"auleta" und es bleibt alles beim Neuen! Zur Konstitution der polnischen Fachneologismen im Bereich der altgriechischen Musik.

Author(s): Grzegorz Pawlowski / Language(s): German / Issue: 1/2015

Epistemic properties of a man constitute the base for change. So far little attention has been paid to those properties in semantics. Questions of epistemic factors, which influence the formation of specialised neologisms, have not been posed. The keynote of this article is the attempt to answer this question. To achieve this goal, I attempt to explain such expressions as ‚neo’, ‚epistemic’ and ‚specialised neologism’. Then I proceed with the presentation of the results of the analysis of an interview. The subject of the interview is the Polish neologism ‚auleta’, created by Maciej Kaziński during his work an the translation of John Landes’ Music in Ancient Greece and Rome.Epistemic properties of a man constitute the base for change. So far little attention has been paid to those properties in semantics. Questions of epistemic factors, which influence the formation of specialised neologisms, have not been posed. The keynote of this article is the attempt to answer this question. To achieve this goal, I attempt to explain such expressions as ‚neo’, ‚epistemic’ and ‚specialised neologism’. Then I proceed with the presentation of the results of the analysis of an interview. The subject of the interview is the Polish neologism ‚auleta’, created by Maciej Kaziński during his work an the translation of John Landes’ Music in Ancient Greece and Rome.

"Ezoteryzm w kulturze Europy" - konferencja na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim Jana Pawła II

Author(s): Diana Sobieraj / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 1/2012

"What are We to Do, and What May We Hope for?" A Semi-Kantian Treatment of the Second and the Third of Kant’s Three Big Questions

Author(s): Fritz Wenisch / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2004

I am not a Kantian. In fact, I consider the outlines of the Kantian system as he developed it in his first Critique as incoherent in several respects. Two of them are: First, as Fichte suggested, the very concept of a thing-in-itself causes an insurmountable problem for Kant; for how can one know that an entity supposedly totally unknown to us is the origin of the chaos of sense perception? Second, there is the well-known related difficulty with respect to causality, a category supposedly applicable only in the realm of phenomena, while at the same time, the non-phenomenal thing-in-itself somehow is to "give rise to" the chaos of sense perceptions. As a minimum, this comes dangerously close to a strictly forbidden transcendent application of causality2. I consider both problems as fatal to the Kantian system. [...]

(Mock-)Thinking about the Same

Author(s): Alberto Voltolini / Language(s): English / Issue: 3/2017

In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally.

(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

Author(s): Piotr Piotrowski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 36/2016

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers are generally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

(rec.) Michał Adamczyk. Wiedza – wiara – racjonalność. Jana Franciszka Drewnowskiego program logizującej modernizacji myśli filozoficzno – teologicznej, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II, Lublin 2015

Author(s): Anna Kozanecka-Dymek / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 2/2016

1930’lar Aydinin Gözünden Devrim İdeolojisi. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’in Perspektifinden Kemalizm

Author(s): Hayriye Gürbüz / Language(s): Turkish / Issue: 93/2018

Turkish intellectuals who has survived by taking the “state” as a pivot from Ottoman Empire till the Republic has switched to the questioning of “How does the state continue its existence and how does it modernize itself?” in 1930s from “How is the state established?” and tried to govern the political power with this mission attached themselves. This governance could be occurred by drawing of a dissent intellectualist figure to the political power or with a supportive and favorable manner of political power. Kadro journal which is a pioneer movement of the 1930s and its ideologist Şevket Süreyya chosen to govern political power with supportive manner and interpreted the Kemalism-ideology of revolution from this perspective. However, it is also difficult to say that the revolution ideology of 1930s overlaps directly with Kemalism. Turkish intellectual who is trained at the state, an officer at the government and state-oriented, reveal its own differences even with small nuances. This article focuses on Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who revealed these small nuances in 1930s with further growing nuances in 1960s. The difference between the 1930s and 1960s is that in the 1960s the reason for existence did not depend on political power. Turkish intellectual, specific to Şevket Süreyya, can exist within the boundaries drawn by political power in the 1930s, was trying to lead both political power and the public in this narrow living area. However, the Turkish intellectuals were critical despite their avoidance of criticism of Kemalism. Şevket Süreyya had critical thoughts despite the limited partnership with political power and his ideology for the revolution did not coincide with Kemalism. The places where this non-overlap is most obvious are the principles of nationalism, populism and etatism.

A Brief History of New Realism

Author(s): Maurizio Ferraris / Language(s): English / Issue: 3/2016

In this paper I try to sketch a brief history of new realism. Starting from nineteenth century idealism, I then move on to discuss twentieth century postmodernism, which, I argue, is the heir of idealism and the theoretical enemy of new realism. Finally, I offer a reconstruction of how and why contemporary new realism came into being and propose a few remarks on its future perspectives.

