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The confusion as to what patriots and what nationalists are is quite common. Some scholars argue that patriots and nationalists are the same; others maintain that there is such a slight difference between the two that it is not worth paying attention to. The author contends that patriots and nationalists differ in many regards, first and foremost in regard to the object of love and concern. Patriotism is love of and concern for the nation-state of which one is a citizen. Nationalism is love of one’s own ethnonational group and concern for the protection and promotion of its interests. Many other distinctions between patriotism and nationalism have been discussed in the text. Local patriotism as a sense of belonging and commitment to a milieu in which one was raised, that is, spent a good part of time while young, is original form of patriotism which means that one has not been taught to feel committed, and how to be committed to that specific milieu. It does happen spontaneously. Local patriotism develops regardless of whether one will it or not to develop. People, one the other hand, have to be trained to nurture patriotic (and national, alike) sentiments – through rituals, ceremonies, public culture, symbols, institutions, etc. The author argues that patriotism is one of the manifestations of a wider phenomenon called groupism which includes, among other things, ‘us’-‘them’ syndrome and overpraising one’s own folk, that is, bias against those who are not part of one’s own group. Nationalism has two basic forms – civil-territorial and ethno-cultural. So does patriotism. Although differently dubbed (e.g., moderate and extremist, constructive and blind), two forms of patriotism basically comprise the same phenomena as two forms of nationalism. Which kind of love and committment has proved stronger, when patriotism and nationalism come into conflict, or compete for supremacy. Although the view, based on the lessons learned from the history, prevails that nationalism as a rule overrides patriotism, one should be critical of such generalizations. The relative strength of patriotism and nationalism has been determined by how systematically and for how long time members of a nation-state and an ethnonational goup, respectively, have been taught to see in their nation-state or ethnonational collective something emphatically valuable, something that is worth fighting for.
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The modest process of modernization that began in the final decades of Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina entered a new stage after 1878, evolving in specific circumstances. The most important period for the economic and social changes that took place in BiH during Austro-Hungarian rule is when Benjamin Kállay headed the territorial administration (1882-1903). It was then that the majority of road and rail communications were built and almost all the country’s industry was set up. As regards the economy, the authorities took the same mercantilist attitude as they had during the absolutist period. They set up and ran companies, and bore most of the liabilities and risk in companies where both state and private capital were invested. The administration endeavoured to attract foreign capital by offering extensive privileges and guarantees, though foreign investors were extremely cautious, becoming involved primarily in forestry and to some extent in mining. It was in Austria-Hungary’s interests to encourage, to a degree at least, the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic potential, since this freed it of concerns that it would find itself in a position of having to pay the costs of administering an occupied country. Kállay’s economic policy was primarily aimed at the exploitation of natural resources, so that the construction of railways and tariff policy were at the forefront of his economic policy. Kállay’s evaluation of the importance of certain railway lines for the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the deciding factor for their construction. However, under the impact of changing international circumstances, towards the end of Kállay’s administration he sacrificed Bosnia’s economic and financial interest to his foreign policy aims and the military strategic interests of Austria-Hungary. With the construction of expensive and unprofitable strategic railway lines (Gabela – Boka Kotorska – Trebinje, and the eastern line), Bosnia and Herzegovina was faced with a heavy financial burden. Narrow-gauge tracks were laid in Bosnia, and their capacity soon proved to be inadequate. The main reason for not building a rail network more appropriate to the needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina was lack of funds; the only tracks that could be laid were those that the country could pay for itself. A particular obstacle was the conflicting interests of Austria and Hungary.
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One way of distinguishing ethics and morality is to contrast moral absolutism, which can be deontological or utilitarian, since both look for absolute rules, with ethical life, which often refers to virtue theory and ethical substance, or the experience of otherness. Lévinas’ sovereignty of the other is an important contribution to understanding the necessity of a relation with otherness in order for there to be a self. The insights of the Kantian sublime, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche concentrate on what the ethical experience and what the ethical decision is. The ethics of life strongly tends to merge with psychological naturalism at one end and social conformity at the other. We need morality and ethics. There is no morality or ethics without contradiction, tension and paradox between the aspects of law and psychology, virtue and utility, communitarianism and autonomy. It is autonomy in the sense of an inner constitution through recognition of otherness within the self which allows the ethical-moral in the possibility of decision, responsibility, guilt and agency.
