NALIČJE JEDNE KRITIKE
(Povodom teksta: Toma Milenković, Nedoslednost u primeni istorijske metodologije; kritika monografije: Boljševizacija KPJ 1919-1929. Istorijske posledice; Istorija 20. veka, br. 1/1994, str. 201-222)
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(Povodom teksta: Toma Milenković, Nedoslednost u primeni istorijske metodologije; kritika monografije: Boljševizacija KPJ 1919-1929. Istorijske posledice; Istorija 20. veka, br. 1/1994, str. 201-222)
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The writing of the communist press about Yugoslavia in the period between the two world wars can be divided into three time periods. The first, lasting until the mid-twenties, was marked by the acceptance, on the part of the KPJ, of unitarianism and its positive position regarding the events of 1 December, 1918. Even then, however, there was criticism of the regime and the so-called great-Serbian striving for hegemony, even in writings dealing with borders and foreign politics. During the second period (1924-1935), under the direct influence of the Comintern the view was accepted that Yugoslavia, regarded as an artificial and imperialist creation, ought to be divided. The aim of such writing in the communist press was primarily to expose the great--Serbian regime and its oppression of other nations in the country. Many articles, especially in the early thirties, were marked by Slovenian and Croatian party separatism. The third period (1935-1941) was characterized by views, also inspired by the Comintern, that Yugoslavia’s unity should be preserved and that a solution acceptable to all Yugoslav nations should be sought within its structure. However, views in favor of separatism and autonomy still persisted in communist newspapers, as did criticism concerning the creation of Yugoslavia. A single article, »The Meaning of 1 December, 1918« (Glas iseljenika, 2 November, 1938), dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the creation of Yugoslavia, deserves special attention since it spoke of the events of 1 December, 1918 with appropriate respect and pointed out that, should the country be broken up, many parts of Yugoslavia, would fall prey to powerful neighbors.
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Government authorities of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia regarded KPJ as a terrorist organization and an enemy of the state whose primary aim was to undermine the foundations of the state and to introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat modeled after Soviet Russia. Initially the fear of possible revolutionary changes was one of the main motives for the actions undertaken by government authorities against the Communists. Repression was the method most often used in the hope of preventing a revolution. The authorities sought to defend the existing system by banning 'the operation and the ideas of KPJ. At the time in which KPJ was outlawed the laws prohibiting its operation were not applied consistently to the Communists. Each case was viewed separately and was largely left to the notions of the police authorities. There was no attempt to understand why communist ideas were taking root in the Kingdom since it was thought that they could have no influence on the inner development of the state. KPJ was seen as being only an exponent of the Comintern and of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
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Benito Mussolini, the leader of the Italian Fascists and, as of 1922, the country’s prime minister, formulated the foreign policy doctrine of Italy in his public speeches during the early twenties. Founding his assertions on the tradition of the ancient Roman Empire, Mussolini supported the idea of creating a new, fascist empire. In his speeches he advocated the cultural, economic and territorial expansion of Italy towards the region of the Mediterranean, Africa and Asia, depending on the course of actual historical events. He regarded the Balkans and Yugoslavia as belonging to the east-Mediterranean. His intention was to expand Italian interests in that region through economic domination but he also advocated territorial conquests. In the beginning of the thirties, Mussolini and his followers lent special attention to Africa as a part of the future empire. Aware of historical circumstances, Mussolini encouraged economic and cultural expansion and made military preparations for the conquest of Ethiopia, which followed in 1935/36. Having thus accomplished his intentions regarding Africa, he then turned to southeast Europe. In the second half of the thirties, he insisted on economic expansion into this region and, in 1939, marked it as part of the future Italian empire.
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Dr. Dragoljub Jovanović, the key figure of the Serbian Farmers’Alliance left wing, left significant and interesting writings regarding his meetings with Dr. Vlatko Maček, the »leader« of the Croatian national movement. These writings show their relationship and their views concerning the role and position of the farmers, Serbo-Croat relations, the question of the form of government, reform in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the solution of the Croatian issue. In spite of certain similarities manifested in their views, the differences between completely drove them apart towards the beginning of World War II. Convinced of the necessity of a Serbo-Croat agreement and believing that Croatian national demands ought to be satisfied, Dr. D. Jovanović approached the association with V. Maček enthusiastically and with the best of intentions. Towards the close of the thirties, however, it became evident that for V. Maček he had only been a »marginal figure« and that his amicable feelings were not shared by Maček. Furthermore, according to Dr. Jovanović, Dr. Maček left the principal notions of Stjepan Radić — the founder of the Croatian farmers’ movement, tended only Croatian interests and spoke of the possibility of solving the Croatian issue outside Yugoslavia.
