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NATO, EU and the New Risks: A Southeast Europe Perspective

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The present publication summarizes the discussions at the international conference NATO, EU and the New Risks: A Southeast Europe Perspective held on October 29-30, 2004 in Sofia. The conference’s discussions benefited from the participation of NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Plamen Panayotov, Bulgaria’s Minister of Defense, Nikolai Svinarov, senior government officialsfromSoutheastEurope(SEE)andWestEuropean countries - representatives of international organizations and aid agencies, diplomatic missions, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations.

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THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Antti Sillanpää / Language(s): English

The paper summarizes discussions held on 24 May 2016 in Riga, Latvia, which focused on exploring the Kremlin and DAESH information activities in order to improve our understanding of the nature of these communications and their effect on Western societies. The questions discussed were: How are the communications and messages of DAESH and the Kremlin constructed and disseminated? Are their methods changing? Why do such messages appeal to youth, even if they are familiar with Western values and consumerism? What are the weakest aspects of our information environment and what can we do to improve? Six items emerged from the discussion as most relevant to the investigation of these issues. 1) Identity and Values Identity and values are in constant flux across time and space. It is easier to attack the values and identity of the other, rather than offering something different and better than the opponent. However, the West should be clear that it cannot simply assume the moral high ground. One of the weakness of the West is that we have allowed some members of society to become isolated and/or marginalised; they are now the ones who are more open and susceptible to the messaging of DAESH and the Kremlin, especially messages that project a sense of pride and/or a feeling of inclusiveness because they appear to offer the opportunity to participate meaningfully in some sort of utopian society. 2) Strategic Communications and the National Narrative There is a distinct need to create and maintain a positive national narrative in which words and deeds align, and to communicate that effectively. A narrative should not be static, but responsive to the environment in which it is based. One idea that came up in discussion was to task a specific governmental entity with coordinating messages concerning the national narrative and the strategic communication approach. This entity should be situated close to the Presidential Administration or the Prime Minister’s Office and have clear operating procedures, goals, and resources that address the identified risks and threats. The highest political backing would ensure sufficient clout to function adequately and carry out the mission. This body should oversee national narrative and strategic communication efforts, and act as an advisory and educational hub for other parts of government. A whole government approach, spanning both civil and military spheres, is required. The increase in the number of stakeholders reduces chances to create and manage coherent but relevant international narratives 3) Messaging and Counter-Messaging There is a continuing discussion as to whether the West should concentrate on counter-messaging or should focus on messaging instead. An argument for engaging in counter-messaging is that lies and harmful messages should not go unchallenged, otherwise falsehoods and partial truths may become accepted as facts and be assimilated into a society’s ‘knowledge base’. An argument against engaging in countermessaging is that this practice is likely to ensure that the West remains in a defensive and reactive posture in the current information confrontation, and adversaries’ harmful messages get unintentionally repeated. However, by actively messaging there is a chance to dictate the informational agenda, thereby forcing the opponent into a reactive position. Irrespective of the focus on messaging or countermessaging, information activities should not be done in isolation, but as an integrated part of a political or policy programme. 4) Perception and Legitimacy Emotional resonance holds greater sway than logical argument as a political or social relationship is formed between an audience and a communicator. Some individuals and groups are more susceptible to messaging than others, often as the result of an unfulfilled need. The motivation to join and/or support DAESH is largely based upon the perception that what is being offered is legitimate and will fulfil some psychological or physical need of the individual recruit. The messenger that communicates a believable response to such needs may well be able to influence that particular individual or group. However, when an individual personally experiences the dissonance between the projected utopia and reality, their trust in the utopian vision soon disappears, and along with it any sense of motivation or commitment to the cause. 5) Measuring Activity and Effect Both DAESH and Russia have adopted Western technologies and understood the audience appetite for infotainment and quick satisfaction. DAESH and the Kremlin employ the tactic of shifting focus and attention away from areas where they are losing or vulnerable. They have the ability to affect our news agenda and our focus through big event news. Even if the Kremlin or DAESH are engaged in harmful or disruptive communication, the activity does not necessarily translate into influence that would weaken the national security of the target state. The measure of an activity, i.e. communicating, does not automatically neatly translate into the measure of its effect, i.e. influence and change of behaviour. There are many variables that can either obstruct or facilitate the level of influence and persuasion that actually takes place when an actor communicates. These differences put pressure on us to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour and develop more meaningful ways of measuring. Observing, let alone measuring, the effectiveness of ‘hybrid warfare’ is particularly challenging. 6) Analytical Tools and Frameworks In addition to traditional historical area studies and social science perspectives, there are a variety of promising frameworks that can be used to investigate the information activities of DAESH and the Kremlin. The potentially fruitful approaches discussed included political and obstruction marketing and psychology.

