![Putyin külpolitikájának első tíz éve](/api/image/getbookcoverimage?id=document_cover-page-image_482174.jpg)
We kindly inform you that, as long as the subject affiliation of our 300.000+ articles is in progress, you might get unsufficient or no results on your third level or second level search. In this case, please broaden your search criteria.
This section presents how budget support has been spent in Georgia. Budget support expenditures amounted to €258 million in 2007–2013 and made up 60% of Georgia’s national budget. This sum consisted of €216 million planned for budget support, including €49 million allocated under the “more for more” rule to some operations and the rest for technical assistance and other grants. In this period of time, 12 programmes were planned, out of which two projects were finalised, six are still under implementation, and four are in the planning process. The majority of the financial resources have been disbursed, as the level of EU conditions met for each tranche hovered around 90%. The EU de-committed only €2.5 million as Georgia had not fulfilled some EU conditions due to changes in the government’s political priorities.
More...
This section presents how budget support has been used in Armenia. In 2007–2013, several budget support operations were implemented in Armenia for an overall sum of €134.9 million. The programmes have seen 85% of targets achieved on average. Some delays in paying the tranches took place when specific conditions were not achieved. Such cases are not publicized by the EU delegation, probably in order not to strain cooperation with the government. In terms of management, the Armenian Ministry of Economy is the major coordinator, while on the EU side the delegation manages the process, both in its operational and financial aspects, with a staff consisting of 7–8 people. The programming usually takes 1–2 years, while implementation of budget support operations usually lasts 3-4 years. The programmes are helped by a set of all of the usual TA tools.
More...
As a foreign policy player, the EU has the clearest priorities in its direct neighbourhood: it must shield itself from numerous threats, such as irregular migration flows, conflict and energy insecurity. However, its political leverage over the region has weakened even as a new union diplomacy has been created. The reason lies in the fact that EU policy tools do not meet reality and changing trends. The European Neighbourhood Policy was created in 2004, a time when the EU was self-assured due to the successful accession of 10 new Member States and wanted to impose upon its neighbours its political vision by using strategies replicating enlargement. It is no longer the same story. Internally, the EU integration model is being rethought and is developing into multi-speed formats from which the 2004 members find themselves rather marginalised. No further accession commitments are likely to be undertaken by the Member States in the medium term beyond those already made to the West Balkans.
More...
In comparison with the other Visegrad countries, Poland’s gas security seems relatively high. This coastal state, unlike the Czech Republic or Slovakia, not only has quite significant domestic output (4.3 bcm in 2012), which accounted for some 29% of the country’s demand, but also has a proportionately low level of natural gas in its TPES (13%). Poland is also a major coal producer, and coal comprises a significant portion of the country’s primary energy supply, ahead of all other sources, including gas. Thus, this data could suggest that Poland—as an insignificant natural gas customer—is not necessarily vulnerable in terms of energy security. However, although the country was only mildly affected by the 2009 cuts of supplies from the east, its position in the gas market is far from being fully protected.
More...
Croatia significantly differs from many Visegrad countries in terms of its gas security. First of all, natural gas is not the most important component of Croatia’s energy mix, accounting for only 28% of the total energy supply, significantly less than oil and its derivatives (70%). Total consumption is only 3 bcm, two times less than Slovakia’s and around four times less than Poland’s or the Czech Republic’s. Second, the country has a relevant amount of domestic natural gas production. Currently, this ranges between 1.9–2.5 bcm annually, which meets around 70% of total demand. Gas is taken from 17 on-shore and nine offshore fields. Proven reserves are estimated at 23.6 bcm, though if production is kept at current level, this is sufficient for only about 10 years. Although this significantly reduces import dependency, there are serious doubts as to whether in the future this beneficial share of domestic sources can be maintained.
More...
The outcome of May’s French presidential elections reflected the will for change in France, in relation to both domestic and EU policies. Like numerous Member States, France is currently economically weak and requires extensive reform. Simultaneously, the European Union is experiencing a triple crisis in the economy, governance and political legitimacy. Low mobility and varying degrees of competitiveness between the countries that share the same currency sap the Union’s resources; inter-governmentalism, introduced as a replacement for the community method, has failed as a mode for solving the eurozone crisis; and European citizens increasingly view the EU with scepticism. In this context, François Hollande’s victory held out the promise of an improved political atmosphere for the discussion of EU policies and a novel means to deal with the eurozone’s long-standing financial crisis. By opening Franco-German cooperation to other Member States and broaching the debate on the EU’s “pro-growth agenda,” the French Socialist president is trying to reshape policies on both a national and European scale. François Hollande’s efforts to distance himself from his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, are particularly evident in his attitude towards the financial crisis and the future of the EU.
More...
France has continually supported a greater security role for the European Union, and the development of Common Security and Defence Policy is, for Paris, a natural progression for European integration and an essential element in the validity of Common Foreign and Security Policy. As the French took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union in July 2000 and again in 2008, CSDP remained the number one priority for them. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the European Union (EU) was supposed to benefit from a new, more active and effective Common Defence and Security Policy. The CDSP is designed to give the EU the means to cope with crisis resolution—by giving it operational tools (civilian and military ones) it is designed to make the Union’s foreign policy more credible. But the EU is not yet able to influence the course of events in the world around it. The EU’s failure in Libya has confirmed the permanent gap between Europe’s ambitions and its insufficient capacity. The refusal on the part of High Representative Catherine Ashton to accept the EU’s lead in commanding the naval embargo of Libya represented a severe setback for the EEAS when at the same time this proposal had been agreed by the UK, France and other EU members and enjoyed the support of the U.S. The EU remains a major civil power, able to carry out humanitarian operations and provide important economic support. But the EU has yet been unable to influence the course of events.
