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The overview of Russia’s grand strategy in relation to the NB8 region (Chapter 1) identified the ‘compatriot policy’ as one tool for achieving its political and military goals in the international arena. Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, claimed responsibility for compatriots of the former Soviet Union (not only ethnic Russians), many of whom became citizens (or non-citizens)64 of countries that regained their independence or were established as sovereign states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These specific historical circumstances created a situation in which a large number of people that Russia considers compatriots reside outside its territorial borders. From the Kremlin’s perspective this gives it the moral and legal grounds to intervene in the internal matters of other sovereign states when justified by the need to protect and defend the rights of Russia’s (ex-Soviet) compatriots. Among the reasons given to justify the five day war with Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 was the need to protect compatriots, thus setting a precedent for Russia’s violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbouring states on the principle of defending compatriots. This chapter provides some insight into how Russia is using its compatriot policy as a tool of influence in the NB8 region, with an outline of the Russian perspective regarding the protection of compatriots. We assess the possibility of using the compatriot policy as a justification for sovereignty violations in the NB8 region, as was done in Georgia and the Crimea. We used a comparative over- view of the compatriots’ main activities in 2016 to answer the research questions. The main conclusion is that due to their ethnic structure, the Baltic States, and Estonia and Latvia in particular, are most vulnerable to the application of narrative of a violation of compatriots’ rights. However, the mere existence of the narrative is not itself an indication of hostile action, because the protection of compatriots’ rights is a means rather than an end. Another conclusion is that Russia consolidates compatriots’ activities in different countries and uses this as a concerted channel for the global promotion of Russia’s worldview. In other words, over time Russia’s compatriot policy has exceeded the ‘Near Abroad’ (a specific term used in Russia’s political language to signify countries that once formed the Soviet Union, where Russia claims to have special interests). For the NB8 region, this means that some of the issues salient in the Baltic States for over two decades have gradually spread to other countries as well.
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The project ‘Russia’s (Dis)Information Activities Against the Nordic-Baltic Region’ was initiated in 2016 as a reaction to the intensification of Russia’s influence activities against the West on the backdrop of the information campaign against Ukraine and the conflict in the southeast Ukraine. Previous studies conducted by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) led to conclusion that Russia is employing a multi-level and multi-direction system of influence to advance its political and military goals. However these studies did not provide in-depth answers about the origins of the various information flows, their actual goals, and their ultimate effect on the social and political processes in Western countries. As pointed out by prominent British journalist Edward Lucas: ‘Even in the narrow question of the effectiveness of Russia’s overtly published propaganda, we have limited information about who consumes it, in what quantity, when, where and why. So before getting too excited about the lies and hatred spewed out by, say, Sputnik or RT, we need to know where it is landing. The answers may vary sharply by country, and across the demographic and social spectrums. But finding them requires quantitative and qualitative research.
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Since the Ukrainian conflict in 2014 and Russia’s interference in the Brexit referendum in 2016 and elections in the United States, France, and Germany in 2017, the Western public has begun to accept the possibility that the Russian Federation is actively and aggressively interfering with sovereign countries via the information environment. One of the aims of the project ‘Russia’s (Dis)Information Activities Against the Nordic-Baltic Region’ was to collect systematic information about the main narratives, themes, and messages that Russia employs regarding Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden.