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A TOOL OF HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Alexander Fokin / Language(s): English

Social media has been used increasingly to support military actions. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that the fight for hearts and minds is as important as kinetic activity, and social media plays a crucial role in this process. Both state and non-state actors effectively exploit social media to gain support for their actions, recruit new members, deceive and intimidate the adversary, and even use it for traditional military activities such as intelligence collection or command and control. Given these conditions, the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) was tasked to conduct a study on how social media can be used as a weapon of hybrid warfare. The recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrated how fake identities and accounts were used to disseminate narratives through social media, blogs, and web commentaries in order to manipulate, harass, or deceive opponents. Several reports by investigative journalists have reported about the existence of so called troll farms in Russian cities, employing people to spread disinformation, rumours, or falsified facts, enter into discussions and flood topic-related web spaces with their own messages or abuse. Nevertheless, trolling is still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Although such activities have been widely identified, their effects have not been measured, particularly due to the fact that is it difficult to distinguish between the paid trolls and people who are simply expressing their opinions. In order to analyse how pro-Russian trolling is used to influence the public opinion in NATOmember countries the NATO StratCom COE commissioned the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: the Case of Latvia. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University, and was aimed at analysing organised proRussian trolling in internet media to measure its impact on public opinion in Latvia. Latvia was chosen for the case study due to the specifics of its information environment (a strong division between the Latvian and Russian language information spaces), as well as the country’s historical background and potentially vulnerability to Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Communication science, social anthropology, political science, and information technology expertise was employed to gain a better understanding of the trolling phenomenon, and to develop methods to identify trolling and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. This research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and it offers recommendations on how to mitigate the effects of trolling when used as a tool in hybrid warfare, beyond the specific case study.

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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Jānis Bērziņš,Aivar Jaeski,Mark Laity,Nerijus Maliukevičius,Aurimas Navys,Gerry Osborne,Robert Pszczel,Stephen Tatham / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.

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NETWORK OF TERROR: HOW DAESH USES ADAPTIVE SOCIAL NETWORKS TO SPREAD ITS MESSAGE

