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ТЕЛЕГРАМ ''ЈАВНОСТИ''; Крагујевац 8. Фебруара; Рад ванредне народне скупштине; Штудкје о стању пољске привреде у Србији; Спољна политика немачка; ПИТАЊЕ; РАЗЛИЧНОСТИ; СТЕЧАЈ; ОГЛАСИ; Удеоничарима крагујевачке друштвене штампарије;
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Russia runs disinformation campaigns against the EU using traditional media and the internet, including social media. Yet, the effectiveness of the fight against Russian disinformation by the Union and its Member States has so far been limited. These activities require strengthening at the international and national levels, as well as increasing public awareness of the use of media.
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Rosja prowadzi kampanie dezinformacyjne przeciw Unii Europejskiej, wykorzystując media tradycyjne oraz internet, w tym media społecznościowe. Skuteczność zwalczania rosyjskiej dezinformacji przez UE i państwa członkowskie była dotychczas ograniczona. Działania te wymagają wzmocnienia na poziomie międzynarodowym i krajowym, a także zwiększenia świadomości społecznej na temat korzystania z mediów.
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Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. elections highlighted the vulnerability of American society and the political and electoral system to hard and soft cyberattacks. Despite preventive measures being voted on by Congress and efforts by the social media industry, it has been impossible to eliminate the flaws in electoral infrastructure and social media, which were seen again in this year’s “midterm” elections. These factors will affect future elections and the U.S. in time will probably intensify its efforts to prevent attacks and manipulation attempts. This experience could become instrumental for Poland in securing its own electoral process.
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Ingerencja Rosji w wybory w Stanach Zjednoczonych w 2016 r. uwidoczniła podatność amerykańskiego społeczeństwa oraz systemu politycznego i wyborczego na cyberataki. Mimo podjętych przez Kongres i branżę mediów społecznościowych kroków zaradczych, nie udało się wyeliminować wad infrastruktury wyborczej i środków przekazu, co udowodnił przebieg tegorocznych wyborów do Kongresu. Czynniki te mogą mieć wpływ także na kolejne wybory, w związku z czym USA prawdopodobnie zintensyfikują działania zapobiegające atakom i próbom manipulacji. Polska może skorzystać z doświadczeń USA dla zabezpieczenia własnego procesu wyborczego.
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Władze Chin traktują Internet jako przestrzeń rywalizacji międzynarodowej. Uważają, że wspierany przez UE i USA swobodny dostęp do informacji w globalnej sieci zagraża stabilności ich systemu politycznego. Zacieśniają więc kontrolę Internetu w swoim państwie, dążąc do ograniczenia przepływu informacji. Za element wzmacniania pozycji ChRL w cyberprzestrzeni uważają także ekspansję gospodarczą chińskich firm z sektora IT za granicą. Inicjują również – konkurencyjny wobec UE i USA – projekt międzynarodowego kodeksu bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego. Działania Chin stoją w sprzeczności z promowaną przez UE otwartością globalnej sieci oraz wolnością gospodarczą.
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Przebieg wyborów prezydenckich w Stanach Zjednoczonych pokazał, że walka o głosy wyborców prowadzona za pomocą mediów społecznościowych umożliwia szybsze rozprzestrzenianie fałszywych informacji, propagandy i dezinformacji. W zbliżającej się kampanii wyborczej w Niemczech może wystąpić podobny scenariusz. By temu zapobiec, rząd niemiecki zamierza podjąć działania prewencyjne, jednak wobec nowych form internetowego zagrożenia mogą się one okazać niewystarczające.
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Opublikowane dotychczas materiały amerykańskiego wywiadu potwierdzają ingerencję służb specjalnych Federacji Rosyjskiej w przebieg kampanii prezydenckiej w 2016 r. Ujawnienie zdobytych za pomocą cyberoperacji dokumentów kompromitujących Hillary Clinton wpłynęło na jej porażkę oraz na sukces Donalda Trumpa. Ambitna operacja Rosjan ma poważne konsekwencje dla nowej administracji USA, jej polityki zagranicznej i działalności wywiadu. Także po zaprzysiężeniu Trumpa kontynuowane będzie bowiem śledztwo FBI wobec niektórych jego doradców. Będą się także toczyć dwa dochodzenia Senatu w sprawie błędów w działalności wywiadu i w cyberobronie USA.