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The study of Russian narratives regarding the NB8 countries identified the most common ‘outgoing’ narratives used in 2016. However, mere content analysis is not a sufficient metric to assess Russia’s influence in the information environment, because media is just an instrument for reaching the ultimate target—the cognitive dimension of the communities that reside in the NB8 countries. Therefore the final ingredient in this study of Russia’s activities in the information environment of the NB8 region for the period 2016–2017 was a comparative public opinion survey that aimed to discover to what extent the narratives promoted by Russia correspond with the views of the societies in the region. It should be emphasized that measuring Russia’s influence in information environment is a complicated task. Four issues limit the possibility of arriving at comprehensive and unambiguous answers by means of a limited quantitative survey: 1) there are no strict divisions between the narratives promoted by Russia and the views of opinion leaders and societies outside Russia—they may coincide without any specific connection to Russia; 2) without qualitative research methods it is impossible to know how the respondents understand such concepts as ‘neo-Nazism’, ‘threat’, ‘destabilization’, etc., and if their understanding differs from the interpretation assumed in the Russian narratives; 3) without additional research it is also impossible to draw any conclusions about the factors influencing of the opinions of respondents, therefore coincidence in views can not necessarily be interpreted as due to Russia’s influence or, indeed, as the absence of it; 4) additional research is necessary to determine how Russia seeks to match its narratives to the attitudes present in the NB8 societies to advance its strategic goals, and, indeed, if this is possible. Nevertheless, an initial attempt was made to measure the spread of the narratives promoted by Russia in the NB8 region in terms of public agreement or disagreement with the ideas that are in line with the content produced by Russian state-funded media and Russia’s strategic goals. Although the survey data should primarily be taken as a basis for further research, the results provide a valuable comparative perspective on public opinion in the NB8 region and the extent of the use of the three Russian state funded media outlets surveyed. The data obtained in this pilot study supports a more sceptical view regarding Russia’s informational influence on Western societies as expressed by prominent Russian expert M. Galeotti: ‘Too much is often made of the alleged influence of the English-language Sputnik news agency and RT television channel, or even of the online trolling and disinformation campaign. Evidence that they actually changed minds—rather than just pandered to existing prejudices—is still lacking.
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Moldova is facing a profound crisis. Although media institutions have, to some extent, been fulfilling their watchdog role, the country is vulnerable and freedom of the press is uncertain at best. The most influential media outlets, especially the television stations, are politically affiliated and often the personal property of politicians and influential businessmen. These media institutions exert significant influence on the public agenda, often determining which subjects are put forward according to their private interests, with no connection to the real needs of Moldovan citizens and society. The representation of issues that concern the public interest has narrowed considerably, while the representation of private, political, and/or economic interests takes centre stage. This makes it possible for politically, ideologically, or economically powerhungry stakeholders to manipulate public opinion. However, the media are not the only actors revealing social problems. The adversaries of democratic development are also ready to exploit existing vulnerabilities. This chapter focuses on the issues of corruption, weak state structures, national politics, and the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia. Poverty and a lack of security also largely stem from these issues.
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This chapter describes four Kremlin narratives that are hostile to Moldovan sovereignty, namely ’Russkii Mir and Soviet Nostalgia’, ‘Federalization Will Ensure Equality’, ‘The European Union is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union is What You Need’, and ‘Romania and NATO are a Threat to Peace’. These narratives overlap and are often contradictory and contain lies. Still, they share some basic principles—they leverage Moldovan vulnerabilities, touch the emotions of different local audiences, and attempt to develop mistrust toward modern Western countries and Trans-Atlantic values and relationships.
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This chapter describes who or what controls the media and media consumption. The analysis emphasizes the importance of the power to control what Moldovans read, see, hear, and experience. Russian media is seen as more trustworthy then Moldovan media. The fact that much of the media is linked to the local political and business elite, most often to Vladimir Plahotniuc, but also to Chiril Luchinschi, Vlad Filat, Vadim Ciubara, Victor Țopa, Dan Lozovan, Dumitru Țîra, and Ilan Shor among others, does not help the situation. Television is still seen as relatively reliable, as it is the third most trusted source of socio-political information.
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This chapter attempts to identify and characterize the main Moldovan opinion leaders, and link them to the political currents promoted by the main mass media channels. We classify the opinion leaders according to their political preferences, affiliations, and external orientation, supplemented by other personal history. A subjective look is taken at their lives and work experience, ideas they have promoted in the past, links with important people and organization, their interests, and other elements that can help to explain their actions in the public sphere. The chapter focuses separately on four groups: pro-government media and opinion leaders, non-Plahotniuc media and opinion leaders, promoters of Kremlin narratives, and emerging opinion leaders. According to our study, some of the most influential opinionmakers were Corneliu Ciurea, Serghei Ostaf, Veaceslav Ionita, Victor Gurau, and Alexandru Cauia, all of whom are linked to pro-Plahotniuc media and platforms.