Author(s): Joseph Shaheen / Language(s): English

We conducted research aimed at understanding the process by which DAESH disseminates propaganda online. Our focus was not the content that is distributed but the method by which it is distributed. We did so using a number of qualitative, statistical, and numerical analysis techniques in hopes of gaining a deeper insight into their operations and making recommendations for NATO and NATO member states on how to combat them effectively. We discovered a number of important findings the most salient of which is on how individual level decisions made by many of their members have contributed to the survival of their propaganda capabilities, and in some instances an advanced ability to thwart efforts to eliminate their message and their outreach to both locals as well as westerners. We can summarize our findings as follows: • Popular social media platforms such as, and especially, Twitter forms the core of DAESH’s propaganda and information dissemination efforts. They use these mediums as the core of a web of content that is spread in many parts of the ungoverned internet. • DAESH (perhaps unknowingly) uses and an adaptive network structure on Twitter to combat outside influences and to react to external operations seeking to curb their operations. This network adapts at high speed and with limited central organization. • DAESH makes innovative use of platform vulnerabilities that allows them to evade detection, suspension and deletion by state and non-state actors through both automated and manual methods of detection. • DAESH has amassed a strong following supported by an internal dedicated human infrastructure allowing them to affect a substantial impact on the information environment. • Through the use of a core-periphery network structure and a high number of networkcentral actors DAESH created a redundancy factor that can withstand repeated efforts to disrupt their information supply chain. • Through the use of account inflation, signaling, and closure methods, DAESH has been able to successfully create friend/ follow networks that feed into their ability to build sustainable adaptive networks, evade detection, and maintain their level of online activity. • DAESH has built a network structure that utilizes the flexibility of small communal networks and allows for the large scale interactions commonly associated with large diverse-use networks. This adds to the challenge of combating them in the traditional information warfare environment. • We create an explanatory process to simplify the reader’s understanding of the group’s usage of social media. We call it the DEER process. The DEER process begins with dissemination and ends with replenishment. We recommend this model as a way to build more effective strategies in combating the group. Our findings lead us to a more detailed understanding of the DAESH propaganda machine which has gained them notoriety throughout the world and especially on traditional media platforms; and though our conclusions are technical in nature, they have far reaching policy implications. To begin, these conclusions illustrate the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of a distributed response to DAESH propaganda. DAESH uses limited centralization from a network perspective in order to evade detection while maintaining some control over method and content of their messages—a hybrid model—where flexibility and potency are both achievable. This means that substantial resources must be dedicated in order to combat their ideology effectively. These resources (human and otherwise) are, at the moment, non-aligned, ineffective, and unsustainable over the long term. This is not because the resources and methods used are by nature ineffective, but because the adversary is using strategies and tactics which have never been encountered on this scale ever before. For example, in this report we show that the targeting of highly visible active accounts on Twitter for deletion or suspension, though can eliminate short terms gains by the group, also provides them with the time and knowledge to build more adaptive, responsive networks. While, if account targeting is based on a community/clustering method, we can increase the transaction costs of our adversary’s recovery substantially—gaining invaluable time pinned on lower levels of propaganda diffusion— and simultaneously building more strategic operational tactics. We propose and recommend that in addition to the adjustments of technical methods used in the targeting of DAESH network infrastructure, that more emphasis should be placed on disrupting the supply chain of propaganda, rather on providing contrasting messages. This implies that permanent investments not only in new technology, but in human resources should be made, and coordinated labor division among NATO members as well as allies in the region should be instituted. Our discoveries rely on a number of assumptions to produce our recommendations—the most important of which—is that this information battle is based on concepts of adaptive networks and complex systems. This is a direct result of DAESH’s approach of relating loose policies to its members and allowing them to make individual level behavioral decisions on how best to conduct an information war. In turn, this means that traditional methods as have been adopted by various agencies, state, and non-state actors alike simply will and do not suffice, as has been evident from the group’s continual ability to conduct a propaganda war while facing insurmountable opposition, both physical and electronic. We also recommend that more effort must be made to remove the value proposition which DAESH uses to attract recruits to begin with. Though, our research did not engage the socioeconomic and geo-political environment under which potential recruits are subjected, we hypothesize that innovative efforts in this space can produce substantial declines in DAESH’s ability to disseminate propaganda and ultimately to recruit westerners to their cause. Finally, we make recommendations for future and ongoing research, some of which is much needed to understand and produce effective strategies to combat the group.

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ROBOTROLLING 2018/1

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Generational change in malicious activity on social media seems to be at hand. Primitive bots indiscriminately promoting links to news sites are on the decline. They are being replaced by coordinated accounts that target conversations centred upon individual media outlets or members of different elites. In recent months on Twitter, the volume of automated content about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has declined at an increasingly rapid pace. The number of bottweets dropped by 15 percentage points for Russian and 20 percentage points for English. We infer that this reduction is best explained by changes introduced by the platform. Our findings are verified by drawing on thirty times more data than for previous Robotrolling issues. For the first time we include messages from VKontakte as a control. We see a marked rise in organised trolling activity conducted by humans using fake accounts compared to early 2017. As of January 2018, 50% of all Russian-language messages are directed at other Twitter users. As social media companies intervene to clean up automation, they should take care that changes they introduce may enable new forms of manipulation. Russian language bot activity is in decline in absolute terms, but Twitter in Russian remains more polluted than Twitter in English.