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During 2014, Russian society underwent an unprecedented shift in perceptions of Ukraine and the West. This is the effect of a deliberate misinformation campaign by the Kremlin, facilitated by the government’s practically full control of media messages inside the country, enhanced by a skillful appeal to the population’s aspirations and grievances. Although the Kremlin holds a tight grip on the Russian public opinion, the West has to invest more in outreach activities targeting various social groups in Russian society. Given that Russia’s information manipulation campaign spreads far beyond Russian borders, the West should actively create and develop tools to defend its information space and address the Russian speaking public in the Eastern Partnership countries.
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W 2014 r. w rosyjskim społeczeństwie zaszły bezprecedensowe zmiany dotyczące stosunku do Ukrainy i Zachodu. To skutek celowej kampanii propagandowej prowadzonej przez Kreml, możliwej dzięki praktycznie całkowitej kontroli nad krajowym przekazem medialnym, wzmocnionej przez umiejętne odwoływanie się do nastrojów społecznych. Chociaż Kreml ściśle kontroluje rosyjską przestrzeń informacyjną, Zachód powinien inwestować w działania skierowane do różnych grup rosyjskiego społeczeństwa. Przede wszystkim jednak, ponieważ rosyjska kampania manipulacji i dezinformacji wychodzi daleko poza granice kraju, powinien aktywnie tworzyć i rozwijać narzędzia służące obronie własnej przestrzeni informacyjnej i komunikacji z rosyjskojęzycznymi odbiorcami w regionie Partnerstwa Wschodniego.
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In this edition of Robotrolling we track the most significant increase in inauthentic Russian-language social media activity we have observed since we began in 2017. While the level of bot activity remains much lower than four years ago, the uptick is concerning. The increased activity coincided with the spring and summer military exercise season, and the period running up to the Russian Federation’s Zapad exercises, scheduled for September 2021. While fake activity increased in the Russian-language space, we observed no increase in English-language activity, either from bots or from human-controlled accounts. In this edition of Robotrolling, we introduce the Global Database of Events Location and Tone (GDELT). This database of news articles helps map how the conversation about NATO in Poland and the Baltics is covered by news media, and serves as a contrast to the environment observed on Twitter and VK. This contrast reveals that in April 2021—as Russian troops mobilized along the Ukrainian border—inauthentic Russian accounts were also disproportionately active online. We round off the issue with a discussion of how AI can help us better understand the global news environment in near-real time, based on conversations with StratCom COE expert Gundars Bergmanis-Korāts and GDELT-founder Kalev Leetaru.
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In this edition of Robotrolling, we trace messaging about the build-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, there has been an expectation that kinetic activity would be preceded by large-scale information activities. We assess that the period from August 2021 to 20 February 2022 saw an increase in elite statements (and troop movements) unmatched by fake pro-Kremlin social media activity. This may reflect a top-down communication hierarchy, wherein lower echelons either received little guidance, or the guidance was to be silent. The volumes of automated activity were too low to offer any reliable signal of the looming invasion. In February 2022, pro-Kremlin channels and accounts amplified the narrative that the “genocide” of Russian-speakers in the Donbas justified intervention. Our analysis shows that this narrative’s traction was attributable to statements by Putin personally, not online propaganda channels. The comparative absence of pro-Kremlin activity on Twitter, combined with increased activity on VKontakte, suggests that Kremlin propagandists prioritised domestic audiences. On Twitter, the increase in Russian-language tweets about NATO was overwhelmingly driven by anti-Kremlin and pro-Ukrainian messaging. The share of automated messages on Twitter and VK about the Baltic states, Poland and NATO dropped, amidst greatly increased overall traffic. Bots accounted for 30% of Russian language and 12% of English-language messages on Twitter; and for 15% of messages about the region on VK. In February 2022, the number of English tweets was seven times higher than Russian tweets.