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Emperor Boris III and his government did not seen Germany’s penetration into Bulgaria as a loss of sovereignty and independence, although the people of the country regarded it as precisely that. A series of circumstances, objective (economic dependence, full 'dependence on Germany for the acquisition of arms, Germany’s great influence on Bulgarian armed forces through the industry, instructors and counselors) and subjective (the ideological affinity of the two regimes, the Germanophile inclinations of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie, anti-Communism as the official doctrine in both countries and shared revisionist tendencies), encouraged the strengthening of the military and political position of Hitler’s Germany in Bulgaria. The decidedly pro-germanic orientation of the Bulgarian monarcho-fascist rulers ensured the support of other countries of the Axis to this regime which, in conditions of domestic hostility, gave the ruling class valuable aid in preserving power. Emperor Boris III and the Bulgarian government, led by practical reasons and strategic interests on the Balkans, which were defined in the »Great-Bulgarian Program«, made theoretical and practical preparations from 1939 to 1941 for the events which would take place between 1941 and 1944. The preparations were manifested in the creation of political and economic concepts, the strengthening of the pro-fascist ideology and the building of a strong military and police force backed by Germany. Furthermore, the events of this period clearly showed that the success of the occupation would also depend on the processes of disintegration and inter-ethnic problems existent in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria became Germany’s most trusted ally on the Balkans. Having received Hitler’s permission on 18 April 1941, Bulgaria began to put into effect the »Great-Bulgarian Program« with all its forces (military, police, political, legal, educational and church administration). In order to ensure the support of public opinion for this policy, the idea of »liberating old Bulgarian« territories and people and their »union with mother Bulgaria«was spread with the aid of powerful propaganda.
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The most numerous Albanian tribe, the Mirdits, whose territory spread from Lješ to the tribe of Djakovička Malesija, gained internationally recognized autonomy at the Berlin Congress in 1878 and made efforts to preserve this autonomy in the course of events which took place in the beginning of the 20th century, in 1920 the Mirdits again strove to keep their autonomy which had always been disputed by Albanian nationalists who, backed first by Austria and from 1919 by Italy, attempted to create a centralized Great Albania through the influence of the major powers. Following the murder of Essad-Pasha in the middle of 1920, Serbs became the only party with which a political course could be accorded. Contacts had been made between Mirdit captains and Serbs as far back as 1849, then again in 1876 -78, 1912 - 15 and 1918. Serbs respected tribal autonomy which made Mark Ghioni a supporter of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians did not offer military assistance to this uprithe autumns of 1920 and 1921. His inclination towards the Serbs resulted in the agreement signed in Prizren on 21 May, 1921 and subsequently to the poorly organized Mirdit uprising, needed more by Nikola Pašić for his political purposes than by the Mirdits themselves. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians did not offer military assistance to this uprising and consequently lost the alliance with the Mirdits.