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ROBOTROLLING 2017/2

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August–October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March–July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political actors use bot accounts in the social media space to manipulate public opinion about regional geopolitics. According to our estimate, such accounts produced 5–15% of the activity about the NATO presence in Latvia and Estonia in the period March–July 2017. Bot-generated messages differ depending on the target audience. Messages aimed at the West suggested that Russian exercises pale in comparison with NATO operations. Messages targeted to the domestic audience rarely mentioned the Russian exercises. Russian-language bots create roughly 70% of all Russian messages about NATO in the Baltic States and Poland. Overall, 60% of active Russian-language accounts seem to be automated. In comparison, 39% of accounts tweeting in English are bots. They created 52% of all English-language messages in the period August–October. Our data suggest Twitter is less effective at removing automatically generated Russian content than it is for English material. Nonetheless, we have seen improvement in social media policing by the platform. A ‘cleaner’ social media is good not only for individual users, but also for businesses. Pressure should continue in order to ensure further improvements.

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RUSSIA'S FOOTPRINT IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The ongoing project covering Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden monitors Russia’s information activities in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and analyses their impact. The report covering the period of 2016/2017 looks at the aims of Russia’s information activities and the narratives used; discusses the compatriot policy as a tool of influence; provides an insight into the use and varying level of trust in the information provided by Russian state-funded media and the public opinion on particular narrative themes promoted by Russia. The main findings are structured around the following research questions.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as so-called Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign at various target audiences in order to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh’s first strategic achievement, drawing considerable attention from various governments and mainstream Muslim groups, was the first public speech given by self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was devoted entirely to the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate. In order to find out how this campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions to existing challenges concerning situation on the Middle East, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) conducted research into Daesh’s information strategy. The methodology for analysing Daesh’s information strategy included a number of techniques such as social psychology, the psychology of communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in consultation with social media experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. This executive summary summarizes three reports - “Type of applied persuasive strategy and its influence on message effectiveness” (Ph. D. T. Grzyb), „Visual framing in the Islamic State” (Ph. D. Shahira Fahmy) and “Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread its Message” (Mr. Joseph Shaheen).

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INTERNET TROLLING AS A HYBRID WARFARE TOOL: THE CASE OF LATVIA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The executive summary outlines the main conclusions of the study Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Case of Latvia, commissioned by the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence. The study was conducted by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with Riga Stradins University and the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Institute of Mathematics and Informatics (University of Latvia)1 and was aimed at analysing organised pro-Russian trolling in internet media and measuring its influence on public opinion, using Latvia as a case study. The research provides an opportunity to evaluate the risk potential of trolling, and offers recommendations on how to mitigate its effects when used as a tool in hybrid warfare. A multidisciplinary approach – including communication science, social anthropology, political science and information technology expertise – was applied in order to understand the trolling phenomenon, develop a method for its identification and evaluate its impact on public opinion. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE - EXAMINING NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE FROM A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy.