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Aneksom 2. Dejtonskog sporazuma Brčko Distrikt je definiran kao „jedinica lokalne samouprave koja je pod suverenitetom Bosne i Hercegovine“. Nedvojbeno je Brčko Distrikt još jedna u nizu posebnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, počev od njegovog nastanka pa do pitanja ustavnog statusa. Stoga će fokus ove teme biti položaj Brčko Distrikta u BiH, njegovo ustavno određenje i uopće analiza termina „teritorij sa posebnim statusom u sklopu BiH“. Poseban osvrt se može dati sada, osam godina od nastanka Distrikta, o ustrojstvu, funkcioniranju i budućnosti ovog nimalo običnog modela lokalne samouprave. Ipak je Brčko Distrikt „najbolja sredina u BiH jer nijedna nacionalna ili politička grupacija nema prevlast, već su upućene na zajednički rad i saradnju“ (Dr. Raffi Gregorian, supervizor za Brčko Distrikt).
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Rad daje strukturalni prikaz jednog entiteta u Bosni i Hercegovini – Federacije BiH. Dat je kratak historijski put nastanka ovog bosanskohercegovačkog entiteta uz teorijsko obrazlaganje i Washingtonskog i Daytonskog sporazuma. Kroz Ustav Federacije BiH prikazana je punoća i jedinstvo odnosa između zakonodavne, izvršne i sudske vlasti, te prikazani njeni glavni nositelji. Kroz ustavno rješenje koje predstavlja temeljni pravni akt kojim se uspostavlja pravni i društvenoekonomski poredak, deskriptivno je elaboriran i ustavni položaj, ustavno uređenje i organizacija vlasti. Nadležnost Federacije BiH i kantona kao federalnih jedinica je također iscrpno prikazana. Uz opisivanje postojećeg stanja, utvrđeni su i glavni problemi koji sprečavaju efikasno funkcioniranje Federacije BiH. Primjetno je da ovaj entitet ima vrlo složenu unutrašnju strukturu koja se, s obzirom na veličinu teritorije, rijetko susreće u komparativnome ustavnome pravu. Također je primjetno da je na Ustav Federacije BiH usvojeno preko stotinu amandmana od 1994. godine, što je posebno postalo aktualno nakon donošenja Odluke Ustavnoga suda Bosne i Hercegovine o konstitutivnosti naroda na cijeloj teritoriji Bosne i Hercegovine iz 2000. godine. Na kraju su date osnovne informacije ustavnog i institucionalnog odnosa Federacije BiH i države Bosne i Hercegovine, te su prikazana rješenja koja bi doprinijela eventualnom poboljšavanju i unutrašnjeg i vanjskog funkcioniranja cijele Bosne i Hercegovine.
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The year 2017 was supposed to be a dangerous one. There were elections planned in France, Germany and Catalonia. It was a key year for Brexit negotiations and the first year of President Donald Trump. Yet, it was a year of booming stock markets in United States, recovering economies across the EU, and a seemingly stabilized Chinese economy. At the peak, crypto-mania shook the world both of professional and hobby investors. The Visegrad Four has been not left out of this boom. In Slovakia, reports of new low-unemployment records became a standard part of monthly statistical reporting. The economy continues to grow, new investors keep coming, and the National Bank of Slovakia has been applying the brakes on the real estate market. However, it is not difficult to observe that there are several economic and political cans being kicked down the world’s street – especially in Europe.
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Teaching and research work in geography at the University of Belgrade had a long tradition and relied on the work of Jovan Cvijić at the end of the 19th and the early 20th century and his disciples and followers in the interwar period and during the first decades after the World War II. Apart from the need to overcome the war damage, new political and socio-economic circumstances resulting from the arrival of the Communist Party to power and the implementation of revolutionary changes had an important influence on the development of the geography teaching after the World War II. The new conditions, along with the steady progress of scientific knowledge, contributed to the frequent changes in curricula and teaching organization. The holders of the teaching and scientific research, international cooperation and the creation of new cadres of geography were still disciples of Jovan Cvijić (Borivoje Ž. Milojević 1885–1967, Petar Jovanović 1893–1957, Vojislav Radovanović 1894–1957, Sima Milojević 1894–1969) who by the end of the 50’s died or retired and were replaced by younger geographers. The life and work of teachers after the war was under the strict supervision of the party organization, which followed their positions and during the 50’s it even interfered in solving their personal conflicts.