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The question of Albanian borders was opened towards the end of the 19th c., especially during the Berlin Congress when borders between Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey were being determined. At the time Albanians demanded autonomy for Albania within Turkey and expressed aspirations of a general sort regarding the territories of the vilayets Shkodra, Kosovo, Bitola and loannina. These aspirations were put forth with more precision during the uprising in 1912, when the following territory was demanded: the whole Shkodra vilayet, the whole loannina vilayet, the Prizren, Priština, Peć and Novi Pazar sanjaks and Tetovo kaza from the Kosovo vilayet, and the Debar, Elbasan and Когсё sanjaks from the Bitola vilayet. Burdened by problems in foreign politics, the Turkish government accepted these demands on 4 September but was prevented from fulfilling them by the outbreak of the Balkan War. After the quick victories of the Balkan allies, the Albanian leaders decided to break all ties with Turkey, having judged that it would definitely have to withdraw from the Balkans. On 1 November 1912 they declared an independent Albanian state and set up a temporary government in Valona. Austria-Hungary and Italy fully supported this move, seeing the creation of an Albanian state as the best barrier to the possibility of Serbia’s exit on the Adriatic Sea. After signing a truce, the representatives of the warring parties met in London on 16 December 1912 to begin peace negotiations. At the same time the ambassadors of the six great powers also et, supposedly to mediate between the warring parties but in actuality they dictated the terms of the peace settlement or rather, he division of Turkish territories in the Balkans. The first decision made at the conference of the ambassadors was that an independent, neutral Albanian state should be founded. The peace treaty between the Balkan allies and Turkey was signed on 30 May 1913. This treaty did not resolve the question of determining borders between the newly-founded Albanian state and its neighbors but left decisions regarding this up to the conference of the ambassadors of the great powers. Here the extreme demands of the interested parties and the different interests of the great powers became evident. However, none of the great powers challenged the question of the annexation of Kosovo and Metohia to Serbia and Montenegro. The negotiations centered on disputes over the cities Shkodra, Peć, Djakovica, Prizren, Debar and Ohrid, and were ended with a compromise according to which Shkodra was given to Albania, Peć and Djakovica to Montenegro, and Prizren, Debarand Ohrid to Serbia. An international committee was formed to mark the border lines but at the outbreak of the First World War it had still not accomplished its task. During the First World War both warring parties used the Albanian territory as bait for winning over allies to their side. In this sense Austria-Hungary planned to annex Kosovo and Metohia to Albania and then to annex the latter to itself, or put it under Austro-Hungarian protectorate. At the same time Austria-Hungary had promised south Albania to Greece, in return for Greece's continued neutrality and had hinted to Bulgaria that it might get parts of central Albania. On the other side the powers of the Entente had promised, by the London Treaty of 1915, Valona with its hinterland to Italy, with the possibility of north Albania being annexed to Serbia and Montenegro, and south Albania to Greece. After the First World War, at the Paris Peace Conference, the question of Albanian borders was discussed again but after lengthy negotiations the conference of the great powers’ ambassadors made a resolution on 9 November 1921 by which an independent Albanian state was recognized, with borders as they had been in 1913. A few minor changes were made in Yugoslavia’s favor in the regions of Debar, Prizren and Kastrat, while north of Lake Ohrid the changes were in favor of Albania. These borders remained valid after the end of the Second World War.
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At the beginning of the Peace Conference in Paris, the extent of the area populated by South Slavs was not clear, especially in Panonia, where the population was greatly mixed in terms of nationality. The suggestion made by General P. Pešić, of establishing strategic borders, was considered to be imperialistic by the Croatian representatives in the Yugoslav Delegation, A. Trumbić and J. Smodlaka. The Serbian members of the Delegation aimed their efforts more towards determining borders in Banat which was wholly Serbian, while the south of Baranja was also inhabited by Croatian Sokci. In March 1919 it seemed as though the border would be established on the river Drava. The Belgrade professor of ethnology, Jovan Cvijić, put in the greatest effort to have the border moved north. The Slovenians assisted the Serbian rather than the Croatian members of the Delegation since they expected Serbian endeavors regarding Baranja to result in the annexation of Prekomurje. Since Baranja had a large German population, efforts were made towards getting the German vote in favor of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.These efforts were successful while Hungary was under Bolshevist rule (until August 1919). Even the Hungarian feudalists were in favor of the annexation to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians because peace reigned in the zone occupied by Serbia. Circumstances changed when the Bolshevist rule was overthrown. Germans began to favor an integral Hungary. There were numerous statistics, motions made to give the population of Baranja a chance to express their wishes and historical retrospectives but none of this was given much heed by the great powers. The president of the Delegation. N. Pašić, even consented to a plebiscite which he did not accept in Macedonia or elsewhere. The area around Mohač, where there was a German majority, was particularly disputed, although demands were also made for Pečuj (because of the rich coal mines). The Serbian Supreme Command demanded the bridgehead across the river Drava on the Slavonic side. The situation became worse when the withdrawal of the Serbian occupational army was ordered. The border line was determined towards the end of 1919 by compromise and without taking into account the ethnic makeup and the wishes of the Slavic population in Baranja. This border was confirmed by the peace treaty signed in Trianon (near Versailles) in June 1920. Typically, the Croatian members of the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians made no effort In regard to Baranja. Baranja was later connected to Serbian Vojvodina, with which it had in common a mixed population and the same economic structure.