More...
The authors respect the view that the agreement has brought peace, but there is room for questioning its effects on the economy, development and prosperity. At the same time they respect the view that peace is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for development. And third, it is unquestionable that without peace there is no prosperity. Thus, the territorial organization is important, development is more important, but peace is the most important. This is the context in which the results of application of these mathematical models should be viewed. This paper compares the efficiency of the model of territorial organization in 1990, or in pre-Dayton period, and efficiency of the territorial organization in the post-Dayton period, measured by applying DEA mathematical model, or CCR and BCC models. The model was applied to the basic territorial units of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main contribution is in the application of models and reducing the subjective influence in conclusions about the territorial organization which is determined by the Peace Agreement in Dayton. The paper uses the results of previous studies of the author. Secondary sources were also used, taken from the statistical yearbooks of the Institute for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or rather the Institute for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Institute for Programming. This paper, along with abstract and key words, includes an introduction, a review of previous studies, methodology, results, conclusion and bibliography.
More...
We analyze causal effects of geopolitical risks and economic uncertainty indices on the green bond market, utilizing two causality tests, around the military conflict in Ukraine. Consistent with the existing literature, the results of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Breitung and Candelon (2006) in the static framework show no causal flows from geopolitical risks throughout the period, either before the war or during the war. Further, we find no evidence for both temporary and permanent causal impacts from the geopolitical risks on green bonds. However, we see that changes in economic policy uncertainty Granger-causes fluctuations in green bonds in both full and during the invasion of Ukraine. The results also reveal that the causality is temporary and permanent over the full period; temporary before the war; but turns out to be permanent and stronger during the war, indicating that uncertainty index can exert causal impacts on green bond indices regardless of market conditions and strengthens its power across extreme market conditions. Further, we resort to a time-varying approach of Breitung and Candelon (2006) causality test based on a rolling window of 50 and 60 daily observations. We find that the causal flows from both indicators appear significant and those causation impacts are not constant but time-varying. Economic policy uncertainty is stronger than geopolitics risks in forecasting the movements in green bonds given a higher rejection of the null hypothesis for the former variable. The causality is mostly permanent rather than temporary and the causation impacts from both variables are stronger during the war.
More...
Crossing the shatterbelts of Eurasia and the commercial sea-lanes of the Indo-Pacific, the Belt and Road Initiative has put the distinctively geopolitical outlook of China’s strategy into the spotlight. Beijing articulates this strategy through the deployment of multidimensional diplomacy, Leninist ‘propaganda work’ and ‘united front work’, economic statecraft, and deterrence signalling. By framing the deployment of this vast array of tools as a strand of ‘geopolitical strategic communications’, this chapter examines the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Beijing’s attempt to shape the perceptions and choices of foreign countries’ decision-makers and public opinions. The chapter explores how the pandemic has both expanded and created avenues for influence, with a focus on the Global South. At the same time, it examines how Beijing’s concern for regime security and diverging national strategies in containing the pandemic have emboldened China’s geopolitical strategic communications vis-à-vis other regional and global powers.
More...
Identically to former years, some representatives of the Czech foreign policy continued with the proactive support of the Western Balkans Euro-Atlantic integration in 2015 as the main long-lasting priority of the Balkan dimension within the Czech foreign policy. Identically to former years, the Czech foreign policy was polarized and politicised in regard to the independence of Kosovo. The normalisation process be-tween Serbia and Kosovo, commenced by the agreement from April 2013, was not reflected in the Czech foreign policy but it was considered by the Czech media. In 2015, the trend of geopolitical competing continued between the EU and Russia; it started in 2014 and functioned as a catalyst for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans and the counterbalance to the tiredness from the integration in the old EU member states. The general procedure during the integration of the Western Balkans was accompanied by the further development of direct economic and social relationships with all South East European countries, and the economic dimension in 2015 was less affected by former unsuccessful investment expansion of Czech power generating companies in this area. Like in the previous year, the Greek debts played quite a significant and special role in the Czech foreign policy in 2015; it was strongly discussed in the public debate on European and macroeconomic topics but the communication on the official side of the Czech foreign policy was minimal. The new subject of reaction in 2015 from the Czech foreign policy representatives, the public, and media was the wave of migrants passing through the Western-Balkan migration path. In regard to the structure, this chapter focuses on the current solutions and political context of the Czech foreign policy in regard to the Balkan Peninsula. Subsequently, the attention is focused on the agenda and the events in 2015, namely the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, the economic and social relations with Southeast Europe, the refugee wave and the migration. Prior to the conclusion, the analysis of the media context of the Czech foreign policy has been introduced with respect to individual Balkan countries.
More...
For the last four decades security in Europe has been burdened by armed violence accompanying the disintegration of a number of states in the Eastern Mediterranean, Western Balkans and the territory of the former Soviet Union. They have resulted in the creation of many new internationally recognised states, unrecognised state-like entities and unresolved ‘frozen’ conflicts. A probable newcomer to the last type appeared in spring 2014 – the Ukrainian-Russian conflict over Crimea. Most of the international community does not recognise its annexation by Russia and considers that Crimea still belongs to Ukraine. The annexation and related attempted secessions and armed hostilities in Eastern Ukraine have worsened the West’s relations with Russia and the general political climate in the EuroAtlantic area. The political and legal stand-off between Ukraine and Russia has created an additional ‘frozen’ conflict in Europe.
More...