A conceptual model of assessment of knowledge transfer to consumer

Author(s): Jurgita Raudeliuniene,Sigitas Davidavicius / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2017

Due to changing needs of knowledge consumers in the context of globalization organizations find it important to search out the way of effective application of the process of knowledge sharing and distribution in their activity in order to create and/or select proper means of communication with consumers on purpose of effective satisfaction of their knowledge needs. In order to address the problems of such nature it is important to assess the process of knowledge transfer and consumer purchase, knowledge needs, knowledge transferred to meet of consumer needs, channels and means of knowledge transfer. Also, to select purposefully channels of communication with consumers and tools of e-marketing that are suitable for satisfaction of consumer needs, i.e. channels and tools that affect self-determination of consumer to take a decision to acquire a product or service of specific organization.

A Contextual Concept of Science

Author(s): Sumei Cheng / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2016

The contextual concept of science regards a scientific theory as a whole simulation for the mechanism of natural world under the given context. It argues that a scientific theory is to understand the reality only in the sense of intentionality in the process of reality simulation, rather than to describe reality in the sense of one-to-one correspondence. This concept of understanding reality is totally different from that of describing reality.Compared with the realist approaches and the anti-realist approach, the contextual approach has the following advantages: (1) it contributes to bridge the communication between the preachers of scientism and the humanists;(2) it has helped to solve the problem of underdetermination faced by scientific realism; (3) it is relatively easy to understand the correction about the concept and theory; (4) it could reflect the true process of science more properly. Therefore, it is a more promising and convincing new perspective to understand science.

A CRITICAL REACTION TO LAINE RANDJÄRV’S HISTORICITY OF EPISTOLARITY FROM AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): Cyril-Mary P. Olatunji,Mojalefa L. J. Koenane / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2017

This article is partly an original research in that it had initially intended to describe what intellectuality means and involves. However, it is mainly a reaction to Laine Randjärv’s article titled ‘Across the Borders: Unfolding the Personality of Creative Intellectuals Through their Correspondence – the Epistolary Heritage of Tuudur Vettik’ in which Randjärv describes intellectuality as border crossing in a simplistic manner that seems to challenge logical experiences and supports the ‘official doctrine’ of the Cartesian dichotomist dualism. This paper argues to the conclusion and in support of the position of Randjärv’s article that intellectuality is border crossing but goes further to question whether border crossing is ever logically possible in such a simplistic form of mental transposition without the self-portrait making implied by the cosmic harmony of Ubuntu. That is, though intellectuality implies overcoming geographical, theoretical and cultural boundaries, restrictions and prejudices. The process however is never simplistic because, following the principles of Ubuntu, the thinker is how he thinks. Therefore, the theoretical position of a scholar is a reflection of the person of the scholar who theorises. Consequently, this paper argues for a qualified acceptance of Laine Randjärv’s position.

A Few Comments on the Linda Problem

Author(s): Adam Olszewski / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2017

This paper discusses an experiment in cognitive psychology called the Linda problem. Firstly, some natural conditions for the correctness of the interpretation of psychological experiments (such as the Linda problem) are formulated. The article is essentially a critique of the interpretation of the results of the Linda problem experiment provided by Kahneman and Tversky as well as – indirectly – their concept of heuristics. It is shown that the interpretation provided by Kahneman and Tversky does not meet the aforementioned conditions for correctness. The main argument is justified utilizing such rules of rationality as conditional probability and Grice’s conversational maxims. It is also pointed out that this argument can be reformulated in terms of the intuitive system of reasoning.

A LEWISIAN ARGUMENT AGAINST USING EQUIVALENCE ACCESSIBILITY RELATIONS IN THE LEARNING BY ERASING FRAMEWORK

Author(s): Alexandru Dragomir / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2013

The fi rst part of this paper will present (1) the concept of knowledge as it is used in epistemic logic, (2) Public Announcement Logic’s concept of learning as elimination of epistemic alternatives, and (3) a game-theoretical perspective on scientifi c discovery (research as a game between Nature and Scientist) together with Nina Gierasimczuk’s established connection between (2) and (3). The second part will be concerned with arguing that the accessibility relations between hypotheses within the framework of „learning by erasing“ should not be equivalence relations

A methodological analysis of the scientific research

Author(s): Kadzik OGANYAN / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2017