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The conflict between the Serbs and Croats over Srem is one of their earliest and most difficult disputes and is also part of the rich and often dramatic difficult history of this region. Srem had already become the »stumbling block between the two nations« at the time of the revolution of 1848-1849. The issue of ownership then raised over Srem has not been settled to this day, notwithstanding short periods of calm. In the dispute, Croats claimed to have rights in terms of state and history, resulting from state and historical arrangements and contracts made by the Hungarian state, by which Srem, while under Hungarian rule, had been one of the administrative areas of Croatian and Hungarian Slavonia. Defending the idea of a Serbian Srem «, the Serbs emphasized their ethnic and historical rights, founding these claims on several intense Serbian migrations to these parts, on their superiority in number resulting from these migrations, on their importance in halting the Turkish invasion of Central Europe, their connection with other Serbian regions and their role in the Serbian history and culture in general. The dispute was still unresolved at the time the August 1939 Cvetković-Maček Agreement was revived, by which two districts of Srem had been annexed to Banovina Hrvatska - the district of Sid and llok, along with the districts Vukovar, Vinkovci and Zupanja, which had been annexed to Banovina Hrvatska as parts of the form er Savska Banovina. The new banovina thus encompassed not only over half the territory of Srem but also districts in which Serbs were in the majority - Sid, llok and Vukovar. This solution and the announcement of the Croats that in the final reform of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia they would demand the whole of Srem, all the way to Zemun, provoked the discontent and anxiety of the Serbs, both of those who had been directly affected by the Agreement signed in August 1939 but also of all Serbian parties, scientists and the press. The beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia broke off this dispute but some of the provisions of the Agreement remained valid when the war ended. The districts of llok and Vukovar remained in the federal unit of Croatia, which recently again gave rise to hostility between the Serbs and Croats.
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The borders of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slavonians cut through the territory of several formerly united Roman Catholic dioceses. The formation of the Yugoslav state caused the old Austrian and Hungarian dioceses to be Split up and reduced in size. Wishing to ensure sovereignty of the state, Yugoslav governments strived to annex parts of foreign dioceses to existing Yugoslav bishoprics, or to have them organized as independent dioceses (apostolic administrations). The Vatican, on the other hand, endeavored to postpone as much as possible the separation of foreign and Yugoslav dioceses. However, in cases where parts of Yugoslav bishoprics were to be connected to Italian ones (for example, when C. Constontini was appointed apostolic administrator of Rijeka in 1920), the Vatican readily gave its full approval. Church interstate division began in 1923 when apostolic administrations were established for Banat and Bačka, and when Baranja, parts of Slavonia, Međumurje and annexed to Yugoslav church regions. On the other hand, parts of Yugoslav dioceses were connected to those of Italy (Rijeka, Zadar, parts of the Bishopric of Krk etc.). Church division between Albania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was never carried out and, consequently, foreign Franciscans served in border regions of Montenegro and Metohija. In some parts of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians regular church administration was never set up (Serbia and Macedonia). The 1914 concord between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Vatican stipulated the founding of a Bishopric of Belgrade and a suffragan diocese of Skopje. However, the establishment of regular hierarchy and administration was put off for a long time. Belgrade and Serbia represented only a Catholic mission under the jurisdiction of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. In Belgrade things remained at the level of»a Catholic missionary with the jurisdiction of a parish priest», since the parish priest wagner administered the Belgrade parish and took care of the Roman Catholics in Serbia. Regular church hierarchy was established only in the autumn of 1924 with the appointment of R. Rodić as the Archbishop of Belgrade,
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The essential questional discussed in this article is whether economic borders existed within Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1941. The main aspects of the discussion are: 1. the boundaries of economic development: a) on which side of the border was Nikola Tesla, b) the boundaries of modernization on Yugoslavia's historical territory; 2. the Inner borders of the Balkans and the Yugoslav historical territory, and 3. the organization of the economy according to administrative areas (banovina), chambers, and social classes, from 1918 to 1941. Supporting the thesis that economy as such cannot, as an intermediary between Man and Nature, have limits, other than those sets by itself, the author deals, initially, with the Nikola Tesla phenomenon. This Serb from Lika, »from the Austro-Hungarian border«, who was permanently settled in New York in the last decade of the 19th Century, modernized the economy and human life on Earth with his discoveries in the field of electrotechnics, which also gave rise to new technologies. The author concludes that it is impossible to draw a boundary between the Serb Tesla and world economy, just as it is impossible to draw a boundary between world economy and the economy of Yugoslavia. The modernization and electrification of the new era did not know of borders between nations and states. Within Yugoslavia, however, it is possible to identify »borders of progress«, borders of modernization, that is, regions on the borders of which modernization came to a halt. This is viewed in the context of the general question concerning so called inner borders of the Balkan peninsula at the beginning of the 20th Century. The article presents the organization of the economy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, according to administrative areas (banovina), chambers and social classes, wherein the author insists on the term »organization« and not »division« of the country, because the subject is the formation of the new state.