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WRITTEN COMMENTS of the European Roma Rights Centre and Center for Civil and Human Rights, Concerning Slovakia (For Consideration by the Committee on the Rights of the Child at the 72nd Pre-Sessional Working Group 5 - 9 October 2015)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Center for Civil and Human Rights (Poradňa pre občianske a ľudské práva, hereinafter also referred to as „Poradňa“) and the European Roma Rights Centre (hereinafter also referred to as “ERRC”) hereby jointly submit this report to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter also referred to as “Committee”) for the consideration to the 72nd Pre-Sessional Working Group (05 Oct 2015 - 09 Oct 2015). The report focuses on issues disproportionately impacting Romani children in Slovakia including: - discriminatory legislation; - discrimination of Romani children in education; - sterilization of Romani girls without parental and informed consent; - segregation of Romani patients, including children, in hospitals; - adequate standard of living; - police ill-treatment and harassment; - Romani children in institutional care. In its 2007 Concluding observations (CRC/C/SVK/CO/2) , the Committee touched upon most of the abovementioned issues. The submitting organisations are concerned that Slovakia has done little to address the Committee’s concerns and recommendations and that progress in complying with the Convention on the Rights of the Child is slow and insufficient. Altogether more than 40 per cent of Roma in Slovakia live in segregated settings either outside of municipalities or on their peripheries. Many of those families live in substandard living conditions facing the threat of eviction. Residential segregation usually affects educational attainment and future employment possibilities. Discrimination against Romani children is twofold in education: they are overrepresented in special schools and classes for children with mild mental disabilities and also segregated in separate classrooms and schools within mainstream education. Romani children are also significantly overrepresented in State childcare institutions and disproportionally affected by the legislative framework regulating the social security system. In recent years, the submitting organisations have recorded a growing number of verbal and physically violent attacks and incidents of harassment committed by police against Roma, including minors, which have not been investigated effectively. Submitting organisations have also advocated for effective investigation of the practice of sterilization of Romani women and girls without parental and informed consent in Slovakia and adequate compensation for affected women and girls, which the Slovak Government fails to conduct.

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WRITTEN COMMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE AND CENTER FOR CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, CONCERNING SLOVAKIA (For consideration by the United Nations Committee Against Torture, at its 55th Session 27 July to 14 August 2015)

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Center for Civil and Human Rights (Poradňa pre občianske a ľudské práva, hereinafter also referred to as “Poradňa“) and the European Roma Rights Centre (hereinafter also referred to as “ERRC”) hereby jointly submit this report to the United Nations Committee against Torture (hereinafter also referred to as “Committee”) for the consideration to the 55 Session (27 July 2015 - 14 August 2015). The report focuses on the following issues: • sterilisation of Romani women and girls without parental and informed consent; • police ill-treatment and harassment of Roma; • ineffective investigation of allegations of police ill-treatment and harassment.

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Prisons in Serbia (April, 2010)

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Gordana Lukić-Samardžija,Ljiljana Palibrk,Ivan Kuzminović / Language(s): English

The team of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (HCHRS) has always paid particular attention to the Penitentiary-Reformatory for Women in Požarevac given that it is the only institution in Serbia for women under sentence, with numerous specificities this entails. Having in mind the reports on previous visits, it can be concluded that the prison conditions are still far from adequate, although steps have been taken regarding the maintenance and renovation of this institution. Certain parts of the prison are decently adapted and furnished given that these activities are funded by modest working capital, however the majority of accommodation facilities remain in need of urgent transformation. This refers to an entire wing of the prison ward in particular, as well as to the numerous premises used both by the prisoners and the staff. It should be noted that some of the buildings of the Penitentiary-Reformatory for Women in Požarevac are among the oldest in the system of the execution of criminal sanctions of the Republic of Serbia. The main building was built 136 years ago, and has since been considerably reconstructed twice (in 1911 and 1971).

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Prisons in Serbia (February – March, 2010)

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Gordana Lukić-Samardžija,Ljiljana Palibrk,Ivan Kuzminović / Language(s): English