The article addresses the structure of scientific research in the context of the methodology of science. This goal is realized through the concrete material of physical theory, detailing the structure of scientific research and its elements; its process and the laws it obeys; its results, which leadthe process; its motives, e.g. the "driving forces" of research and the role of philosophy in the process.The paperexamines the theoretical phase of researches as a synthesis of the empirical and the speculative,in contrast to the existing literature that presents the opposition between theoretical and empirical research. The steps of knowledge of the objective laws in a particular area are analysed: the empirical research,the non-fundamental theoretical,the speculative, and the fundamental theoretical; this analysis allows the generalization of the patterns of scientific research. Particular attention is paid to the speculative research and its main elements. The“methodological mechanism” of formation of new fundamental conceptions in science is unravelled. The essence of this mechanism consists of some non-logical cognitive operations (idealization, choice of “Gestalt”, substitution, generalization). The knowledge of corresponding combinations of these operations made by the investigator facilitates the process of research, decreases the probability of errors in the scientific cognition.

A Minimalist Framework for Thought Experiment Analysis

Author(s): Marek Picha / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2016

Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce the basic analytical tool that allows us to differentiate an experimental core from an attached argumentation. The last section is reserved for discussion. I address several possible questions concerning adequacy of minimalistic definition and analysis.

A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism

Author(s): Seungbae Park / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2014

There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false.

A Philosophical Critique of the Concept of Miracle as a “Supernatural Event”

Author(s): Adam Swiezynski / Language(s): English / Issue: 49/2017

The notion of the supernaturality of an event may be understood in various ways. Most frequently ‘supernatural’ means ‘separated from nature’, i.e. different from nature. Thus, what is meant here is the difference in ontological character. The definitions of miracle, present in literature, emphasize the fact that we may talk about a miracle only when the phenomenon takes place beyond the natural order or stands in opposition to it. The description of a miracle as a ‘supernatural event’ contains in itself the reference to that which is natural. The supernaturality of an event means that it surpasses (transcends) naturality. Additionally, this transcendence contains a kind of opposition to that which is natural. However, the miracle as a supernatural event takes place within the scope of that which is natural, although it takes place in a different way from natural events. It seems that this supernaturality may involve two things: (1) the course of the miraculous event; (2) the cause of the miraculous event. We should consider each of them separately and specify what we understand by the supernatural course of the event and by the supernatural cause of the event. If we could prove that we can talk about supernatural events at least in one of the two signaled aspects of supernaturality, then we would be able to define the miraculous event as a supernatural one. The analyses proposed in the paper allow us to formulate the following statement concerning the miraculous event, which is, to a great extent, a critical correction of the traditional way of understanding it: the miracle may be correctly understood as a supernatural event, only when this supernaturality concerns the personal cause of the event and not its course.

A Pragmatist Dimension in Georg Henrik von Wright’s Philosophy

Author(s): Sami Pihlström / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2014

This paper reconsiders Georg Henrik von Wright’s theory of causation from the point of view of pragmatism. Given the conceptual link between causation and action, von Wright’s position might be reinterpreted along pragmatist lines, even though he never explicitly developed his views with reference to pragmatism. However, the dichotomy between the ontological and the conceptual presupposed by von Wright may also be criticized from a pragmatist perspective.

A priori imaginace

Author(s): Mikel Dufrenne / Language(s): Czech / Issue: 2/2015

In this article, Dufrenne argues that imagination need not be only the subjective capacity to invent the unreal (dreams, fantasies), but that it is actually capable of revealing images that bring human beings closer to the hidden plenitude of Nature. Among these a priori images, such as heaven, water, blood, and earth, Dufrenne emphasizes the elementary, power, depth, and purity, which he believes are the most fundamental of them. He considers a potential classification of these images on the principle of ontological quality.

A Reason to Avoid the Causal Construal of Dispositional Explanations

Author(s): Lilia Gurova / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2017

Those who argue that dispositional explanations are genuine explanations usually construe them as causal explanations. There are several well-known arguments against the causal efficacy of dispositions, but there are as well demonstrations that on some minimal conditions, dispositions could be viewed as causally relevant to the effects which they are taken to explain. Although the latter position is generally tenable, it may be shown that in some important cases it is not a good idea to commit to a causal construal of dispositional explanations. The argument goes as follows: (1) Dispositional explanations are valued for certain specific extra-inferences which they allow us to draw; (2) The causal construal of dispositional explanations can account for some of these extra-inferences only on the assumption that the disposition is a common cause of its manifestations; (3) However, under certain circumstances, the common cause assumption is refuted on theoretical or empirical grounds; Therefore, (4) under certain circumstances, the causal construal of dispositional explanations cannot account for what these explanations are valued for. The latter conclusion is a reason to argue that in some cases at least, the causal construal of dispositional explanations should be avoided.