reversed pre-election signals that had promised a relatively liberal atmosphere. After a rigged election result that gave President Alyaksandr Lukashenka an implausible 79 percent of the vote, more than 600 Belarusian citizens were arrested, including eight of Lukashenka’s nine opponents in the election. However, although he was able to survive the election, Lukashenka now faces economic pressures and a forthcoming struggle over the privatisation of state assets, which will be the most important test of his ability to keep both the elite and society under control. In that context, the post-election crackdown was a sign not of the regime’s strength but of its internal weakness. As the country’s internal struggles intensify, it would be a bad time for the European Union to isolate Belarus. At the same time, however, the EU must react in order to regain credibility in its neighbourhood. In the past, the EU and the United States tried both isolating and engaging the regime. Although neither policy was a complete failure, neither was particularly effective. In addition to expressing solidarity with those still in prison, the EU must now devise a proactive strategy that changes Lukashenka’s options. Lukashenka is a great survivor who has shown skill in balancing between Russia and the West, but his position has been weakened. While Russia is also increasingly frustrated with its ally, the interruption of EU dialogue with Minsk increases the chances that Moscow will gain control of its neighbour’s economy. The EU now has an opportunity to regain the initiative in its relationship with Belarus. It should raise the stakes for both the regime and Russia through a combination of targeted and ‘smart’ isolation, selective sanctions and engagement.

(030) THE NEW GERMAN QUESTION: HOW EUROPE CAN GET THE GERMANY IT NEEDS

Author(s): Ulrike Guerot,Mark Leonard / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

Since the beginning of the euro crisis last year, there has been a kind of “unipolar moment” within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was possible without Germany or against Germany. Although Germany has now signalled it will do what it takes to save the euro, much of Europe is worried about the way this will be done and even resentful about where Germany seems to be heading. Germans, on the other hand, feel betrayed by the European project with which they once identified perhaps more than any other member state. In fact, whereas Germans once saw the EU as the embodiment of post-war German virtues such as fiscal rectitude, stability and consensus, they now see it as a threat to those same virtues.###This brief aims to move beyond this dialogue of the deaf and outline what a new deal between Germany and the rest of Europe might look like. It shows how an increasingly eurosceptic Germany is tempted to “go global alone”. Meanwhile other member states are responding to the new Germany with a mixture of “hugging Germany close” and forming coalitions that could one day be used to balance German power if Berlin fails to recreate a legitimate basis for its role in the EU. It argues that Germany needs to recast its approach to economic governance to avoid the creation of a two-speed Europe; work with other big states to reinvent the European security architecture; and put its economic might at the heart of a push to develop a global Europe.

(031) TURNING PRESENCE INTO POWER: LESSONS FROM THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Author(s): Nicu Popescu,Andrew Wilson / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2011

Since the launch of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, the European Union has become the biggest trading partner of most of the states in the region, embarked on association and free-trade talks, deployed crisis management operations, and offered visa facilitation and visa-free dialogues. But the EU has not succeeded in turning this presence into power. In fact, as the EU has become more involved in the eastern neighbourhood, its ability to influence political developments in the region has stagnated at best. With the exception of Moldova, all of the EU’s eastern neighbours have gone in the wrong direction in the last few years. Behind the EU’s failure to turn presence into power in the eastern neighbourhood lie three structural trends: the increasingly authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood states; the emergence of a multi-polar world that allows countries in the eastern neighbourhood to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing between external actors; and the EU’s own limited commitment to the ENP. The EU should continue to increase its own visibility and outreach with the public, business interests and state institutions in the eastern neighbourhood. However, it should not rely on soft power alone. Instead, it should also aim to develop a more transactional relationship with its eastern neighbours – in other words, to decide what its interests are, be less diplomatic with interlocutors and set tough conditions on issues such as visa liberalisation.