As all the earlier reports by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia have been taken as relevant and objective, we used the same, time-tested methodology and scrutinized the same aspects of prison life while monitoring the Juvenile Reformatory in Valjevo and the District Prison in Leskovac. These aspects relate to living conditions (buildings and grounds, sanitary installations and hygiene, equipment, food and healthcare), security, legality of treatment, social resettlement, contact with the outside world and institutional personnel. In our view, these are the dimensions that reflect all the elements of significance for a human rights non-governmental organization. On the other hand, a standardized methodology facilitates detection of most pressing problems on the one hand, and the changes for worse or for better on the other. This summary outlines characteristics of each monitored aspect, whereas detailed observations are presented in the reports below. Living conditions – Overcrowding and changed structure of prison population characterize all detention institutions in Serbia, including the Valjevo Juvenile Reformatory and, in particular, the Leskovac District Prison. Overcrowding plagues not only dormitories but also other premises available to prisoners (living quarters, recreation halls, etc.) Though some investments have been made in the past couple of years – to renovate sanitary installations, repair roofs, etc. – prison facilities are still in very bad shape. General hygiene is far from adequate, mostly due to high fluctuation of prisoners and decayed buildings. Both prisons are also poorly furnished and inadequately equipped with bedclothes, mattresses, etc. The quality of food in the Valjevo institution is adequate and the meals served to prisoners are not uniform. However, this aspect is rather problematic in the Leskovac institution. Milk and milk products, fresh fruits and sweets are rarely on menus in both institutions. Medical services are also better in the juvenile prison. Both institutions, however, are coping with large numbers of prisoners dependent on psychoactive substances. Security – This aspect is in itself problematic in all total institutions. Increased number of prisoners has made the security situation even more complex. Despite the fact that they are the biggest in both prisons, security services are actually understaffed. Various equipment such as metal detectors or video surveillance systems do make it easier for security officers to perform their duties, but cannot compensate other shortcomings. The problem of ‘prison gangs’ that plagues the Valjevo institution is not that serious in the Leskovac one. According to records and interviews, security officers are not assaulted by prisoners but cases of intra-prisoner violence are frequent. Legality of treatment – Objective circumstances in which the two institutions operate more or less result in illegal treatments. Adequate categorization and the respect for law are hardly possible with such large numbers of prisoners, which, in turn, open the door to “legally justified” misconduct. The changed structure of prison population in Valjevo has practically changed the function of this juvenile prison. The situation in the so-called wards under intensified surveillance is questionable in both institutions. Prisoners are still not adequately informed about their rights and duties though circulation of such information is better than before. Consequently, prisoners cannot get proper legal aid, while their grievances are not always processed legally. Suspected corruption and other misconduct are usual in any prison environment – however, the number of initiated proceedings and disciplinary measures taken against officers testify that corruption and misconduct are the realities of these two institutions. Social resettlement – For all the above-mentioned reasons pre-release programs and activities meant to assist prisoners’ reintegration into the outside community are rather inadequate and ineffective. In addition, prison officers in charge or reeducation are not professionally capacitated enough, financial and technical preconditions are bad, system flaws have not been removed yet, and state authorities did little to encourage cooperation between prisons and socioeconomic factors in the outside community. Contact with the outside world – Generally speaking, this is the best aspect in both institutions. Prisoners have no complaints against the communication with the outside community, as provided under the law, or against privileges and benefits dealing with leaves of absence from prison institutions. The interviewed prison officers say their communication with prisoners’ families and relevant governmental institutions was good. However, the team assesses this cooperation as inadequate, too formal and actually inefficient notably when it comes to juveniles. Institutional personnel – With such numbers of prisoners the two institutions cater for, all services are actually understaffed and the officers working for them inadequately qualified for dealing with prison population. Difficult working environments and stressful work conditions, and the presence of corruption and nepotism, negatively affect intra-personnel relations and further complicate the anyway huge problems these institutions have to cope with on everyday basis. As the relations between different services are not clearly defined, responsibility for wrong decisions and inadequate assessments is similarly veiled. Such general climate negatively affects the exercise of prisoners’ rights but also makes manipulation possible for them. For their part, prison officers are also often deprived of many rights, mostly those stemming from labor relations. Both prison institutions are managed by acting directors. Despite good results they have achieved for rather short periods in office, the two will not be appointed directors as they work in this capacity for other prison institutions. Both prisons need to urgently solve the problem of their cadres.

