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REDEFINING EURO-ATLANTIC VALUES: RUSSIA`S MANIPULATIVE TECHNIQUE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili / Language(s): English

Since November 2013, when the uprising of the Ukrainian nation set in motion a wide spectrum of events and political process, researchers and policy makers have been questioning the reasoning, consequences, and international implications of those political processes, as well as their impact on the future of the international political environment. This study, Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia`s Manipulative Techniques, is not one of the many investigations published in recent months focusing on Russian information warfare in Ukraine. It is not a study about them. This is a study about us, namely, the ‘transatlantic community’—a community we consider to be based on democratic values. This study seeks to answer an essential question: how can it be that countries, which enjoy leading positions in terms of prosperity, freedom, solidarity, innovation, economic competitiveness, and seemingly unlimited normative power based on the long-standing democratic traditions have neglected or ignored (intentionally and unintentionally) the manipulative redefinition of their core democratic values. By allowing our core democratic values to be deconstructed and reconstituted by values derived from an authoritarian regime makes Western society vulnerable to influence. Russia’s international ambitions are not based on conquering new territories, but on creating mental landscapes susceptible to political manipulation. Russia’s foreign policy goals with regard to the West are clear: ‘to weaken the West economically, to split it politically, and to establish Russia as the hegemonic power on the European continent’1 . Extensive material resources are unnecessary; individuals and societies that question themselves are decisive ‘weapons’ in the battle for influence. Transitioning out of the international relationships that dominated during the Cold War was an eye- and mind-opening exercise for both governments and societies. Most of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, including the Baltic States, joined those that are based on democratic values; however some keep their old values, fashionably redressed in a style called ‘sovereign democracy’.

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THE KREMLIN AND DAESH INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Author(s): Antti Sillanpää / Language(s): English

The paper summarizes discussions held on 24 May 2016 in Riga, Latvia, which focused on exploring the Kremlin and DAESH information activities in order to improve our understanding of the nature of these communications and their effect on Western societies. The questions discussed were: How are the communications and messages of DAESH and the Kremlin constructed and disseminated? Are their methods changing? Why do such messages appeal to youth, even if they are familiar with Western values and consumerism? What are the weakest aspects of our information environment and what can we do to improve? Six items emerged from the discussion as most relevant to the investigation of these issues. 1) Identity and Values Identity and values are in constant flux across time and space. It is easier to attack the values and identity of the other, rather than offering something different and better than the opponent. However, the West should be clear that it cannot simply assume the moral high ground. One of the weakness of the West is that we have allowed some members of society to become isolated and/or marginalised; they are now the ones who are more open and susceptible to the messaging of DAESH and the Kremlin, especially messages that project a sense of pride and/or a feeling of inclusiveness because they appear to offer the opportunity to participate meaningfully in some sort of utopian society. 