Logika modalna i teoria gier

Author(s): Zbigniew Tworak / Language(s): Polish Issue: 2 (98)/2017

In this paper, I demonstrate the fruitfulness of looking at modal logic from the perspective of game theory. In particular, I show how games in strategic form can be transformed into Kripke’s models for a multi-modal logic that combines the concepts of strategy profile, preference, and knowledge. The logic is sufficiently general to express solution concepts such as the best response, Nash Equilibrium, and Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies. Moreover, the logic allows us to derive the conditions on which these concepts are based.

De re vs. de dicto

Author(s): Marie Duží / Language(s): Czech Issue: 4/2000

The paper solves the problems connected with the occurrences of expressions (or the respective constructions) in the de re or de dicto supposition. It is shown that some expressions, e.g. definite descriptions, that are seemingly ambiguous are in no way ambiguous, they denote in all the contexts one and the same “thing” and have a precise definite meaning which is best explicated by the TIL (Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic) logical construction. What differs is only the supposition (de dicto / de re) in which they occur. The precise definition of the distinction between de re, de dicto occurrence is provided, and using this definition four kinds of problems are analysed, namely de re / de dicto using definite descriptions (‘offices’), sentences (propositions), definite descriptions in notional attitudes, and embedded sentences in propositional attitudes. The paper provides a certain adjustment and correction of Tichý’s approach to the problem.

Filozofia logického atomizmu (IV)

Author(s): Bertrand Russell / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 4/2000

Prv než sa budem venovať hlavnej téme dnešnej prednášky, chcel by som sa stručne vrátiť k problematike existencie z predchádzajúcich dvoch prednášok.

Lambekovy kalkuly a 'logiky kategorií'

Author(s): Jaroslav Peregrin / Language(s): Czech Issue: 4/2000

Fregovým geniálním nápadem, z e kterého vyšel při svém pokusu o vytvoření rigorózní, ne-psychologické teorie významu, bylo rekonstruovat význam složeného výrazu principiálně jako výsledek funkční aplikace významu jedné z jeho částí na význam části nebo částí zbývajících.

Filozofia logického atomizmu (III)

Author(s): Bertrand Russell / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 3/2000

Dnes budem hovoriť o všeobecných výrokoch [propositions] a existencii.

Dynamická logika

Author(s): Jaroslav Peregrin / Language(s): Czech Issue: 3/2000

Teorie tvořená tčmito dvěma výroky je , mčfeno běžnými logickými standardy, zjevně konzistentní. Znázorněno prostředky modálni či intenzionální logiky výrok ( I ) říká, že existuje nějaký možný svět (dosažitelný z toho našeho, pokud pracujeme s kripkovskou relací dosažitelnosti), ve kterém prší; zatímco ( 2 ) říká, že tímto světem není přímo ten náš.

Filozofia logického atomizmu (I)

Author(s): Bertrand Russell / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 1/2000

Sériu prednášok, ktorú práve začíname, som nazval filozofia logického atomizmu. Niekoľkými poznámkami by som mal zrejme priblížiť, čo rozumiem pod týmto názvom.

O jednom pokuse rozšíriť predmet logiky

Author(s): Pavel Cmorej / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 4/1998

V stati [9] I. Hanzel kritizoval moju poznámku o Fregeho neskoršom príklone k intenzionálnemu chápaniu pojmov, ktorú som neuvážene pripojil k svojmu článku [2] (387 alebo [3], 26).

Porębska, M. - Suchoń, V.: Elementarny wykład logiki formalnej z ćwiczeniami komputerowymi

Author(s): Eugen Andreansky / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 4/1998

Review of: Porębska, M. - Suchoń, V.: Elementarny wykład logiki formalnej z ćwiczeniami komputerowymi, Universitas, Kraków 1996

Bolzanovo pojetí pravdy a korespondenční teorie

Author(s): Marta Vlasáková / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 1/1997

When building and elaborating new philosophical theories and concepts, it is useful to take sometimes into account historical development of understanding a particular problem. In my opinion, Bolzano's very thoroughly interpreted classical concept of truth could help to clarify many problems related to the phenomenon of truth, which still being discussed.

K procesovému chápaniu pojmov

Author(s): Pavel Cmorej / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 1/1997

"Nerád", ale statočne, pohotovo a veľmi obšírne odpovedal L. Kvasz na otázky, ktoré som položil prívržencom vývinovej teórie pojmov (VTP) a jemu osobne v stati [2]. Žiaľ, nepresvedčil ma o tom, že jeho článkom [3] môžeme "polemiku o vývine pojmov ... ukončil' a prejsť k iným problémom", nepodarilo sa mu to ani pokusom podplatiť ma cenou útechy, že moje "chyby nie sú o nič menšie, než boli Zenónove" ([31, 401), preto nevidím inú možnosť, ako pokračovať v diskusii.