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Prisons in Serbia (July – October, 2010)

Author(s): Marija Jelić,Gordana Lukić-Samardžija,Ljiljana Palibrk,Ivan Kuzminović / Language(s): English

The team of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (HCHRS) has always paid particular attention to the Penitentiary-Reformatory for Women in Požarevac given that it is the only institution in Serbia for women under sentence, with numerous specificities this entails. Having in mind the reports on previous visits, it can be concluded that the prison conditions are still far from adequate, although steps have been taken regarding the maintenance and renovation of this institution. Certain parts of the prison are decently adapted and furnished given that these activities are funded by modest working capital, however the majority of accommodation facilities remain in need of urgent transformation. This refers to an entire wing of the prison ward in particular, as well as to the numerous premises used both by the prisoners and the staff. It should be noted that some of the buildings of the Penitentiary-Reformatory for Women in Požarevac are among the oldest in the system of the execution of criminal sanctions of the Republic of Serbia. The main building was built 136 years ago, and has since been considerably reconstructed twice (in 1911 and 1971).

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Spolková republika Německo v české zahraniční politice

Author(s): Vladimír Handl / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

Pro českou politickou scénu představoval vztah vůči SRN v roce 2009 vůbec nejdůležitější bilaterální relaci: Bez těsné a systematické spolupráce a německé pod¬pory by ČR těžko relativně úspěšně obstála ve své jedinečné roli předsednického státu EU. Vztahy s německým partnerem měly ovšem zásadní význam také pro vývoj české ekonomiky a rozvoje příhraničních regionů. Depolitizovaná spolupráce se SRN v prakticky orientované „sousedské“ agendě byla dlouhodobě předmětem vni¬tropolitického konsenzu.

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Правото като гарант за сигурността в обществото

Author(s): Goran Goranov / Language(s): Bulgarian Publication Year: 0

Among the goals pursued by law are justice, the common good and legal certainty. Legal certainty as a goal of law is also a value of the law itself and is part of its concept. The approach to its definition opens up avenues in different directions to be explored. This report will analyze the various meanings, arising from its main divisions, its main manifestations in the legal system and its main problems.

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THE POST-YUGOSLAV BALKANS IN THE IDEOLOGICAL WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO

Author(s): Darina Grigorova / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

The paper is focused on the ideological frame of Russian Post-Soviet Foreign Policy in the Balkans. Is there any Russian soft power? In a short introduction, the main ideological and geopolitical tendencies in the presentday Balkans are outlined. In the first part of the paper, we describe the geopolitical reality of the Balkans today and Russian positions in it. In the second and the third part of the paper, we analyze the content and the transformation of the Russian idea/concept ‘Russkiy mir’ and geopolitical, ideological and spiritual consequences of that transformation. The fourth part of the paper describes the current state of relations between NATO and Serbia 20 years after the bombing of the FR Yugoslavia in the context of the geopolitical competition of old and new factors in world politics. The conclusion highlights the main geopolitical and spiritual challenges of some Balkan Orthodox peoples and the possible role of Russia in the Balkans.

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Russia’s Role in the Provision of Sustainable Energy Security in South Eastern Europe

Author(s): Igor Tomberg,Pavel K. Baev,András Deák,Konstantin Michajlovič Simonov,Milan Simurdić,Zorana Z. Mihajlović Milanović,Anatoly Pomorcev / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

2009 – the crisis year – brought about crucial changes in the established and seemingly successful picture of the oil market. The New Year “gas war” between Russia and Ukraine consolidated bad tradition, demonstrating the vulnerability of the present structure of the oil and gas market once again. There were no winners, everyone suffered: the supplier, the transporter and the consumers. Conclusions and assessments of the conflict, and its consequences, are, generally, diametrically opposed. This was reflected in the subsequent actions and statements of the players in the market. It seems generally considered that on the ‘gas front’ Russia is leading a war “against all”. This confrontation is not new; but if earlier it could be considered as “debatable”, now resentment towards the actions and positions of Moscow are reaching a kind of hysteria. Such a political context, alongside some recent events, certainly has an influence on the future of the energy security in Europe, especially considering dramatic changes in the oil and gas markets.

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