2) Strategic Communications and the National Narrative There is a distinct need to create and maintain a positive national narrative in which words and deeds align, and to communicate that effectively. A narrative should not be static, but responsive to the environment in which it is based. One idea that came up in discussion was to task a specific governmental entity with coordinating messages concerning the national narrative and the strategic communication approach. This entity should be situated close to the Presidential Administration or the Prime Minister’s Office and have clear operating procedures, goals, and resources that address the identified risks and threats. The highest political backing would ensure sufficient clout to function adequately and carry out the mission. This body should oversee national narrative and strategic communication efforts, and act as an advisory and educational hub for other parts of government. A whole government approach, spanning both civil and military spheres, is required. The increase in the number of stakeholders reduces chances to create and manage coherent but relevant international narratives 3) Messaging and Counter-Messaging There is a continuing discussion as to whether the West should concentrate on counter-messaging or should focus on messaging instead. An argument for engaging in counter-messaging is that lies and harmful messages should not go unchallenged, otherwise falsehoods and partial truths may become accepted as facts and be assimilated into a society’s ‘knowledge base’. An argument against engaging in countermessaging is that this practice is likely to ensure that the West remains in a defensive and reactive posture in the current information confrontation, and adversaries’ harmful messages get unintentionally repeated. However, by actively messaging there is a chance to dictate the informational agenda, thereby forcing the opponent into a reactive position. Irrespective of the focus on messaging or countermessaging, information activities should not be done in isolation, but as an integrated part of a political or policy programme. 4) Perception and Legitimacy Emotional resonance holds greater sway than logical argument as a political or social relationship is formed between an audience and a communicator. Some individuals and groups are more susceptible to messaging than others, often as the result of an unfulfilled need. The motivation to join and/or support DAESH is largely based upon the perception that what is being offered is legitimate and will fulfil some psychological or physical need of the individual recruit. The messenger that communicates a believable response to such needs may well be able to influence that particular individual or group. However, when an individual personally experiences the dissonance between the projected utopia and reality, their trust in the utopian vision soon disappears, and along with it any sense of motivation or commitment to the cause. 5) Measuring Activity and Effect Both DAESH and Russia have adopted Western technologies and understood the audience appetite for infotainment and quick satisfaction. DAESH and the Kremlin employ the tactic of shifting focus and attention away from areas where they are losing or vulnerable. They have the ability to affect our news agenda and our focus through big event news. Even if the Kremlin or DAESH are engaged in harmful or disruptive communication, the activity does not necessarily translate into influence that would weaken the national security of the target state. The measure of an activity, i.e. communicating, does not automatically neatly translate into the measure of its effect, i.e. influence and change of behaviour. There are many variables that can either obstruct or facilitate the level of influence and persuasion that actually takes place when an actor communicates. These differences put pressure on us to achieve a better understanding of human behaviour and develop more meaningful ways of measuring. Observing, let alone measuring, the effectiveness of ‘hybrid warfare’ is particularly challenging. 6) Analytical Tools and Frameworks In addition to traditional historical area studies and social science perspectives, there are a variety of promising frameworks that can be used to investigate the information activities of DAESH and the Kremlin. The potentially fruitful approaches discussed included political and obstruction marketing and psychology.