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U ovom izveštaju nalaze se statistički podaci i analize u vezi s licima koja su 1992. godine u Autonomnoj oblasti Krajina (AOK) ubijena ili prijavljena kao nestala. Izveštaj je sačinilo Demografsko odeljenje pri Kancelariji tužioca za predmet Tužilac Međunarodnog suda protiv Radoslava Brđanina i Momira Talića, predmet br. IT-99-36-PT. Autori izveštaja koristili su tri izvora podataka o nestalim ili ubijenim licima: Spisak nestalih lica Međunarodnog komiteta Crvenog krsta (MKCK), Bazu podataka o ekshumacijama i Bazu podataka s potvrdama o smrti. Potonje dve baze podataka Kancelarija tužioca sačinila je za potrebe ovog predmeta, i to na osnovu dokumenata o ekshumacijama i potvrdama o smrti koje su izdali sudovi u Bosni. Identitet ljudi navedenih u tim dokumentima potvrđen je poređenjem imena i ličnih podataka, prema popisu stanovništva koji je vlada Jugoslavije sprovela 1991. godine. Osim toga, imena lica koja su navedena kao nestala ili mrtva upoređena su s biračkim spiskovima za izbore u Bosni 1997. i 1998. godine, kako bi se utvrdilo da niko ko je zapravo glasao na jednom od ovih izbora nije pogrešno zaveden kao nestao ili mrtav.
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Ovaj izveštaj (u daljem tekstu: izveštaj o Herceg-Bosni) rezultat je rada Odeljenja za demografiju (DU) Tužilaštva (OTP) Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ). Mi smo ga sastavili na zahtev tima Tužilaštva MKSJ koji radi na predmetu JADRANKO PRLIĆ i DR. (predmet br. IT-04-74-PT). Izveštaj sadrži demografske statističke podatke o etničkom sastavu stanovništva u osam odabranih opština u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao i minimalne brojeve interno raseljenih lica i izbeglica iz tih opština na koje se odnosi predmet JADRANKO PRLIĆ i DR. (u daljem tekstu: opštine Herceg-Bosne), 1991. godine i 1997-98. godine. Pored te dve glavne vrste podataka, takođe dajemo približnu procenu ukupnih brojeva IRL-a /interno raseljenih lica/ i izbeglica za područje Herceg-Bosne, kao i sažeti statistički prikaz za celu Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Prilog A ovom izveštaju sadrži tabelarni pregled rezultata na opštinskom nivou (A1 do A5), dok Prilog B (B1 do B6) sadrži opis izvora podataka. U Prilogu C (C1 i C2) sažeto je opisana metodologija koja je korišćena u ovom istraživanju. Najzad, u Prilogu D (D1 do D4) navedene su profesionalne kvalifikacije autora.
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U ovoj studiji pretstavljeni su rezultati analize statističkih obrazaca kretanja izbeglica i ubistava na Kosovu u periodu od marta do juna 1999. Podaci su dobijeni iz evidencije albanske pogranične policije u kojima su registrovana lica koja su ulazila u Albaniju preko sela Morina /Morinë/; razgovora koje su obavili Srednjoevropska i istočnoevropska pravna inicijativa Američke advokatske komore (ABA/CEELI) i njeni partneri; razgovora koje je obavio Human Rights Watch (HRW); razgovora koje je obavila Organizacija za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju (OEBS); te izveštaja o ekhumacijama koje su sproveli međunarodni timovi u ime Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ). Ove analize se odnose na ukupni procenjeni broj ubistava i ukupni broj izbeglica koje su napustile svoje domove prema vremenu i mestu. Zaključak ovog izveštaja je da su se ubistva i kretanje izbeglica odvijali po pravilnom obrascu koji karakterišu tri faze. U svakoj fazi, nakon velikog broja ubistava i izbeglica usledio bi znatno manji broj ubistava i izbeglica. Ovi nalazi su potom korišćeni za procenu tri moguća objašnjenja za taj obrazac. - Aktivnosti Oslobodilačke vojske Kosova (OVK) motivisale su stanovnike Kosova da napuste svoje domove. - Vazdušni napadi od strane Organizacije severnoatlantskog pakta (Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO) stvorili su lokalne uslove zbog kojih su stanovnici Kosova ubijani i zbog kojih su napuštali svoja ognjišta. - Sistematskom kampanjom jugoslovenskih snaga stanovnici Kosova proterani su iz svojih domova. - U ovoj studiji zaključeno je sledeće: - Obrasci, kako kretanja izbeglica tako i ubistava, imaju karakteristike koje ukazuju na postojanje spoljašnjeg uzroka. - Kretanje izbeglica i ubistva događali su se na istim mestima i u isto vreme, što implicira da su obe pojave imale zajednički uzrok. - Dve od hipoteza predloženih da bi se objasnili obrasci ubistava i migracije, aktivnosti OVK i NATO-a, ne odgovaraju uočenim obrascima kretanja izbeglica i ubistava. - Statistički dokazi potvrđuju hipotezu da su jugoslovenske snage sprovodile sistematsku kampanju ubijanja i proterivanja.