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In the author’s view, no other event of the thousand-year history of Bosnia and Herzegovina can compare in importance with ZAVNOBiH. Founded in Mrkonjić-grad on 25-26 November 1943, ZAVNOBiH, the National Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, restored Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood at the height of the war against the fascist occupying forces and domestic quislings, thanks to the National Liberation Movement of BiH, ending 480 years of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s existence within various state systems – the Ottoman, the Habsburg Empire, the hegemonic regimes of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Hitler’s German occupation and its puppet state known as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). ZAVNOBiH evolved in three stages. In the first, it operated as the general political representative body of the National Liberation Movement of BiH; in the second, it constituted itself as the supreme state authority of BiH; and it began the third by inaugurating the shape to be taken by the socio-political system as defined by what was known as scientific socialism. The basic and enduring values and orientation of ZAVNOBiH are: – the national equality of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Serbs, Bosniacs (Muslims) and Croats; – the political equality of BiH within Democratic Federal Yugoslavia; – the democratic rights and freedoms set out in the Declaration on the rights of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unlike the Dayton Constitution, which legitimized the nationalist partition of BiH into ethnic entities brought about by aggression, ZAVNOBiH is the expression and symbol of the historic identity and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a historical phenomenon that has no parallel in the entire history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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This essay, making the hundredth anniversary of Theodore Wiesengrund Adorno’s birth, reconsiders the semiotics of world civilization in the light of the experience of Adorno’s negative dialectic. When the critical self-reflection and self-contradiction of philosophy is re-evaluated, which reaches its peak in Adorno’s negative dialectic, where the European spirit still seeks – after critical metaphysics – to revolve around itself as the spirit of negation, one must “be aware of the strange fate of atonal thought, the intention of which was in the liberation of possible human experience, which shatters the coldness of the bourgeois mind.” For this very reason the shadow of what finally found in thought the motif and need for negation and dominance falls across it. Adorno knew this: his thought remains without “substance” and “ground.” Distancing itself from the arrogance of the traditionalism of philosophy, plunged in the opacity and infinite indifference of Time, it seeks to stand its ground against its own destruction, in the face of the general distortion of both Word and Deed. When man himself opposes the world, his work turns into outcry against the impossible which – without pathetic gestures – is worthy of thought, life and the expression of the ineffable.
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The paper sets out the nature of Bosnian identity and draws attention to its two facets: on the one hand, the fact that in the entire history of Bosnia, its originality, and the nature of Bosnian society, national identity never evolved as the dominant social, cultural and political process as it typically did in Europe from the 16th to the 20th century. Whereas nation-states and homogeneous national societies evolved in Europe, a process associated with the evolution of civil society and capitalism, the national market, state and language, in Bosnia multilateral society persisted, with a neutral stance towards the religious, ethnic and cultural differences of its population, but also with the very pronounced shared supranational features specific, spiritually and culturally, to a given society, in which different models of culture and spirituality strikingly intermingled and influenced one another. In Bosnia, no national market in goods and labour ever evolved, nor was there feudalism of the European type, where the peasants were tied to the land; neither did a national language evolve and a single national script come to dominate. There was no state corresponding to the national territory and able to ensure within it the use of a single language, a single protected market and so forth. The fundamental identity of the Bosnian was the multifaceted, universal identity characteristic of every society in which there was no determinant idea of nation and the nation-state and which did not see the emergence of intolerance towards others as something that was an obstacle to national constitution and evolution, as was so typical of western history. When, alongside the waning of Ottoman power and the growing strength of its neighbouring states as they emancipated themselves from Ottoman rule, the idea of national identity began to make inroads or to be systematically introduced into Bosnian society, which could only be done in Bosnia by nationalizing the religious differences among the population, a dual process came about. On the one hand, there was the creation of nations that had their constituent centre outside Bosnia and which evolved their national, cultural and political agenda by adopting ready-made ideas and models that were foreign to Bosnia, but this was also accompanied by efforts to maintain the original multilateral Bosnian culture and way of life. Naturally enough, this tore Bosnia apart internally and gave rise to all kinds of internal tensions. The prevalence of the model of national history resulted, as has been evident ever since the end of the 19th century, in divisions leading to the destruction not only of the original Bosnian way of life but also to political divisions, culminating in several attempts to create national states within Bosnia or even to the unilateral nationalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. It is this that generated the bloodstained history of Bosnia in the 20th century. In this context, the author refl
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In debates over ethics one may obtain a good overview if the debate is classed according to whether it is in harmony with or contrary to universalism. On one side are Hare, Rawls and Habermas, and on the other Taylor, Rorty and Baumen, with between them Nussbaum, Benhabib and Honneth. What has Adorno to do with this? His reflections on the aporia of a righteous life and rational practice lie within the context of the non-ethical discourse of the old critical theory of society. In “Minima Moralia,” he draws attention to the link between morals and repression, and puts forward the thesis that ever since ancient times, norms and moral principles have been the theoretical underpinnings of social management and that there can be no true life in the counterfeit totality of an advanced capitalist society (Adorno, 1980, 210; 43). But the problem of universalization in the philosophy of morals is one that Adorno did not address at all. For all that, I am of the view that he had a great deal to do with it. Adorno can help us to understand moral philosophical universalism in all its ambivalence, which can be seen in the ethical controversy between the universalist and the particularist.
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Forty-five children between the ages of nine and twelve years, who were forced to flee their native Sudan and seek refuge in Egypt, were interviewed about their everyday life in Cairo. Phenomenological analyses of the transcripts revealed the physical, social and technological dimensions to their encounter with a new cultural world. The interviews also revealed the extent to which the children had to face racism, discrimination and social exclusion. Specific analyses of children’s difficulties in learning a new form of Arabic and their involvement in play and games indicated that a refugee child develops his or her self-identity as a stranger by reflecting on particular confrontations with the new environment. Finally, comparative analyses across age groups led to the construction of a phenomenological-developmental model of the child refugee. Both the model and the findings are discussed in the context of Alfred Schutz’s (1964a) essay The Stranger, George Herbert Mead’s (1967) communicative model of the self and Binnie Kristal-Andersson’s (2000) psychological framework for understanding migration.