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ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE

Author(s): Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili,Jānis Bērziņš,Aivar Jaeski,Mark Laity,Nerijus Maliukevičius,Aurimas Navys,Gerry Osborne,Robert Pszczel,Stephen Tatham / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy. Over the years, Russia has been drawing lessons from different Allied operations and has worked on adapting its military planning to the realities of a modern conflict. It tested these lessons in the recent August 2008 war with Georgia which marked the first use of cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation. Russia has also shown a willingness to modernize Soviet-era tools and adapt them to today’s complex information environment. Critically, it has been willing to afford informationbased activities primacy in operations, using more conventional military forces in a supporting role. Russia’s information campaign has to be analysed in the context of the strategic narrative of the Russian government, reflected in policy documents like the Foreign Policy Review of 2007 and the State Security Review of 2009, and supported by legislative initiatives like the Federal Law on the Russian Federation’s State Policy on Compatriots Living Abroad. The notion of compatriots deserves particular attention as it allows Russia to legitimize the state’s duty to defend its compatriots abroad from any kind of threat to their rights or physical well-being. It also leads to the explanation of the need to sustain the so-called Russian World which implies maintenance of a unified Russian-language information sphere beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (mainly targeting the territory of the former USSR). The Russian government’s long-developed control over the mass media has been an important factor in the effective implementation of the information campaign against Ukraine. Russia’s narrative was instrumentalized with the help of concurrent messaging. For example, the main Russian TV channels were actively involved in framing opinions about the situation in Ukraine from the very beginning of the crisis. Control is exerted directly by the Presidential Administration, including also government-controlled internet ‘trolling’ which is a growing, under-researched phenomenon used to support the Russian government’s narrative. This control over the media has made it difficult for democratic states with free media to compete with the forceful, synchronized messaging of the Russian government. The Russian narrative includes several dominant themes: positioning Russian Slavic Orthodox Civilization in opposition to “decadent” Europe; positioning Ukraine as integral to Eurasianism and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union; promoting the Russian World which unites Eastern Slavs, implies that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and recognizes the natural supremacy of Russia; portraying Ukrainians as a pseudo-nation who are unable to administer their own country and sustain their statehood; referring to the Great Patriotic War thus bringing out the hatred of Nazism and relating it to the Euromaidan protesters who are labelled as nationalists, Nazis and fascists posing a threat to the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine’s population; dividing the West by utilising the differing interests of EU member states and positioning the USA in opposition to the EU; and using legal and historic justifications to legitimize Russia’s actions in Ukraine (including the Crimea Referendum). The report identifies that Russia’s information campaign was central to Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The information campaign and related military action by Russia corresponds to the characteristics of a new form of warfare where the lines between peace and war, foreign military force and local self-defence groups are blurred and the main battle space has moved from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the populations in question. Crimea may be considered a test-case for Russia in trying out this new form of warfare where hybrid, asymmetric warfare, combining an intensive information campaign, cyber warfare and the use of highly trained Special Operation Forces, play a key role. The crisis in Ukraine has provided valuable lessons for the Ukrainian government, the countries neighbouring Russia (whose Russian-speaking communities were enlarged as a result of Soviet-era policy), and NATO and the EU as organisations. The following are the general conclusions of the report: • Russia was prepared to conduct a new form of warfare in Ukraine where an information campaign played a central role. The characteristics of the new form of warfare which were implemented in Crimea were outlined by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, nearly a year before the crisis in Ukraine. Analysis of the Ukraine conflict suggests that NATO and the EU must adapt to the new reality where information superiority, as opposed to military power, is becoming increasingly important. • Russia’s narrative is largely based on historical memory. Russia’s thorough understanding of its own audiences – including compatriots abroad – was able to leverage historical memory: the Great Russian Empire, World War II and Nazi atrocities, and the might and collapse of the USSR. • Crisis in Ukraine is a result of Russia’s long term strategy. Learning from the Russian information campaign in Ukraine, it is clear that early detection and analysis of those elements within the Russian narrative signalling potential aggressive behaviour is critical. The report also demonstrates that Russia’s state policy documents contain such indications. • The role of Compatriots Abroad is critical and should be considered carefully in the future. The security implications for countries neighbouring Russia are particularly serious. The kind of strategy that Russia has employed in Ukraine is likely to work best in areas where there are larger communities of Russia’s Compatriots Abroad. They are the targets of Russia’s information campaign and potentially may be ready to provide local support in cases of Russian aggression. The Ukraine and Georgian cases demonstrate that such information campaigns, backed by military means, are easier to carry out in territories bordering Russia – in particular, in those countries which are not members of NATO and therefore not party to the Washington Treaty. • Audience Analysis is critical to operational success. Russia has demonstrated that understanding audiences and what motivates them is critical to operational success that is enduring. • There is “another side of the coin” to Russia’s information campaign. Although Russia’s information campaign has been successful in influencing its audiences (the Russian population and compatriots abroad), it also bears a degree of counter-productivity as it has radicalized and alienated other audiences – West Ukraine and Kyiv, the populations of NATO and EU countries and the USA. • Deception is used by Russia as a tactic to distract and delay. Investigating and disproving the false information, different versions of events and even conspiracy theories rapidly disseminated by Russia requires a lot of time, effort and resources on the part of international organisations like NATO, the Ukrainian government, independent media, experts and even ordinary citizens. • Disinformation campaigns erode over time. The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine beyond Crimea demonstrates that disinformation campaigns erode over time as more and more factual evidence is revealed to negate lies and falsification.

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NETWORK OF TERROR: HOW DAESH USES ADAPTIVE SOCIAL NETWORKS TO SPREAD ITS MESSAGE