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Poznato je da u našoj istoriografiji postoji obimna literatura, a na njoj smo se svi mi istoričari učili na studijama, da je naša revolucija, posvojim osnovnim zamislima, posve originalna. Dublja i sve stranija istraživanja dovela bi ovu tvrdnju pod sumnju, ponajpre ako se ispituje ponašanje subjektivnog faktora, kao nosioca te revolucije u jednom dužem periodu.
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After the revolution and the civil war had been concluded, several million of people emigrated from the Soviet Union, a small number of whom arrived to the just founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Russian emigration was cordially and warmly received, both by the official organs of authority and by the population, particularly its Orthodox part. According to accessible data, about 62% of Russian emigrants were constituted by people with secondary school education, approximately 13% had a higher and high education, whereas only 3% of emigrants were illiterate. Several moments were characteristic of the Russian emigration in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; they considered their exile as a temporary conditions and they lived in an „entirely refugees’ way”; they had a very intensive and developed social life, i.e. they lived an „intensively Russian life” creating numerous professional, political, cultural organizations; they had difficulties in adapting themselves to the new environment and including themselves into it, subordinating their entire activity to the future life in Russia; they did not renounce their old habits (traditionalism which contained in it many values of the old order and which had to secure the continuity with the former life) and, what is particularly important, of the „Russian spirit and Russian culture" by which they ennobled and enriched the environment into which they had arrived. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the emigration has formed a special school system which enabled it to preserve its identity and its national being. In addition to the national, educational and cultural significance, the Russian schools had also an expressed political function to educate the youth who had to be „the cultural detachment of Russia in foreign countries”. The cultural importance of the Russian emigration is particularly reflected in the number of eruditely educated professors and scientists who left a visible trace in the work of universities and scientific institutions of the Kingdom, raised the level of science and teaching, founded the study of scientific disciplines which were not cultivated until then in our country. The Russian emigration had also an intensive literary and artistic life and numerous workers in different domains of creativity, that reflected itself in the milieu they arrived in and which it ennobled, by its cultural mission, its zeal, its tradition and its spirit and made it more cultural and more enlightened.
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The activity of Dr. Anton Korošec, the leader of the Slovenska ljudska stranka, is viewed in the context of Yugoslav politics in the period between 1917 and 1940. The analysis lays emphasis on views and evaluations of Korošec’s political activity given by people and institutions in Serbia, with a special focus on the relations Slovenians and Serbs in the time of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians, that is the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, until Korošec's death on December 14th, 1940. A choice was made of the most essential and indicative events and evaluations, on the basis of which a general judgment could be made of the political profile and activity of A. Korošec in the Yugoslav state. Anton Korošec proves to have been an eminent figure both in politics regarding Yugoslavia’s unification, towards the end of World War I and later, in the political life of the unified state. He held prominent public positions from the beginning, several times as minister in various departments and, in 1928, he became the first „prečanski” prime minister of Yugoslavia. Korošec’s power and influence in state politics was based on the support he hoped to gain from the Serbian Radikalna stranka and the court circles, headed by Aleksandar Karađorđević. To attain this end, he adroitly used the position of his party in disputes between Serbia and Croatia, abiding mainly by the politics of Serbia. In this way Korošec successfully effectuated Slovenian national interests, struggling primarily for Slovenia's major autonomy. At the same time, he firmly supported the integrity of the Yugoslav state and was a renowned advocate of Yugoslav politics in high state politics of the Kingdom between 1918 and 1940. The frequent oscillations in Korošec’s politics are the manifestations of the necessity to maintain the domination of the catholic party and movement in Slovenia and of clever tactical moves made by him in Yugoslav „high" politics, which had definite positive results for the general advancement of Slovenians in Yugoslavia in the years between 1918 and 1941.