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The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of psychotherapy as ethical care, a mode of healing practiced in societies rich in the phenomena concerning the operations of collective life. By contemplating and establishing the four concepts: situated negativity, therapeutic locale, bodily experience(in situated negativity), and speech as action, the author is able to delineate the modes of therapeutic interactions right at the locale between the therapist and the patient in order to disclose the structure of interpersonal thwartedness and connectedness within psychotherapy. Viewed in this perspective, psychological suffering is always the suffering of situated negativity. Healing, however, is not to cancel this negativity but to let it become a source of new ways of existence. This reverse of attitude toward negativity involves ways of “talking” into bodily experience in psychotherapy. The meaning of ethical care thus can be described as: what the therapist aims to approach through speech is not positive normative ethics, the socially recognized “should-be,” but the situated negativity which denotes an expelled position from normative interpersonal ordering and which is to be experienced as nameless and full of forces. Situated negativity is not that which to be eliminated but the source to be appreciated by both the therapist and the patient.
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This paper explores how Schutz’s ideas enrich and extend the ethic of care promulgated by feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Sara Ruddick, and Eva Feder Kittay. Using Schutz’s ideas about the IThou relationship, systems of relevances, and growing old together, the author lays a foundation for continuing dialogue between feminist theorists of care and Schutzian phenomenologists.
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The main endeavor of this project is to elucidate the correlation of two basic phenomenological concepts (typification and Phantasia), thereby allowing for a new discussion concerning the foundation of the life-world. While typification has been particularly developed in the social phenomenology of A. Schutz, Phantasia remains in a rather Husserlian “domain,” with regard to its phenomenological implications. In considering a new perspective, however, their discussion lends itself to a new understanding of the process of constitution. Namely, it will surpass the so-called egological sphere, by incorporating new valences for the structures of the life-world. Even if Phantasia is to be understood in terms of a subjective zone “par excellence,” its correlation to the constant realization of typification will help to circumscribe how Phantasia can condition and contribute to the realization of the life-world on a larger scale.
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After justifying its centrality in the Schützian project of founding interpretive sociology, I present the theory of relevance as the cornerstone of Schütz’s constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude, conceived of as the investigation of the meaningful construction and the structures of the lifeworld. Through what I call the life-plans approach, I contend that the essence of every sociocultural world has to be found in a thick network of intersubjective and hierarchized relevance structures upon which personal life-projects are built. This proposal is based on Schütz’s subordination of the theory of action to the theory of relevance, which challenges every atomistic view of social action. The interplay of relevance structures in the field of consciousness and especially the focus on imposed relevances encourage us to reflect on the scope of human freedom. Lastly, I examine the everlasting tension in Schütz’s thought between the anti-rationalistic potential of the theory of relevance and the methodological rationalism inherited from Weber and the Austrian marginalists.
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How modern economics is a social rather than historical cultural science, how it can produce adequate accounts in scientific constructs about common-sense constructs, can relate objectivistic accounts to subjective interpretations, how it can be theoretical, and how it hypothesizes marginal utility is all expounded in relation to Schutz’s theory of science, especially what he calls “postulates.”
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In this paper, I try to argue that what Schutz enterprises can be integrated into what Husserl calls phenomenological psychology. My interpretation is based on Schutz’s own remarks, which are though more or less dismissed by most of the interpreters of Schutz. Beginning with an articulation of the social theory of Schutz, I explore the meaning of phenomenological psychology in Husserl as next in order to point out that despite the disagreement with Husserl’s transcendental approach to intersubjectivity Schutz has a closer adherence to Husserl than commonly held.
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The struggles that Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, Harold Garfinkel, and other social phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists have had with Edmund Husserl’s progenitive but inconsistent notion of intersubjectivity are summarized and assessed. In particular, an account of Schutz’s objections to intersubjective constitution is presented. The commonly pervading elements and major differences within this lineage of inquiry – a four generation- long lineage of teacher and student that commences with Husserl, runs through Schutz and Gurwitsch, then Garfinkel, and then the present author and his colleagues – are discussed, under the advisory (as suggested by Maurice Natanson) that what Husserl sought was more important than what he found.
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This paper aims to clarify the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology upon Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In developing his phenomenological sociology, even though Schutz was deeply influenced by Weber, he considers that the interpretative sociology developed by the latter has some difficulties. It is Husserl’s phenomenology that enabled him to overcome the difficulties of Weber’s interpretative sociology and to found a phenomenological sociology as an interpretative sociology in a true sense. In section 1, I will deal with the significance and difficulties of Weber’s interpretative sociology. In section 2, I will deal with the influence of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology and furthermore, in section 3, the influence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology on Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In section 4, I will mention that there are some motives in Husserl’s later phenomenology that could be useful for the development of the phenomenological sociology.
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