Author(s): Joseph Shaheen / Language(s): English

We conducted research aimed at understanding the process by which DAESH disseminates propaganda online. Our focus was not the content that is distributed but the method by which it is distributed. We did so using a number of qualitative, statistical, and numerical analysis techniques in hopes of gaining a deeper insight into their operations and making recommendations for NATO and NATO member states on how to combat them effectively. We discovered a number of important findings the most salient of which is on how individual level decisions made by many of their members have contributed to the survival of their propaganda capabilities, and in some instances an advanced ability to thwart efforts to eliminate their message and their outreach to both locals as well as westerners. We can summarize our findings as follows: • Popular social media platforms such as, and especially, Twitter forms the core of DAESH’s propaganda and information dissemination efforts. They use these mediums as the core of a web of content that is spread in many parts of the ungoverned internet. • DAESH (perhaps unknowingly) uses and an adaptive network structure on Twitter to combat outside influences and to react to external operations seeking to curb their operations. This network adapts at high speed and with limited central organization. • DAESH makes innovative use of platform vulnerabilities that allows them to evade detection, suspension and deletion by state and non-state actors through both automated and manual methods of detection. • DAESH has amassed a strong following supported by an internal dedicated human infrastructure allowing them to affect a substantial impact on the information environment. • Through the use of a core-periphery network structure and a high number of networkcentral actors DAESH created a redundancy factor that can withstand repeated efforts to disrupt their information supply chain. • Through the use of account inflation, signaling, and closure methods, DAESH has been able to successfully create friend/ follow networks that feed into their ability to build sustainable adaptive networks, evade detection, and maintain their level of online activity. • DAESH has built a network structure that utilizes the flexibility of small communal networks and allows for the large scale interactions commonly associated with large diverse-use networks. This adds to the challenge of combating them in the traditional information warfare environment. • We create an explanatory process to simplify the reader’s understanding of the group’s usage of social media. We call it the DEER process. The DEER process begins with dissemination and ends with replenishment. We recommend this model as a way to build more effective strategies in combating the group. Our findings lead us to a more detailed understanding of the DAESH propaganda machine which has gained them notoriety throughout the world and especially on traditional media platforms; and though our conclusions are technical in nature, they have far reaching policy implications. To begin, these conclusions illustrate the ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of a distributed response to DAESH propaganda. DAESH uses limited centralization from a network perspective in order to evade detection while maintaining some control over method and content of their messages—a hybrid model—where flexibility and potency are both achievable. This means that substantial resources must be dedicated in order to combat their ideology effectively. These resources (human and otherwise) are, at the moment, non-aligned, ineffective, and unsustainable over the long term. This is not because the resources and methods used are by nature ineffective, but because the adversary is using strategies and tactics which have never been encountered on this scale ever before. For example, in this report we show that the targeting of highly visible active accounts on Twitter for deletion or suspension, though can eliminate short terms gains by the group, also provides them with the time and knowledge to build more adaptive, responsive networks. While, if account targeting is based on a community/clustering method, we can increase the transaction costs of our adversary’s recovery substantially—gaining invaluable time pinned on lower levels of propaganda diffusion— and simultaneously building more strategic operational tactics. We propose and recommend that in addition to the adjustments of technical methods used in the targeting of DAESH network infrastructure, that more emphasis should be placed on disrupting the supply chain of propaganda, rather on providing contrasting messages. This implies that permanent investments not only in new technology, but in human resources should be made, and coordinated labor division among NATO members as well as allies in the region should be instituted. Our discoveries rely on a number of assumptions to produce our recommendations—the most important of which—is that this information battle is based on concepts of adaptive networks and complex systems. This is a direct result of DAESH’s approach of relating loose policies to its members and allowing them to make individual level behavioral decisions on how best to conduct an information war. In turn, this means that traditional methods as have been adopted by various agencies, state, and non-state actors alike simply will and do not suffice, as has been evident from the group’s continual ability to conduct a propaganda war while facing insurmountable opposition, both physical and electronic. We also recommend that more effort must be made to remove the value proposition which DAESH uses to attract recruits to begin with. Though, our research did not engage the socioeconomic and geo-political environment under which potential recruits are subjected, we hypothesize that innovative efforts in this space can produce substantial declines in DAESH’s ability to disseminate propaganda and ultimately to recruit westerners to their cause. Finally, we make recommendations for future and ongoing research, some of which is much needed to understand and produce effective strategies to combat the group.

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ROBOTROLLING 2018/1

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Generational change in malicious activity on social media seems to be at hand. Primitive bots indiscriminately promoting links to news sites are on the decline. They are being replaced by coordinated accounts that target conversations centred upon individual media outlets or members of different elites. In recent months on Twitter, the volume of automated content about NATO activity in the Baltics and Poland has declined at an increasingly rapid pace. The number of bottweets dropped by 15 percentage points for Russian and 20 percentage points for English. We infer that this reduction is best explained by changes introduced by the platform. Our findings are verified by drawing on thirty times more data than for previous Robotrolling issues. For the first time we include messages from VKontakte as a control. We see a marked rise in organised trolling activity conducted by humans using fake accounts compared to early 2017. As of January 2018, 50% of all Russian-language messages are directed at other Twitter users. As social media companies intervene to clean up automation, they should take care that changes they introduce may enable new forms of manipulation. Russian language bot activity is in decline in absolute terms, but Twitter in Russian remains more polluted than Twitter in English.