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The revie „Stožer” (Axle) as published in Belgrade at the time of political absolutism in Yugoslavia. As the left publication, it supported the putting into effect of the ideas of Communist movement and in a period it as under the direct influence of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It found its place in the movement of social literature, hich fought for the development of ne relations in art, first of all in literature. The authors of articles, published in this paper, pleaded for the domination of class component in a works of art and for the socialization of the total creativity in the culture. According to these interpretations, the art ought to be a concrete means for the struggle in the planned revolution, to help, by its expressive possibilities, the coming to po er of the proletariat, the destruction of the bourgeois society. In this way, the artist becomes a revolutionary. On the pages of „Stožer” as carried on also a violent controversy between the movement of social literature, conditionally termed the Harding of the communist movement, and the surrealist movement in Belgrade. It as polymerized about the sense of revolution and the possibilities of its realization. The surrealists supported the liberation of art from its political instrumentalization, for the completely unlimited artistic free from. They fought for the revolution, first in the sphere of human spirituality and conscience and only later could be reformed also the social basis, for, according to their conceptions, only a free and conscious man could carry out the revolution. In these endeavors, they remained lonely thin the framework of the revolutionary movement. There prevailed the concepts of the militant engagement of the artists and the revolution in the sense of realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
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The main characteristics of Bauer’s ideological conviction can be narrowed down to consistent clericalism and anti-liberalism. Bauer promoted the ideas of the Catholic Movement and the Catholic Action, advocating the revival of catholic spirituality through the educational system, the press and new orders and congregations. He viewed ideas of „naturalism and Darwinism”, supported by bourgeois liberalism, with contempt, seeing them as earthly and subjective human products and he successfully lent an „ethnic” aspect to the Roman Catholic ideology by representing the South Slavic population as exclusive in comparison with the adherents of other confessions. Together with the Catholic bishopric, Archbishop Bauer wished to draw the Croatian and Slovenian people away from liberal „masonic” bourgeois misconceptions and to lead them to the fundamental values of „true Christian culture” . Bauer praised the Croatian people as the „bulwark of Christianity" (antemurale christianitatis) against the „schismatic” east. He considered the attack of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on Serbia in 1914 through the prism of the defense of Catholicism against Serbian „piemontism” . Having realized that the defeat of the Hapsburgs was inevitable, Bauer acquiesced to the revolutionary events of October 29th and December 1st in 1918, fearful of the expansion of liberalism from bourgeois Italy, where the anti-clerical tradition of the „Risorgimento” continued. The disappearance of orthodox Russia, however, widened the possibilities of proselytism, that is of spreading the Roman Catholic faith among the orthodox. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians was to serve as a bridge for propagating Roman Catholic pan slavism in the orthodox east. Due to reasons mentioned above, the ideological climate in Yugoslavia would consequently lead A. Bauer to the anti-Yugoslav camp, regardless of his initial inclination towards the Yugoslav state, apparent in 1918 and 1919. Namely, due to the dominant influence of bourgeois liberalism, laical anti-clericalism would play a significant part in the political, economic and cultural life of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bauer, therefore, fought a „cultural battle" in the sphere of education against the state’s „irreligious” educational policy and considered the agrarian reform to be an assault on the part of the State on catholic „religious endowments”, which provided the means for the maintenance of the cultural institutions of the Church.
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In this study of the Comintern code and its use before and during World War II, the author also cites and analyses examples of other codes used throughout World War 1. The codes are presented with their cryptographic characteristics and the conditions and manner of their application. Attention is also paid to the development of the cryptographic service, from the first days of the War, when the simplest codes were used, to the end of the War and the „unbreakable” code. Codes were an object of interest not withstanding the hardships of war and special care was given to the selection and training of staff. The author also discusses the activity of foreign deciphering services and the possibility of their deciphering the coded messages of the National Liberation Army and the Yugoslav Partisan Detachments.