O jednom pokuse priškrtiť logiku

Author(s): Pavel Cmorej / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 2/1996

Vo 4. čísle H. ročníka Organonu F vystúpil na obranu vývinovej teórie pojmov (ďalej len VTP) už piaty obhajca.

Znalosť predmetu a jeho pojem

Author(s): Pavel Cmorej / Language(s): Slovak Issue: 4/1995

V 1. čísle II. ročníka Organonu F bol uverejnený monologický dialóg [2], ktorým V. Černík obnovil polemickú diskusiu o vývine pojmov predčasne prerušenú koncom roka 1992.' Je to dialóg s fiktívnym partnerom P. Amorejom preto monologický v ktorom každý čitateľ oboznámený so spomenutou diskusiou spozná môjho názorového dvojníka, obhajujúceho zväčša myšlienky, ktoré som zastával v polemike.

SORIȚII

Author(s): Ionel Narița / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 1/2017

In this study, we are concerned about the simplest kind of sorites,containing four terms and three premises. Using the extension conservation principle, itfollows that there are 16384 valid sorites moods belonging to 8 figures. From thesemoods, 44 have only positive terms. One of the sorites figures contains no valid moodswith positive terms.

The Many Inadequate Justification of Methodological Naturalism

Author(s): Robert Larmer / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2019

Contrary to proponents’ claims, methodological naturalism is not metaphysically neutral. Consequently, its acceptance as a practice requires justification. Unfortunately for its advocates, attempts to justify it are failures. It cannot be defended as a definition, or a self-imposed limitation, of science, nor, more modestly, as an inductively justified commitment to natural causes. As a practice, it functions not to further scientific investigation, but rather to impose an explanatory straitjacket.

PSEUDOPARADOXUL

Author(s): Iancu Lucica / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 6/2016

My study aims to analyze some aspects of the term pseudoparadox. The study follows two of my recent papers, (3) and (4), in which I have analyzed inclusively several issues regarding the current definitions of the paradox. The objectives of the study: 1) the intension and extension of the term pseudoparadox, 2) the most important types of pseudoparadoxes, 3) the relation between pseudo-paradoxes and paradoxes. Finally, I propose to the reader, as an exercise, the examination of an argument regarding its categorization in the species of paradox and pseudoparadox discussed in my paper.

CONTRARIETATE ÎNTRE PREMISELE ŞI NEGAŢIA CONCLUZIEI ÎN INFERENŢELE CLASICE

Author(s): Gabriel Iliescu / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 6/2016

The present concern is to outlook what kind of opposition staysbetween the premises the negation of the conclusion on classical inferences. As from such a set of premises are deducible contradictory conclusions, someone concludes that the premises must be tensioned by the same kind of opposition. I proof, on a finite number of classical inferences, that it is not like this. Moreover, such an opposition between the premises is showed to be the contrary, that means a non-classical kind of opposition. The actual paper stays under a wider idea as separation between classical and non-classical logic.

PARADOXUL CA EROARE LOGICĂ

Author(s): Iancu Lucica / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 3/2016

My study is an approach of the paradoxes in thecontext of general theory of logical errors. I have set out to show: 1) if the paradoxescan be attributed to a particular error, or to a category of logical errrors, and 2) ifparadoxes can join paralogisms, sophisms and apporias into a unitary approach. At thesame time, I have attempted an analysis of Aristotle’s paradox concept in directcomparison with modern paradoxes. Remarcable for Aristotle’s paradox analysis is therole of the question. On account of paradoxical interogation, and because of it, I haveintroduced the distinction between the active and pasive contradiction. As I have triedto show, paradoxes, in the modern sense of the term, are passive contradictions,needing to be activated through questioning. In the final part, I have discussed the limitsof the paralogistic conception regarding paradoxes.

LOGICĂ ŞI ONTOLOGIE

Author(s): Czeslaw Lejewski / Language(s): Romanian,Moldavian Issue: 3/2016

LOGICZNIE POPRAWNY ARGUMENT TU QUOQUE

Author(s): Piotr Sękowski / Language(s): Polish Issue: 44/2018

The argument tu quoque is widely called a logical fallacy. The aim of this study is to show, that this theorem is ill-considered. The text is focused on the analysis of various examples of tu quoque. This analysis leads to the conclusion that there are logically correct tu quoque. There are given some examples of such tu quoque. Main theorem of the article is that tu quoque is correct if it’s used as some kind of mental shortcut refer- ring to other arguments.