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DAESH INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS INFLUENCE

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The terrorist organization, Daesh, also known as so-called Islamic State/IS/ISIS/ISIL, has launched an extremely sophisticated information campaign at various target audiences in order to gain support for its expansion in the Middle East. Daesh’s first strategic achievement, drawing considerable attention from various governments and mainstream Muslim groups, was the first public speech given by self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It was devoted entirely to the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate. In order to find out how this campaign is managed, and to propose practical solutions to existing challenges concerning situation on the Middle East, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) conducted research into Daesh’s information strategy. The methodology for analysing Daesh’s information strategy included a number of techniques such as social psychology, the psychology of communication, and social media analysis. The work was done in consultation with social media experts and advisors from NATO member states in order to achieve the best result. This executive summary summarizes three reports - “Type of applied persuasive strategy and its influence on message effectiveness” (Ph. D. T. Grzyb), „Visual framing in the Islamic State” (Ph. D. Shahira Fahmy) and “Network of Terror: How Daesh Uses Adaptive Social Networks to Spread its Message” (Mr. Joseph Shaheen).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST UKRAINE - EXAMINING NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE FROM A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PERSPECTIVES

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The report analyses Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, covering the period from the 3rd Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) until the annexation of Crimea (16 March 2014). It refers also to some more recent, important examples of the information campaign relating to events such as the MH17 air tragedy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. HAMAS’ USE OF HUMAN SHIELDS IN GAZA

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Hamas, an Islamist militant group and the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip, has been using human shields in conflicts with Israel since 2007. According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the war crime of using human shields encompasses “utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas, or military forces immune from military operations.” Hamas has launched rockets, positioned military-related infrastructure-hubs and routes, and engaged the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from, or in proximity to, residential and commercial areas. The strategic logic of human shields has two components. It is based on an awareness of Israel’s desire to minimise collateral damage, and of Western public opinion’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties. If the IDF uses lethal force and causes an increase in civilian casualties, Hamas can utilise that as a lawfare tool: it can accuse Israel of committing war crimes, which could result in the imposition of a wide array of sanctions. Alternatively, if the IDF limits its use of military force in Gaza to avoid collateral damage, Hamas will be less susceptible to Israeli attacks, and thereby able to protect its assets while continuing to fight. Moreover, despite the Israeli public’s high level of support for the Israeli political and military leadership during operations, civilian casualties are one of the friction points between Israeli left-wing and right-wing supporters, with the former questioning the outcomes of the operation.

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Nismo razumeli

Author(s): Vladimir Gligorov / Language(s): Serbian

Gospodin Dačić kaže da se sa istorijske razdaljine vidi da Milošević nije razumeo promene koje je doneo pad Berlinskog zida. Gospodin Vučić, tačnije, kaže da „mi nismo razumeli“, mada se čini da je to malo previše inkluzivno. Ne mali broj nas je razumeo i čak se angažovao, ali nas nije bilo dovoljno, a i nerazumevanje se isplatilo. To sve nije nevažno, ali je svejedno demagogija. Iz tri razloga.

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An International Handbook of Good Practices for Building Resilience against Violent Religious Radicalisation

Author(s): Rositsa Dzhekova,Lilia Yakova / Language(s): English

This handbook was created within the framework of the GREASE consortium which focuses on examining the relationship between radicalisation, secularism and the governance of religion. The main objective of the handbook is to outline good practices on resilience-building against violent religious radicalisation. It accomplishes this goal by combining practices from twelve in-depth case studies on violent religious radicalisation in countries in “the West” (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, the UK), the MENA region (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia), South and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia) and countries with history of ethno-nationalist separatist struggles (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia). Based on shared practices, themes and commonalities across this range of country cases, the handbook outlines a common set of good practices. It illustrates these good practices though real examples from the country studies while it recognises that there is “no panacea to violent religiously-inspired radicalisation.” Although the handbook does not make claims that the good practices it identifies are the solution to violent religious radicalisation, such practices can provide valuable practical guidance and orientation to relevant stakeholders in designing resilience efforts. CSD contributed to the content of the handbook through results from the case study it conducted on good practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Der „Andere“ als Störenfried: Siedlungshistorische Anciennitätsdiskurse um Kosovo