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Archaeological and epigraphic sources allow to reveal external (state) and internal (administrative) borders between countries of the South Siberian region in the 6th—14th centuries. So, funerary sites with some Turkic sculptures, well distinguishable from similar objects of other Turkic people, seem to be an indicator of external borders of the First and Second East Turkic khaganates. Where they are absent, there was no Turkic domination. The northern border of the Uigur khaganate is noted by pise-walled fortresses and a 230 km long wall that connects them. Old Khakassia stone fortresses protecting passes in Western Sayan Mountains also show that borders of this country passed across ridges. But with expansion of the country from the second half of 9th century, the rivers became borders. It is evidenced by placement of military cemeteries of the ancient Khakass found on only the right coast of the Irtysh River. Two Mongol towns which had typical buildings for the Mongols, appear to be centers of two administrative districts. The old Khakassia family and personal heraldry is familiar to a series 9—10th centuries connected with marks in epitaphs and rocks, specified hereditary land use, outlining borders of possessions in Tuva and in Khakassia.
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The author reviews the current state of studies into Western Kazakhstan sites dated by 13th—14th centuries. The area under research is predominantly represented by sites belonging to the nomadic population of the Golden Horde. The paper describes features of historical and geographical location of funerary sites in Western Kazakhstan. Overall, the archaeological sites identified in Western Kazakhstan are a reflection of some general processes in Eurasian steppes generated by appearance of the consolidated Mongol state, and later by the Golden Horde, and manifested in the uniformity of features of material culture.
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The article primarily focuses on the historical geography of the Crimean territories of the Genoese Gazaria. The Genoese Gazaria is the totality of the Genoese possessions on the lands of the Golden Horde, especially in the coastal areas of the Northern Black Sea, where the medieval toponym “Gazaria” was used to embrace the whole state of the Golden Horde. In general, there were no clear state borders in the Genoese Gazaria: those were coastal zones under the rule of the khans of the Golden Horde, where the Genoese would be given separate quarters in the cities and would enjoy autonomous rights, or would establish their settlements on the coast. The Crimean peninsula was an exception in this system, there the Genoese settled a whole system of cities and rural districts, with clear political and administrative borders. The domain of the Genoese on the Crimean peninsula developed into independent political and administrative system during a long and gradual process, which took a hundred years: from the origin of the main regional center in Caffa (around 1275) to 1387. The author addresses historical geography of the various administrative parts of the Genoese Gazaria on the Crimean peninsula: the rural district of Caffa, Consulates of Soldaia, Cembalo and Vosporo, and possessions on the Southern Coast of the Crimea, the Kerch Peninsula and the Tarkhankut Peninsula. He also analyzes findings of a study into the historical topography of the four fortified Genoese cities — Caffa, Soldaia, Cembalo and Vosporo.
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The author uses palynological data to offer a reconstruction of landscape and climate in the vicinity of the Eneolithic settlement of Kartal. The pollen section should be considered extremely valid, since it is made in buried soil. The period of the Bolgrad-Aldeni accounted for the climatic optimum of the Holocene. This fact has been repeatedly pointed out by experts. This warm and humid cycle of oceanic climate largely contributed to the development of agrarian cultures of the early Eneolithic. Termination of life in Kartal in the period of the Bolgrad-Aldeni and subsequent population gap, which falls on the second half of the VI Millennium (5500—5000 BP), based on available data, was not accompanied by any abrupt climatic fluctuations. However, by the time Cernavoda I population appeared in Kartal, the climatic situation had become much less comfortable than in the Gumelnita period. In the most general terms, we can talk about a much more continental climate, general aridity and, consequently, low humidity.
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