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The agrarian and peasant issue includes social, economic, political, socio-psychological and cultural subject matter, whose meaning changes through historic evolution and differs from one particular country to another, but nevertheless primarily depends on the character of the political and economic structure of a given global society. The period discussed in this study is very short from a historical viewpoint, but considering the dynamics of events which took place in the world and in Yugoslavia in the first half of the 20th century, this is a period filled with numerous, important events and agrarian changes vital to the agrarian and peasant issue. It would be difficult to understand the changes which took place in agrarian affairs after World War II, without being acquainted with the pre-and post-War periods of this subject matter. The primary activity in the economy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was farming. The two crucial problems of this branch of economy were peasants’ debts and the never satisfied „hunger” of the peasants for land. Hence, there was not a single political party whose program and political activity did not deal with the peasant and agrarian issues. The Yugoslav Communist Party could not avoid this problem either; during World War II it already found itself in a position to influence changes in agrarian affairs. The sporadic distribution of land to the peasants (based on the principle according to which land should be given to those who cultivate it) and collectivistic farm production on liberated and semi-liberated territories, were the first heralds of changes to come. After the War, the Party, in its creation of agrarian politics, gave economic moments secondary importance in respect to political ones. The two most important political and economic measures taken by the new State in 1945, were the agrarian reform and colonization, and, with them, the farmers' and peasants' cooperatives and the practice of buying up the entire agrarian output.
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The formation and the activity of the Serbian Culture Club (SCC) in the period 1937 - 1941, are among the least clarified aspects of the social and political life between the wars in Yugoslavia. The main reason for the neglect to conduct a research on this topic lies certainly in the inaccessibility and scarceness of the sources of information but is probably also due to the „delicate” nature of this subject. The Serbian Culture Club gathered in its ranks the cream of the Serbian intellectual and partly also political, elite. The Club was led by Slobodan Jovanović (Chairman), university professor, Dragiša Vasić, writer and attorney, Vladimir Ćorović, univ. prof., Mihajio Konstantinović, minister and others. The initiative for founding the Club had come from Nikola Stojanović, an attorney from Sarajevo. The SCC was founded in the beginning of 1937, as a strictly centralized organization, in which the highest authority were the Chairman and the Supervisory Board, while the Club Assembly had considerably diminished decision making rights. The „Program" of the Club placed cultural objectives before all others and put emphasis on declaring political issues to be irrelevant to the Club's activity. The gap between the Club's proclaimed goals and those which it actually set and attained in practice grew wider with time. The Club was transformed from a cultural association to an organization which acquired all the attributes of a classic political party. The extremely centralized SCC started a political newspaper („Srpski glas” — „The Serbian Voice"), established local branches (sub-committees) and organized its own „youth” within a special Youth Section. The cultural activity of the Club, which was carried out through various Club sections, lectures, articles, special editions, was based on traditionalistic national products and institutions. The primary conclusion which asserts itself is that the „culture" of the SCC was reduced to being an instrument of the Club's political activity. The SCC appeared following the failure of the January 6th experiment, in the years in witch political life was being liberalized. The national issue, which had until then suffered the greatest suppression, came to the forefront. It was brought up by the Croatian political leaders who demanded that this issue be settled by changing the social structure. In these conditions of a scattered Serbian political front and the breaking up of leading Serbian political parties, while on the other side the Croatian Peasant Party presented a compact national program, the SCC supported the homogenization of Serbian political powers. Aspiring to the position of the supreme interpreter of Serbian national demands, the SCC sublimated in its political ideology the national demands of almost all Serbian political parties. The Club became politically very active in the autumn of 1939, following the Cvetković-Maček Agreement. The SCC was against the creation of the Region of Croatia as a „corpus separatum ” within the Yugoslav State. The Club pointed out that the position of Serbia after the Agreement was extremely undefined. The pro-British SCC expressed concern over the increasing surrounding of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy, on which the domestic separatist powers relied. The SCC declared itself clearly as being in favor of protecting the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The activity of the SCC met with the reaction of numerous political and cultural entities in the country. The harshest criticism came from the Croatian side. The Club was accused of supporting the current of Serbian nationalism and to have gathered „Serbian chauvinists” in its ranks. Analysis clearly shows that the political ideology of the SCC contained all the basic traits of nationalism, while it is difficult to find evidence for the chauvinistic dimension.
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