Author(s): Konrad Clewing / Language(s): German Publication Year: 0

Kosovo ist je nach politischer und völkerrechtlicher Perspektive eine kleine Region oder (nach zunehmender internationaler Meinung und auch nach deutschem Rechtsstand-punkt) ein kleines Land im europäischen Südosten. Um seine knapp bemessene Fläche von weniger als 11.000 Quadratkilometern konkurrieren aber bis heute nicht bloß die Regierungen in Prishtina und in Belgrad. Auch die kosovoalbanische und die serbische Öffentlichkeit tun dies seit langem und in ihrem dominanten Mainstream unter völlig verschiedenen Prämissen.

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Blízký východ, Středomoří a Afghánistán v české zahraniční politice

Author(s): Jaroslav Bureš / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

Česká zahraniční politika ve vztahu k Blízkému východu a Středomoří byla nucena v roce českého předsednictví mnohem více přihlížet k potřebám společné zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky EU i k zájmům zvláště jihoevropských členských států. Reaktivní, spíše pasivní přístup minulých let byl nahrazen aktivnějším zájmem o region a hledáním konsenzuálního, celoevropského postoje ke klíčovým otázkám. To se poměrně dařilo s výjimkou rozporů kolem hodnocení a řešení krize v Gaze. Optika vládou vnímaných bezpečnostních rizik, spojených přímo či nepřímo s regionem, vycházela z Vojenské strategie ČR schválené v roce 2008, ale způsob, jak reagovat na potenciální hrozby, doznal změny, což bylo dáno několika faktory. S nástupem Obamovy administrativy došlo ke sblížení americko-evropských postojů a k ústupu USA od silové diplomacie.

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Bezpečnostní rozměr české zahraniční politiky

Author(s): Ondřej Ditrych,Jan Eichler / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

Uplynulý rok se v oblasti bezpečnostního a obranného rozměru české zahraniční politiky nesl zejména v duchu adaptace na pociťovanou proměnu bezpečnostního prostředí v souvislosti s ukrajinskou krizí a nově i výrazně sekuritizovanou problematikou utečenectví a nekontrolovaného tranzitu občanů cizích států přes území ČR. Na jedné straně tak mohl pokračovat trend k spíše pasivně konstruktivní tvorbě a realizaci české zahraniční politiky ve vztahu k jejímu okolí. Na straně druhé, normalizace, tedy široké přijetí představy o výjimečnosti současné bezpečnostní situace a nutnosti přijímat adekvátní, výjimečná opatření, přinesla nová rizika.

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Rusko v české zahraniční politice

Author(s): Lukáš Tichý,Nikita Odintsov / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

Česká zahraniční politika ve vztahu k Ruské federaci (RF) byla v roce 2015, stejně jako o rok předtím v roce 2014, nadále ovlivněna napjatou geopolitickou situací mezi Ruskou federací a západními státy a nevyřešeným konfliktem na Ukrajině. Po eskalaci bojů na počátku roku 2015 došlo 12. února v Minsku k uzavření nových dohod, které měly doplnit minský protokol ze září roku 2014. Tyto dohody představovaly plán, jenž měl ke konci roku 2015 vést k vyřešení ozbrojeného konfliktu na východě země. Nicméně ke konci roku 2015 byl pokrok minimální. Sankce uvalené na Rusko, jejichž osud je pevně spojen s plněním dohod, byly tak prodlouženy, což ovšem v České republice nevyvolávalo takové debaty, jak tomu bylo v předcházejícím roce.