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In this first issue of the Virtual Manipulation Brief, we zoom in on the Russian language conversation, and how it changed as a result of the decision to invade Ukraine. Sanctions hindered the Kremlin’s messaging on Western platforms, while the focus on domestic audiences pulled many propagandists to Telegram, VKontakte, and RuTube. The number of Russian Telegram users has increased by two-thirds, while four in five users of Facebook and Instagram have left Meta’s platforms. The increase in users understates the importance of Telegram. It acts as a reliable hub, where pro-regime voices can post (almost) without fear of platform censorship. Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan’s social media posting patterns reveal how communication has adapted following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In response to sanctions, she, together with many journalists working for RT and Sputnik, moved to posting through Telegram. Telegram posts are automatically cross-posted to her Western platforms, meaning the messaging continues to flow at little or no extra effort. This method has the added benefit of evading attempts by Twitter to prevent the amplification of RT content. Such use of automation means the Kremlin’s messaging will not disappear on Western platforms, even when domestic audiences are the primary focus. The comparison of Russian-language messaging about NATO on VKontakte and Twitter shows how this combination of push and pull factors has dramatically altered the Kremlin’s reach. We estimate that the relative reach of pro-Kremlin messaging on VKontakte in March 2022 was a hundred times more than normal, compared to Twitter. The Virtual Manipulation Brief builds on our Robotrolling reports, tracking how Russian bots and trolls manipulate the flow of information online. It expands the area of focus beyond the conversation about NATO to Russia’s war against Ukraine. And it will look beyond Twitter and VKontakte to track how antagonists use other social media platforms to disinform the public. In this issue, we start by examining how social media usage in Russia changed since February. A comparison of heavily amplified content about NATO on Twitter and VKontakte exposes the Kremlin’s waning ability to control conversations on Western platforms. Finally, we show how the Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan moved her communication to Telegram to evade sanctions directed at RT.
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Šest godina nakon otvaranja pregovora o pristupanju, Crna Gora je i dalje primjer zarobljene države. Kao što godinama i decenijama iscrpljuje demokratsku javnost, tako Vlada Crne Gore strategiju iscrpljivanja majstorski primjenjuje na proces evropskih integracija, pri tom zloupotrebljavajući potrebu Evropske unije za novim integracijskim optimizmom.
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The media scene in Montenegro, for a long period, reflects a deep social polarization, accompanied by numerous problems that, in different manners, affect the environment in which the media function as well as the quality of media reporting. The problems of hard censorship are particularly emphasized, as reflected in the burden of unsolved cases of attacks on journalists and their property. This is accompanied by the dysfunctionality of self-regulatory bodies and regulators - the Agency for Electronic Media, but also the public service media RTCG that fails to genuinely transform itself, and even takes a few steps backward, which consequently limits the opportunities for citizens to be objectively informed about events in Montenegro.
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In Serbian media peacekeeping missions and military exercises are mainly referred to in the context of Kosovo. Multinational operations are overwhelmingly brought up in positive context. Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is mostly touched upon in positive tone, but the reports are generally very polarized and the number of neutral texts is rather small. Overall, military exercises are the most frequently mentioned topic. However, in the reports on military exercises, Russia is never referred to in a negative tone. On the other hand, NATO is primarily mentioned in a neutral or a negative tone. This analysis focuses on media reporting regarding selected keywords, namely military exercises, peacekeeping missions, multinational operations and IPAP. These keywords were selected because they receive considerable attention in the media, but there is often a mix of true and false information in reports on them. The analysis covered 383 media pieces published between 1 December 2018 and 28 February 2019. Media sources included online portals, printed newspapers, TV and radio. The goal was to determine how often and in what context these subjects are mentioned in the media, which media sources report on them the most and whether they are brought up in positive, neutral or negative tone. We also measured how often key international actors, namely NATO, Russia and the EU are referred to. Furthermore, the tone towards NATO and Russia was analyzed in media pieces regarding military exercises and IPAP respectively.
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In connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities have introduced wartime censorship, forbidding the publication of content that does not conform to the official message of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. This massive and unprecedented propaganda is leading to an increase in support for Vladimir Putin, and Russians protesting against the war are being brutally repressed and persecuted. The consequence is the strengthening of the totalitarian character of the Russian state and the emigration of Russians who do not support the war. The most significant element of the Russian war propaganda is that of “denazification”, a claim aimed also at Poland.
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The dynamics of the domestic political situation in Russia in 2021 was determined by the authorities’ crackdown on Alexei Navalny – the most important opposition figure – as well as on his associates and supporters. The aim was to destroy the nucleus of a nascent political alternative to the regime in view of the parliamentary election in September 2021 and, above all, the presidential election scheduled for 2024. The September vote revealed the limits of public support for the Kremlin and the considerable scale of the protest vote against those in power. Despite the unprecedented wave of repression and the lack of real competition in the parliamentary election, it was necessary to commit wholesale fraud to achieve the desired official results. The communist party (CPRF) became the main beneficiary of the protest vote, although it is doubtful whether the communists can become a real opposition force.
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In December 2020, President Vladimir Putin signed a package of laws tightening regulations on non-governmental organisations, public gatherings and media censorship. It is one of the elements marking a new quality in the Kremlin’s domestic policy: Russian authoritarianism has de facto abandoned the pretence of democratic procedures in favour of increased control and repression.
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