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Multilaterální rozměr české zahraniční politiky

Author(s): Jan Blažek / Language(s): Czech Publication Year: 0

V roce 2015 došlo poprvé od roku 2011 ke změně rozhodujícího hodnotového a strategického rámce multilaterální spolupráce, resp. celé české zahraniční politiky. Dne 13. července byla totiž schválena nová Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky. Ta navazuje na koncepci z roku 2011, stejně jako na programové prohlášení vlády, a snaží se reflektovat i změny ve světovém politickém řádu. Tato koncepce vymezila tři rozhodující globální cíle, které budou opět tvořit základní kostru obsahu této kapitoly: a) Bezpečnost; b) Lidská důstojnost a lidská práva a c) Prosperita a udržitelný rozvoj.

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Russia in Czech foreign policy

Author(s): Nikita Odintsov,Lukáš Tichý / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

In 2015, the Czech foreign policy in its relation to the Russian Federation (RF), as in the previous year 2014, was still influenced by the tense geopolitical situation be-tween the Russian Federation and the western countries and the unresolved conflict in Ukraine. After the escalation of fights at the beginning of 2015, new agreements were signed in Minsk on 12th February, which were intended to supplement the Minsk Protocol from September 2014. These agreements represent the plan that, at the end of 2015, had to lead to the solution of the armed conflict in the eastern part of the country. However, the progress at the end of 2015 was only minimal. The sanctions imposed on Russia, the fate of which is tightly linked to the fulfillment of the agreements, were prolonged, but this did not cause such a debate in the Czech Republic as in the previous year.

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The Middle East, the Mediterranean and Afghanistan in Czech foreign policy

Author(s): Bronislav Bechyňský,Michaela Ježová,Marek Čejka / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

In 2015, the general principles of the Czech Republic foreign policy concerning the Middle East remained identical to the former years in the main points. According to the new Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, adopted in June 2015, the Czech Republic continued focusing on strengthening the bilateral economic relations with the countries in the region, particularly Israel, the Gulf countries, and North Africa with the aim to ensure stable security in the area. The bilateral priority remains the strategic partnership with Israel; however, the newly adopted concept binds the Czech Republic to strengthen the cooperation with the Palestinian administration and the preparation of the Palestinian representation to accept statehood. The new concept also highlights the necessity to standardise the relationships with Iran. Unlike those of the former years, the new concept reflects the aim of the left-wing government to support new bilateral partnerships in the region without priority focus on the interests of Israel.

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THE POST-YUGOSLAV BALKANS IN THE IDEOLOGICAL WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO

Author(s): Darina Grigorova / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

The paper is focused on the ideological frame of Russian Post-Soviet Foreign Policy in the Balkans. Is there any Russian soft power? In a short introduction, the main ideological and geopolitical tendencies in the presentday Balkans are outlined. In the first part of the paper, we describe the geopolitical reality of the Balkans today and Russian positions in it. In the second and the third part of the paper, we analyze the content and the transformation of the Russian idea/concept ‘Russkiy mir’ and geopolitical, ideological and spiritual consequences of that transformation. The fourth part of the paper describes the current state of relations between NATO and Serbia 20 years after the bombing of the FR Yugoslavia in the context of the geopolitical competition of old and new factors in world politics. The conclusion highlights the main geopolitical and spiritual challenges of some Balkan Orthodox peoples and the possible role of Russia in the Balkans.

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European Neutrals in the Cold War

Author(s): Thomas Fischer / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

I have been asked to present at this opening panel some historical background information on the European neutrals in the Cold War. As we will talk more specifically about the experiences of individual neutral states tomorrow, I will mainly focus here tonight on the ideological and systemic conflict between the superpowers and on what this meant for the practice of neutrality during the period from 1945 to 1989.

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Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement

Author(s): Dragan Bogetić / Language(s): English Publication Year: 0

I will make an attempt to briefly present the key determinants and content guidelines of the Yugoslavian non-aligned policy, but also to indirectly indicate the contact points and differences between this policy and the concept of neutrality itself. After a period of uncritical glorification, followed also by euphoric satanization of the non-aligned concept, finally the time has come, based on relevant archive material, to provide real answers, at least to some elementary questions in this field. Some of them are: if this policy was in fact desired or forced; how difficult was it to prompt sometimes unwilling partners who were not belonging to neither of political-military blocks to cooperate, and finally, why Yugoslavia distanced itself from Europe and connected to far away and unknown civilizations.

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